Fears over ethnic tensions in South Sudan

In the year that saw the 20^th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide there are rising fears that similar power struggles drawn on ethnic lines may precipitate another genocide in Africa. There are certainly parallels between South Sudan and Rwanda not least the lingering colonial legacy. There is also the exploitation of ethnic identity in times of political strife as well as a lack of robust structures to deal with internal political conflict.

The current rift between Dinka and Nuer and associated power-brokers and groups came to the fore with the dismissal of Riek Machar as Vice President by President Salva Kiir in December of last year. This put an end to the rather fragile, uneasy alliance fraught with mistrust that existed between the two men and their factions since before independence.

Ethnically South Sudan boasts tens of languages and almost as many tribes, but recent spates of violence are forcing different groups within the country to align with one of only two sides – with no guarantee of protection from either. Whilst it is evidently Machar’s wish to gain more power and Kiir’s reluctance to concede it that has caused the rift, the danger is that the many armed, militarised groups let loose in populated areas have been encouraged to view their struggle as an ethnic one.

For his part Machar, a member of the Nuer group, has long emphasised the ethnic dominance of the Dinkas in government and previously in the SPLM/A as a sign of an attempt to gain ethnic hegemony by the group. The Dinkas constitute the largest ethnic group of the South Sudanese population.

Ethnically-based killing particularly aimed at the Dinka group has happened before. The 1991 massacre in which armed Nuer fighters, under Machar, killed around 2,000 Dinka in the town of Bor, was a shameful episode in the South-South violence that characterised much of the fighting during the civil war (1983-2005). Today, tensions are more fraught and, in the absence of a common enemy, the stakes are much higher. As an independent country South Sudan and its resources present a huge coup for any group, but instead of being content with power-sharing both sides seem now to be seeking full authority.

South Sudan suffers from inflation rates at 50%, abject poverty and intense rivalry within an increasing number of political factions.  As the world’s youngest country it may be forgiven (right now) for many of its political short-comings but its inability or unwillingness to demilitarise its politics will only catalyse ethnic warfare. With no strong institutions to govern, many power-brokers and generals still essentially command their own forces, their loyalties to the government fluctuating with their cut of oil revenues. This is largely a failing of President Kiir’s government. Faith in his leadership has been steadily dwindling. The fear now is that some in opposition, particularly rebels, may not see the IGAD-mediated peace talks in Addis Ababa and the 2015 elections as viable ways to address these failures.  These fears triggered the release of a letter to the IGAD mediation team from 39 Dinka tribal chiefs in which they cited the danger of attributing government failures to the Dinka group as a whole and worries as to where this blame culture will lead. It also discussed concerns over the lack of democratic leadership in South Sudan and the dangerous precedence set by armed rebellion in the fledgling country. IGAD would do well to consider these.

The slow pace at which efforts in Ethiopia seem to be responding to events in South Sudan is also of concern given that patience is not Riek Machar’s strong suit.  Having been at odds with Kiir’s predecessor Dr John Garang, Machar has never liked playing second fiddle; particularly it seems to a Dinka. And although he apologised publically for the Bor Massacre before taking office as Vice President, there remains a strong sense of déjà vu. Machar, then as now, has courted the favour of the government in Khartoum who not without a sense of schadenfreude would perhaps enjoy giving support to the SPLM’s own rebellion.  In the long-term, however, the Sudanese will need to be aware of the effects that destabilising South Sudan will have on border communities, refugee flows and the proliferation of small arms northwards into volatile regions beyond the border.  

But history need not repeat itself: South Sudan is not Rwanda nor does it need to relive its own dark past. In some ways there is greater difficulty today in that both sides are killing each other, leaving the potential for human loss immense.  In the long run this would change the demographics of the country and may well produce a power vacuum as, like many of its neighbours, South Sudan has not cultivated a robust younger breed of politicians.  Instead power, and to a great extent wealth, has been withheld by the old revolutionary commanders giving rise to consistent two-horse races. Power-sharing must therefore be made attractive to both sides right now and guarantees of representation must be given for all groups in the long-run; after all South Sudan is yet to have its first election.  The 2010 ‘trial’ elections, seen largely as a precursor to secession, have not managed to build trust and confidence in ‘government’ thus far; neither has it given Machar and Kiir the safety to lay down their weapons, with their behaviour largely unchanged since their military days.  Practically, as well as curbing the proliferation of arms throughout the country, opportunities and resources have not been made available to all; something that a country with the largest proportion of its population under 17 years of age cannot afford.

