Part Two
Changing politics
Although much of the political
landscape has changed in the past 25 years, many of the faces have not. Many of
these political figures who are currently in their 70s and 80s, have remained
at the helm of Sudanese politics from the various civil wars, successive peace
agreements to the oil boom. These political figures seem unable to relinquish
the power they command.
For the President, the threat of
an ICC indictment hangs perilously over his head whereas for the opposition
leaders it would seem like one last chance at glory; too good to pass on. This has more than anything had a disastrous
effect on their parties. They are not beyond knowing the value of new blood.
Not long ago al-Sadig al-Mahdi said that he would step down as head of the Umma
Party; he remains its head even in exile in Egypt.
In 2013 President Bashir promised
not to run for the 2015 elections, but then reversed his decision a year later.
The decision was heralded by former political foe Hassan al-Turabi leader of
the Popular Congress Party – further blurring the lines between parties.
Threats of incarceration and egos
aside, the failure of these parties, whether in power or opposition, to
cultivate a younger more invigorated generation with fresh ideas has left the
old guard without anyone to take the reins. In addition, the uncertain security
environment has not allowed any room for anyone outside the traditional parties
to emerge as an alternative leaving Sudan’s political future
dangerously uncertain.
The current fate of Sudan’s
neighbours inspires little hope. Despite steps taken by the opposition and the
armed forces in Paris and Addis, no one wants to see a Syria-scenario in Sudan.
In September 2014 the National Consensus Forces – an alliance between the
political and armed opposition groups – announced a ‘Sudan Call’ for the
government to withdraw from power, and under a transitional authority to ensure
policies that would increase freedom put in place. While the unity of armed
groups under the Consensus Forces is a positive step away from the compartmentalisation
of Sudan’s issues, it is not unlike the demand of opposition groups in Syria –
so much so that al-Mahdi one of the chief architects and signatory of the
‘Sudan Call’ has warned against a Syria scenario arising from continued
conflict.
But Sudan’s
parties are older and well established and the proliferation of arms has yet to
engulfed larger cities so Sudan
will not become Syria
anytime soon. In a more amiable environment Sudanese political parties have in
a dynastic fashion sowed the seeds of their own demise which will through the
absence of even their nominal representation pave the way for autocracy and a
true manifestation of one-party politics.
This is a closer reality.
While there are those who would
contest the use of the phrase one-party-rule in relation to Sudan today, one must consider not
merely the number of political parties but their efficacy on the political
stage.
The government needs opposition
groups to present a picture of plurality and the opposition groups need the government
as a rallying point to cling onto remaining constituencies. But behind the
smokescreen the government has been able to co-opt its key threats into the
government, sons of political rivals, erstwhile opposition groups or even armed
groups – while the opposition has been publically losing ground. It is easier
for the government to buy its enemies by keeping control of economy,
opportunities and the military.
Beyond the political arena
The NCP’s rule has gradually
dissolved the ability of political affiliation to be non-determinant on
opportunity and everyday life made it increasingly difficult to remain neutral.
Therefore membership or at least an affiliation to the NCP also becomes a means
of survival.
The curtailment of the freedoms
of assembly and association and successive clamp-downs on press freedoms mean
that activists and other civil society actors are also unable to attract
support as they once could in the university halls, trade unions or the
press. The Islamist organisation which
birthed the current ruling party is aware of the influence of organised groups,
has attempted to restrict the power of these groups. Now in power that strategy
is a policy.
The coming together of activists
and protestors in the September 2013 demonstrations while significant garnered
no political mass. There was no Tahrir
Square-style coming together of different groups and the old guard was
conspicuous in their absence. At a 2013 Chatham
house talk al-Mahdi gave the impression that major parties were not interested
in joining a national protest seeking instead to try other avenues. By staying back and not joining forces with
activists and protestors these increasing diminishing parties are able to
ensure that they will be the only avenue for opposition.
For more than twenty years, no
event has had as much effect on Sudanese activists as the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. Although opposition parties and individuals alike were very much
sidelined by the CPA, it did manage to open up unprecedented spaces for
freedoms, enshrining in constitution
rights that had been long-denied.
However along with its other failures it did not lend any permanence to
the space that had been carved out and after the session of the South in 2011
when the CPA no longer held any value for Khartoum, the roles of the NCP and
the opposition were fossilised as we see them now: the NCP in centre stage and
other parties whether in government or not, consistently 20 feet from power.
Moving forward
The National dialogue process
which lasted a year resulted in further polarisation of the government and
opposition parties. This constant
yo-yoing will give neither group credibility to go forward. However it has
shown – much to the opposition’s dismay that the government still very much calls
the shots in what is increasingly a zero-sum game.
The main problem for the
opposition is that while the NCP has evolved from a party of university
Islamists on the fringes of society to have pervasive influence over politics,
military and society, the ‘opposition’ parties have remained relatively the
same, fossilised in leadership and paralysed by in-fighting and quickly losing
the momentum to keep going. While party leaders should not bare the entire
brunt of this trend, it is they and only they – whether residing in London, Cairo
or elsewhere – who can put in place the mechanisms to keep the party wheels
rolling in their absence; or to reinvigorate the party faithful in times of
great stress instead of courting external support.
In any case those hoping for external
interference in Sudanese affairs would be very disappointed; the international
community has shown very little appetite for intervention, let alone a military
one. Opposition would certainly be more credible and effective if they were
seen to be able to keep those within their ranks faithful to the party. These
parties still have a significant role to play in Sudanese politics but they
will need to look internally first.