The Death of Political Parties in Sudan?

Part 1 

New Year’s Day saw the 59^th anniversary of Sudan’s independence from the British.  With an unsurprising surge of nationalism Sudanese state-run television played back to back video clips of the footage of the Independence Day ceremony from 1956.   

Those black and white images of the Sudanese flag being raised at the presidential palace in the presence of the Governor General Alexander Knox-Helm, Al-Azhari (head of what would later become the Democratic Unionist Party) and the opposition leader Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mahjoub (Umma Party) is one that was free from the overshadowing presence of any one party. This is in deep contrast to the Sudan of today which seems unable to allow for celebrations amongst a similarly varied audience from among Sudan’s present-day political parties. 

One of the starkest differences is the relative secularity of Sudanese politics at a time when Muslim Brotherhood-style parties were confined to the Arkan Nighash (Speaker’s Corners) of Khartoum University compared to the present Islamised political landscape. Furthermore over time we seem to have lost the ability to distinguish between political parties. The number of parties has certainly grown exponentially; if the national dialogue 7+7 mechanism is anything to go by, there are at least 14 individually named parties in Sudan, each vying for a slice of the ever-shrinking political cake. However the influence of most of them, even combined, has waned drastically.   

These erstwhile strong opposition parties, once considered prodigal sons are now in their modern-day incarnations are perhaps misguided by those who would more accurately be described as cultists. These parties’ ranks formerly filled with a myriad of people who would gain status, a potential to rise in the ranks or simply as sense of belonging have through successive internal and national developments been degraded. Many Sudanese now seem to eschew political association, even privately. The largest of these opposition parties the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Umma Party (NUP), the Popular Congress Party (PCP) and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) have steadily concentrated decision-making power into the hands of the few with some taking up increasingly patrilineal structures of leadership.  This has led to in-fighting, fragmentation, apathy from support bases and funding issues. As the world becomes less centralised these parties have critically also failed to grasp the imagination and support of the Sudanese people in the 21^st century. 

Sectarian allegiances

Initially sectarian allegiances formed the lynchpin of support that some of the more traditional parties have enjoyed with the Umma Party drawing support from the Ansar or followers of the Mahdi (largely from Darfur, Kordofan or the Mahdi’s familial home of Dongola) and the DUP’s initial, and to some extent remaining, ties with the Khatmiyya sect, one of the largest sects in Sudan. However with the increasing correlation between NCP allegiance and economic opportunity, even sectarian ties within families have gradually been undermined. On a deeper level, the NCP carries with it not just a political ideology but also a religions perspective allegiance to the party has the potential to diminish even long-held familial sectarian beliefs. 

On the face of it the 2010 election results show very few votes cast in favour of these traditional sectarian parties; DUP (1.93%) and the Umma Party (0.96%).  However, t it is worth considering that potential large swathes of people would have heeded the call to boycott the elections all together accounting for the poor results.  This shows that the these political parties may well still yield considerable influence over their retained supporters; but quite how many of those remain and which demographics they represent is uncertain. It is also possible that general apathy resulting from decades of one party rule has played a large part in dissuading voters. 

The NCP and the Islamic Front which preceded it have largely replicated the initial idea of the Umma and the DUP, with Hassan al-Turabi as its supreme leader, insofar as a religious-based organisation could supersede traditional or ethnic ties and be more nationally relevant. While the NCP has learned from its counterparts the reverse is hardly true. Most of the larger parties have fragmented into opposing factions, while the NCP has largely been able to co-opt its break-away factions. Unable to question party leadership and betray any claim of democratic processes within the opposition parties, some instead have splintered into as many as four factions leaving supporters in the polity at a loss as to which to support.  

Loss of faith 

Even without the confusion of multi-faction parties, it is uncertain whether people can tell the major parties apart, particularly when long-standing, respected parties such as the DUP are seen to join forces with the government and undermine their secular ideology and alienate lifelong supporters. With the sons of both al-Sadig al-Mahdi (leader of the Umma party) and self-exiled Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani (leader of the DUP) joining the presidential entourage as assistants to Omer al-Bashir, hope of a reversion to distinctive politics under future leadership were quashed.  These appointments have come despite the arrest of party leaders, including most recently al-Mahdi himself and seemingly ad hoc moves by the government that ‘opposition’ parties see as degrading to the political process.  These include the recently added 14 amendments to, most problematically, an interim constitution which effectively increase the president’s powers.

2015’s Independence Day celebration was rather thin on multi-party representations. But not too long ago Independence Day celebrations at the palace saw Al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani decorated with the first class order of the republic. This is something that could hardly be entertained during the period of initial resistance to the coup d’état of 1989.  The tacit approval of 2005’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 has cast the NCP as Sudan’s only legitimate political party and has disempowered the ‘opposition’ parties, casting them at best as supporting acts rather than genuine political counterparts. 

After the coup d’état of 1989, when the opposition parties united under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance, political parties were able – at least in spirit – to provide credible resistance as per the NDA ethos. It was the first time this resistance was tested.  Due to recent tensions, exacerbated particularly by the continuing issues surrounding the beleaguered national dialogue process, a new national alliance of opposition groups was formed.  This time however with the backdrop of previous dealings with the government and the incredible loss of credibility of opposition parties, the National Consensus Forces alliance inspires less hope.  