However, silver linings do exist.  While the slow pace of the IGAD process can be exasperating, given the right incentives, it can provide the warring sides with a chance to work through more of their deeply-rooted disputes, having been denied the chance to do so during the CPA negotiations a decade ago.  Faith in the African leadership of peace talks and mediation efforts has not yet waned and if powerful actors are not yet accountable to their own citizens then at least they will have to take note of their neighbours. This is a continent quite aware of its recent violent history and its status in the world. Africa is endeavouring to take ownership of its issues – this regional effort must therefore not be undermined. 

South Sudan's seemingly interminable tensions

The story so far...

Since the start of the bloody conflict in December 2013 there have been concerns about whether the peace process, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arusha peace talks, mediated by Tanzania’s President Tekwete, could bring about a resolution to the bloody conflict in South Sudan. Clearly the ongoing tensions in the world’s youngest nation have its neighbours concerned. The talks in Addis Ababa which commenced after January’s cessation of hostilities agreement between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his former Vice-President Riek Machar have reached an impasse with Kiir on the verge of recalling his delegation from Ethiopia amid his accusations of Machar’s reversion to military means. Despite signing an agreement to ‘resolve the conflict’ (May 9^th 2014) both sides remain heavily armed (according to the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms, SSANSA) and each with their pockets of strong support in the key areas outside the capital, Juba.  This latest deadlock comes after Kiir accused the rebel leader of returning to violent conflict last week in Bentui – which has changed hands between the government and rebel fighters often - thereby undermining the peace talks.  However, Machar’s allies are quick to point out that Machar’s presence at the delegation is proof enough of his commitment to peace. The Arusha talks in late October have, at least, signalled that both sides were able to take responsibility for the intense violence thus far but whether that can be capitalised on to effect concrete power-sharing agreements is doubtful – owing largely to suspicion between the two parties as well as the role of other, more maligned political actors within the South Sudan political landscape.

The last week’s skirmishes in oil-rich Bentui, in the border state Unity, have been allegedly planned and launched from Heglig within neighbouring Sudan’s borders, although their involvement in this recent battle remains unclear.  Sudan has previously supported peace talks in the erstwhile southern Sudan, no doubt mindful of the potential exacerbation of its own internal conflicts, its overstretched military resources and the effect of swathes of refugees from the south on its population, economy and food security. However its continuing role in South Sudanese politics has thus far only added to the mistrust and suspicion among key South Sudanese leaders, unable to extricate themselves from the long history with the Sudanese government as well as escaping their own political short-comings.  Kiir is considered indecisive and prone to surround himself with yes-men while Machar is still perhaps best known and little forgiven for his role in the 1991 Bor massacre – while both sides continue to curry favour with Sudan’s NCP, against whom they fought for 22 years.

Looking ahead

Given the endurance of bad blood between the two sides, the shifting allegiances and intermittent fighting, it is not unreasonable to wonder if the overall decrease of the levels of violence seen last December is due to strategic or logistical issues brought about by the rainy season. Concerns now arise about possible escalation with the start of the dry season in November and the attacks in Bentui may signal the start of further cycles of violence in poverty-stricken South Sudan. This is supported by the ramping up of recruits particularly children, strengthening the call by civil society and rights groups for an investigation into this and other crimes during the 10-month conflict.

Independence !

On Saturday 9^th July, South Sudan finally gained independence from the North; which comes after decades of civil war during which over 1.5 million died.

People celebrated in the streets and spirits are high but this is not the end of the struggle for South Sudan.

Al-Bashir said his government had divided Sudan for the sake of peace, and that they have no intention of going back to war unless compelled to do so... but they may well be compelled to do so.

Border disputes continue, with both sides laying claim to the region of Abyei. Whilst peacekeeping forces will be moving in, this does not guarantee that the contestation will not lead to war.

