National Dialogue Process

Last January, President Bashir launched a national dialogue initiative in which he urged opposition parties and rebels to join the dialogue to discuss pressing issues including ending the wars in the peripheries, allowing political freedoms for individuals and parties, fighting against poverty and revitalizing national identity. The 7+7 committee includes members of the government and parties loyal to the government (7) and opposition parties (7). The National Dialogue Committee coordinates the activities of political forces that are participating in the dialogue process and is intended to be partially independent of the government.

Time line of key events in the national dialogue process - 2014

January - Bashir invites opposition parties to join national dialogue as promised. It has been boycotted by many of the main opposition parties. The Sudanese Communist Party, largely a party for older, intellectual and political elite (but still playing a relevant role) – as well as others said that first a conducive environment should be created and wars put to an end, before they would join the process.

April – A round table event with 83 political parties and the ruling NCP took place.  It was boycotted by National Consensus Forces (consisting of the Umma Party, the Communist Party and the Popular Congress Party) because conditions of ceasefires, justice and freedom were not met.

May - Arrest of Al Sadiq Al-Mahdi, head of the Umma Party, for claiming that Rapid Support forces (RSF) are engaging in criminal activity such as rape, pillaging and other abuses in Darfur and Kordofan.  The RSF are made up of militia loyal to the government that have been subsumed into the regular army but are officially part of the National Intelligence and Security Services. This was seen as the first tangible stumbling block to the national dialogue process.  Al Sadiq’s subsequent arrest could also be seen as silencing the most well known opposition leader and the one who, due to traditional sectarian allegiances, is most able to incite people to action.

August – Paris Declaration: Members of the opposition National Umma Party (NUP) and the rebel alliance Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) met in Paris to discuss concerns about the national dialogue. Both the NUP (individually) and the SRF, are not participating in the process because of their doubts about the government’s intention to initiate what they see as meaningful reform. On 8 August, they signed the statement known as the “Paris Declaration”, calling for genuine political reform and an end to the various conflicts. They also aim to unify opposition parties in Sudan. The declaration also asserts that the conditions for national dialogue currently do not exist in Sudan, primarily a reference to the continued detention of political prisoners.

September - Paris declaration signatories comprised of the SRF and the National Umma Party (NUP) and the national dialogue subcommittee for external liaison drafted and signed a framework plan for the national dialogue and constitutional process in Addis Ababa under the aegis of the African Union Hi-Level Implementation Panel (AU-HIP) chaired by Thabo Mbeki.

November - The ‘Sudan call’ was signed in Addis Ababa calling for the end of war, dismantlement of the one-party state, achievement of a comprehensive peace and democratic transition in the country.

The agreement was signed by the head of the National Consensus Forces (NCF), Farouk Abu Issa (former Foreign Minister under Nimeiri); deputy chairman of the SRF Minni Minnawi; leader of the National Umma Party (NUP) Al-Sadiq Al Mahdi and head of the Alliance of the Sudanese Civil Society Organisations, Amin Mekki Madani. Farouk Abu Essa and Amin Mekki Medani were promptly arrested when they arrived on Sudanese soil. They remain in detention.

December – Almahdi’s son, who is now a presidential advisor, meets with Bashir to discuss bringing groups back in to the process. But after a year of threats, clampdowns and mistrust it is likely that the process has been derailed.

National dialogue committee condemns arrest of key people in the dialogue process saying it is not conducive of an environment of trust.

Overall, the National Dialogue process is largely seen as either inefficient, or as a smoke screen designed to draw attention away from the looming election, which Bashir is set to win.  Others have called it theatre, acting out the script of national unity and dialogue despite a bad economy, fewer opportunities and continuing conflict. The overarching mistrust between the government and those with whom it aims to talk is hindering the legitimacy of the process at every turn.