Elections in April then seem to be a foregone conclusion. Even under free and fair elections it is possible that the NCP would be voted into power again.  Against the background of perceived weakness of opposition parties, the NCP has been able to capitalise on what many see as the hypocrisy of the ICC (and by extension the international community) against Omer al-Bashir and therefore, goes the narrative, against Sudan.  It has also been able to corner the market on jobs and opportunities increasing rather than increasing its support – regardless of how nominal it may be. 

This chronic waning of faith in the formal opposition and the boycott of the 2010 elections by the majority of the largest political parties precipitated a stark reaction from particularly Sudanese activists.  The group Girifna (Arabic for ‘We are fed up’ or more accurately ‘We are disgusted’) paved the way for public dissent leading to an increase in articles, online blogs and politically-motivated social networking and ultimately exposing the erosion of the political structure.   With armed groups still fighting in the peripheries, these developments will have also increased support for these movements and have weakened the narrative that armed rebellion works counter to the national interest.  This has no doubt played a part in the coming together of both opposition and armed groups under the National Consensus Forces.

Spotlight on Darfur

The plight of Darfur seems to have gone from the spotlight being much overshadowed by events in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile as well as across the border in South Sudan. The longest lasting peace deal to date, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), got a boost this February when the Sudanese government and other signatories came together to pledge continued support for the deal. So far it the support of bigger rebel groups but may outlive its relevance in its current state. Recent changed including further splits in the anti-government armed groups; the rise of Arab-Arab violence particularly in Northern Darfur; the increase in Gold mining in North Darfur and the rebel groups that have been employed to control the mining boom there were not planned for. Even more progressive developments such as the signing on of JEM-Sudan last year to the DDPD may, if they are not adequately accommodated, give rise to leadership issues and complicate behind the scenes agreements between previous signatories.

This week President al-Bashir has announced that the 18 Darfur armed group who have signed peace deals with the GoS have formed a council headed by Mustafa Tairab, Head of the Darfur Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) (reported on the 2^nd of November).  However precious little was said about how this council and the government were intending to incorporate remaining armed groups into the fold nor about how they would disincentivise others in Darfur’s five states from arming in this still volatile region. The humanitarian situation remains dire with vast numbers of IDP still joining the big camps near large areas, fearing the paucity of protection in rural areas. Furthermore, the much touted process of national dialogue, which Darfur’s governors have been keen to show support for, has been slow to pick up pace and credibility.  It has also been somewhat – and perhaps unintentionally - undermined by Umma party and opposition manoeuvrings in London and Paris over the past few months.

The Qatar-sponsored donor conference in April 2013 where pledges of $1 billion were made has yet to lead to concrete and tangible peace initiatives, with reports of violence by local armed groups as well as government or government-aligned groups. Despite the recent pledge of $11million by the EU for humanitarian needs in South Darfur (Sudan Tribune 5^th November 2014), intermittent and disjointed support from the international community has not helped in overcoming grave humanitarian issues. With confidence in the DRA and UNAMID dangerously low, it is little wonder that small yet significant skirmishes are taking place in North, East and South Darfur particularly.  Yet the urgency of post-session Sudan that saw Darfuri al-Hajj Adam Youssef appointed, rather symbolically, as vice-president has gone. 

Looking ahead

South Sudan’s recent history may be an omen of what could ensue in Darfur if it has, as many think, a mind to secede.  It is important to remember that the SPLM did not rally behind the call to secession until it was made clear by the ‘Salvation’ regime that a new lone national identity – that did not fit the majority of southerners – would be the standard for national inclusion. However there is very little that the Darfur groups agree on: this is not yet the SPLM with its rather single-minded struggle against the North - that may or may not come later.  The language of the government’s war machine has indeed changed somewhat from a religious ‘jihad’ against non-Muslims to a nationalistic discourse, redefining what it means to be Arab and Muslim in a country with a myriad of ethnicities.  It is important to note that Sudan is scarcely considered Arab by a large majority of its Middle Eastern neighbours. That said, the fact that the overwhelming majority of Darfuris are Muslim has not precluded their perceived alienation from the new national identity of the second republic – reproduced through media outlets and made evident through the correlation between periphery non-Arab identifying groups and armed resistance. It remains to be seen whether in the run-up to the 2015 national elections the spirit of national dialogue will yield significant developments for the Darfur states.

South Sudan's seemingly interminable tensions

The story so far...