South Sudan faces other difficulties. They are rich in oil but one of the poorest states in the world, with one in seven children dying before the age of 5. With the problems such as poverty, a lack of infrastructure and corruption, as well as the threat from the north, the new South Sudanese government will have plenty to worry about.

Problems concerning citizenship are also arising. South Sudan has agreed to allow all northern Sudanese living there to apply for citizenship but the same offer has not been extended to southern Sudanese living in the north. They will become foreigners and may have to return to South Sudan, even if they have never lived there which will divide families and friends.

But the government are making progress. They have called for the international community to support them and help them to build their country. They are looking for investment, in particular to strengthen their infrastructure which many hope will bring with it security. Glencore are helping under a new deal to develop the countries national oil company and market its oil.

And the people are behind the government. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a referendum was held on independence, which was favoured by more than 99% of voters. So whilst the new government will face struggles, it is the hope of the world that they can be successful in their endeavours and settle their disputes with Sudan peacefully, with the backing of their people who have fought for independence for so long.

How It Came To Be

The conflict in Sudan is a particularly complex one, involving a plethora of incidents and high profile figures which have had varying levels of influence across different parts of the country. The below report aims to give a brief overview of some of the factors that have lcontributed to the situation leading up to the referendum for secession of Southern Sudan.

ONCE UPON A TIME...

After gaining independence from Egypt and the UK in 1956, Sudan suffered 17 years of civil war during 1955 - 1972 followed by ethnic, religious and economic conflicts which led to the second civil war from 1983 - 2005. The origins of war lay in colonially initiated policies of separate administrative rule and unequal development which allowed the predominantly Muslim North to become a lower middle income market economy whilst the rest of the country remained underdeveloped. In 1955, in anticipation of independence and fear of Northern domination, Southern army officers mutinied. Military regimes continued into 1969 when General Nimeiri led a successful coup. The South was eventually granted autonomous status under the Addis Ababa Agreement.

In 1983, President Nimeiri attempted to create a federated Sudan including states in Southern Sudan, thereby violating the Addis Ababa Agreement. Inspired by Hasan Turabi's vision of an Islamist Sudan, Nimeiri imposed Islamic law, which was bitterly resented by predominantly non-Muslim Southerners. The conflict between central government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was reignited. After widespread popular unrest, Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985.

Omar al-Bashir was brought to power after a coup in 1989. Under Bashir's leadership, political parties were banned and Islamic legal code was introduced on a national level. Bashir transformed Sudan into an Islamic totalitarian single-party state and created the National Congress Party (NCP) with a new parliament and government drawn solely from members of the NCP. NCP divided the unified Southern Sudanese government into provincial governments, undermining the power of the tribal clients of the old parties.

In July 2005, after 30 months of negotiations, the NCP-led government and the SLPM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA provided a political framework for a permanent ceasefire between the government's forces and the SPLM. It promised a new Government of National Unity in Khartoum including both the SPLM and the NCP, a semi-autonomous government for the South with a Southern constitution based on non-Islamic customary laws and values, exemption of non-Muslims from the Islamic penal code, and 50% of oil revenues to go to the South. It was hoped that these measures would make unity attractive to Southern Sudanese whilst reserving their right to vote for self-determination in a referendum in January 2011.

The CPA excluded the oil-rich province of Abyei - largely inhabited by Arabic nomads and African settlers; located on the border between the North and South - which was to have its own referendum to decide whether to join the North or the South. The CPA also ignored imbalances elsewhere in the country, including Eastern Sudan and the Darfur region of Western Sudan.

MEANWHILE...

Even before it was signed, the CPA was overshadowed by the crisis in Darfur - longstanding tensions between African agrarian tribe settlers and Arab nomads that turned into a full-scale uprising in 2003. The dispute began when rebel groups including the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) comprising predominantly African agrarian tribe settlers, and the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM) comprising predominantly Arab nomads, took up arms against the government - claiming the region was being neglected. In 2006, the Minni Minawi faction of the SLM signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Central Government. Most other rebel groups refused to sign, vowing to fight on until the government agreed to share power and wealth in the region. In 2008, Djibril Bassolé was appointed as the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur.

In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Bashir on charges of genocide. This followed the ICC's previous issue of an arrest warrant for Bashir on war crimes and crimes against humanity, on the basis that Bashir masterminded a plan to destroy 3 tribal groups in Darfur - the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa - because of their ethnicity.
The charges against Bashir have been strongly rejected by a number of prominent players in the Middle East. The Arab League condemned the warrant for undermining the unity and stability of Sudan, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference denounced the warrant as unwarranted and totally unacceptable.

MORE RECENTLY...

In January 2011, the promised Referendum of the 2005 CPA went ahead. Official results were announced on 7 February 2011; almost 99% of registered Southern Sudanese voted for secession. Secession is due to be implemented at the end of the CPA on 9 July 2011. President Bashir signed a decree confirming his government's acceptance of the results as the legitimate expression of the will of the people of South Sudan. A senior official from the NCP also reported that Bashir will not seek re-election.

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Haile Menkerios, described the Referendum as "probably the single most important foundation for the future of peace and stability of Sudan and of the entire region". Nonetheless, unresolved CPA issues remain including the Abyei Referendum, border demarcation, border management, citizenship arrangements, and wealth sharing - particularly regarding oil reserves and revenues. 82% of the total oil is located in the South, but Khartoum in the North owns the pipelines that carry it to ports.

Since the Referendum, hundreds have been left dead as a result of a surge in bloody clashes in South Sudan between the army and rebel forces loyal to General Athor -previously a senior member of the SPLM during the war against the north, but turned renegade since losing the election for Governor of Jonglei in April 2010. Following attacks by Athor's forces on the town of Malakal, the SPLM announced they would suspend all talks and contacts with the NCP, accusing the North of arming rebels in the South in an attempt to destabilise the emerging independent state of South Sudan. SPLM also unveiled confidential documents detailing NCP's alleged plot to overthrow the Southern government by arming, training and financing militias. Bashir's advisers denied SPLM's allegations, and claimed the SPLM was seeking a scapegoat for a Southern problem.

Thao Mbeki, former South African President and Chairman of the African Union High-Level Panel on Sudan, appealed to Southern President Salva Kiir to resume negotiations. An emergency meeting was chaired by Mbeki, at which both Kiir and Bashir agreed to examine the documents offered as proof that NCP was backing rebel militias. The UK provided funding to the AU High Level Implementation Panel in support of President Mbeki's efforts to facilitate agreement on post-referendum issues.

UNTOLD TALES...

Of course there are many more factors which have significantly contributed to the situation in Sudan, that have not been outlined here. This report does not claim to cover all of them but intends to offer a condensed version of the main events in some of the more high profile areas. Further comments and contributions are most welcome.

Fears Grow over Referendum

Tensions are rising in Southern Sudan over the further delay of registration for the referendum on secession which is supposed to be held on January 9th. The registration which was supposed to take place in late October has now been delayed three weeks until the 15th of November. Observers are starting to worry about the possiblilty of conflict restarting if southerners feel that Khartoum is attempting to delay or disrupt the vote in Southern Sudan, which is oil rich but one of the least developed regions in the world.

The referendum was promised as part of the peace deal which was signed in 2005 but it now looks like the North are trying to sabotage the referendum by delaying it and therefore stirring up passions in the South. It is feared that the delay in registration is part of a ploy by President Omar Bashir's government to delay the vote indefinitely. He hopes that by doing so it will lead to protests that could make any result in the referendum void and not recognised internationally or cause the referendum to be forgotten.

Despite insistence that Khartoum will accept the outcome of the referendum many international observers are doubtful.

The SPLM

Came across this site. It is the official website of the SPLM. Interesting:

CLICK HERE FOR THE SPLM SITE

For the child soldiers, life after death

Darfur has been described as 'apocalyptic' by Matthew Conway, a member of the UN refugee agency who has visited the country. Estimates put the death toll at over 200 000, with over 2.5 million displaced. Neither New York nor the United Nations Security Council is attempting to deal with the political issues according to Jan Pronk, from the former UN envoy to Sudan.

The child soldiers who survived the second Sudanese civil war that left over 2 million people dead are being helped by Unicef in southern Sudan (The Independent).

UN sent home soldiers after claims of sexual abuse

Chris Doyle of Caabu sent this item round:

"The United Nations said yesterday that it has suspended fourpeacekeeping soldiers following allegations of child sexual abuse in southern Sudan."

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