Since the start of the bloody conflict in December 2013 there have been concerns about whether the peace process, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arusha peace talks, mediated by Tanzania’s President Tekwete, could bring about a resolution to the bloody conflict in South Sudan. Clearly the ongoing tensions in the world’s youngest nation have its neighbours concerned. The talks in Addis Ababa which commenced after January’s cessation of hostilities agreement between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his former Vice-President Riek Machar have reached an impasse with Kiir on the verge of recalling his delegation from Ethiopia amid his accusations of Machar’s reversion to military means. Despite signing an agreement to ‘resolve the conflict’ (May 9^th 2014) both sides remain heavily armed (according to the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms, SSANSA) and each with their pockets of strong support in the key areas outside the capital, Juba.  This latest deadlock comes after Kiir accused the rebel leader of returning to violent conflict last week in Bentui – which has changed hands between the government and rebel fighters often - thereby undermining the peace talks.  However, Machar’s allies are quick to point out that Machar’s presence at the delegation is proof enough of his commitment to peace. The Arusha talks in late October have, at least, signalled that both sides were able to take responsibility for the intense violence thus far but whether that can be capitalised on to effect concrete power-sharing agreements is doubtful – owing largely to suspicion between the two parties as well as the role of other, more maligned political actors within the South Sudan political landscape.

The last week’s skirmishes in oil-rich Bentui, in the border state Unity, have been allegedly planned and launched from Heglig within neighbouring Sudan’s borders, although their involvement in this recent battle remains unclear.  Sudan has previously supported peace talks in the erstwhile southern Sudan, no doubt mindful of the potential exacerbation of its own internal conflicts, its overstretched military resources and the effect of swathes of refugees from the south on its population, economy and food security. However its continuing role in South Sudanese politics has thus far only added to the mistrust and suspicion among key South Sudanese leaders, unable to extricate themselves from the long history with the Sudanese government as well as escaping their own political short-comings.  Kiir is considered indecisive and prone to surround himself with yes-men while Machar is still perhaps best known and little forgiven for his role in the 1991 Bor massacre – while both sides continue to curry favour with Sudan’s NCP, against whom they fought for 22 years.

Looking ahead

Given the endurance of bad blood between the two sides, the shifting allegiances and intermittent fighting, it is not unreasonable to wonder if the overall decrease of the levels of violence seen last December is due to strategic or logistical issues brought about by the rainy season. Concerns now arise about possible escalation with the start of the dry season in November and the attacks in Bentui may signal the start of further cycles of violence in poverty-stricken South Sudan. This is supported by the ramping up of recruits particularly children, strengthening the call by civil society and rights groups for an investigation into this and other crimes during the 10-month conflict.

Fighting in Sudan continues

12/06/12

Sudan blog:

            Preceding the recognition of South Sudan as being an independent country, president Omar al-Bashir of Sudan announced in the name of Sudan that “We will bless our brothers in the south over their country and we wish them success”. However, a warning was sent from the Sudanese people that foreshadowed the independence. The message was that neither one of the countries should interfere with one nor the others’ affairs and that both countries should stick to their borders, and especially, to keep them secure. Knowing the geopolitical bearings between the two nations and their enduring conflicts, the future between these two countries remains uncertain.

            In the province of South Kordofan in southern Sudan lies a burgeoning conflict between the SPLM (Sudan’s People Liberation Movement) and the federal state of Koradafan leaded by Ahmad Haroun who has already been indicted for crimes against humanity at the ICC for attacks that took place in Darfur. The reasons of the fighting in South Kordafan are several. According to Haroun, the conflict is religious. Arab-Muslim civilians from the Nuba region in South Kordofan have been given weapons to supposedly defend themselves against the growing threat coming from the South. Like Haroun, many of his followers perceive this war as religious, and fight in the name of God to protect their people. However, this is not the case and the growing conflict is a complex mix of greed, retaliation and fear of the bloodshed province. It is not an ethnic combat between black African Nubas against Arabs.

            The Nuba Mountains lie in the most southern tip of Sudan at the border between Sudan and South Sudan. This region is renowned for its abundant reserves of oil. The difficulty of the partition between Sudan and South Sudan lies within the division of the oil fields (98% of Sudan’s Government budget is paid from the direct revenue of its oil fields). Today, 75% of the whole Sudanese region’s oil belongs to South Sudan, and this is the primary factor in the fighting between the two nations. Sudan wants more oil. As the conflict keeps on growing, the rebels will find more reasons to continue fighting, such as the ethnic differences of the Nuba people.

            The South Kordafan province has always been neglected and underdeveloped by the Sudanese Government. This is one of the reasons why the area is so prone to war. The Nuba people are significantly affected by this conflict, Nuba homes are continually shelled and destroyed by both Sudanese and South Sudanese forces. Development projects have also been affected, and forced migrations are common. 28 000 people were forced to flee the town of Talodi due to constant airstrikes from North Sudan against the SPLM’s rebel forces in the region. Meanwhile the people are suffering and hunger starts to set in the region.

            Since partition, Sudan has been hostile to South Sudan, and both countries have allied with the other’s rebels. A recent report by the NGO, Small Arms Survey, suggested that the Sudanese Government still shares close bonds with the rebels from the South, and Sudan has been accused of using rebel armies from South Sudan and the province of Darfur such as the SPLM, SSLA and the JEM. These groups have been seen in Khartoum on a regular basis. Both countries have been exchanging arms, provoking skirmishes by rebels in the other’s territory. The corruption between these two countries does not favor a peaceful relationship for their future. The population of the two countries is suffering and the countries are tearing themselves to shreds. It is hard to imagine that they will ever stop fighting.