8,000 SUDANESE MOTHERS APPEAL FOR PEACE AND DIALOGUE

This message comes from Mothers for Peace

E-mail: mothersforpeacelondon@hotmail.com

 

Sudanese Mothers for Peace  are extremely concerned about the present situation of instability, human rights and armed conflict in Sudan, particularly in Darfur, Blue Nile and Kordofan; as well as the mounting tension between south Sudan and Sudan. 

Because of this we were preparing for an International Conference to raise the voices of mothers to say “No” to war.

 In this conference we were intending to call all the Sudanese, the government, the opposition parties, the armed movements, to come together to try to solve the problem of Sudan by dialogue and negotiation without the interference of any outside power so as to establish lasting peace, Justice and HR in Sudan and the region Recognition of the mistakes in the past and the apology and forgiveness should be the start.

 The International Community, the African Union, the Arab League, the Arab Countries Concerned, the European Union and all the Embassies in Sudan plus the International NGOs, and the International Personals concerned in Peace for Sudan will be invited.

In the present situation we have research mothers in the camps, in Darfur, and Kordofan, Blue Nile and East Sudan targeting the simple mother who is the victim of the war and have collected up till now 8,000 signatures from mothers calling for peace and raising their voices against wars.

We are still preparing for this conference and giving the chance for more mothers to have their say.

According to the present situation of war braking out so severely at this moment, in South and North Kordofan and others places we postponed our conference to be next August 2013.

Now: on behalf of 8,000 mothers

We appeal to all parties to stop this nasty killing of each other right now and to sit down for peaceful political negotiation to secure peace justices HR and democracy to every citizen in Sudan.

Recalling the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and for the representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions in conflict resolution and peace processes, Sudanese mother for peace will remain Supportive to this process.

Mama Khadiga

The Nuba People

The NCF has been talking with representatives of the Nuba people (the Nuba Solidarity Group) who come from The Nuba Mountains of central Sudan as well as from North Sudan and Southern Egypt. All three population groups speak the same Nuba language and share a heritage.

They tell us, "We don't have a problem with the North (i.e. the Sudanese government) but we are treated as second class citizens in our own country.

"We (the Nuba from the Nuba Mountains) want self-determination in a three way referendum giving a choice of going with the North, or autonomy, or going with the South.

"The continued bombing in the Nuba Mountains creates a need to highlight the humanitarian issue of our refugees in the South.. There are 60,000 of our people in the Uyida Camp near the border including 11,000 children. They need attention: food, clean water, and healthcare."

The NCF will hold a working group meeting on the Nuba issue on Thursday 6th December. For more details contact NCFPeace@aol.com .

Real progress for Sudan and South Sudan?

The agreement negotiated between Sudan and South Sudan this week is positive news. As was highlighted in the NCF’s previous blog, the issue of oil is one that fuels disagreement between these two neighbours, often exacerbating religious and ethnic tensions. The agreement sets out how much South Sudan will have to pay to transport its crude oil through pipelines in Sudan (the figure is not entirely clear but some sources put it at $25.80 per barrel). Earlier in the year South Sudan had to shut off oil exports because of disagreement over what the transport rate should be. US Barak Obama has said, “This agreement opens the door to a future of greater prosperity for the people of both countries.”

At the same time the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) signed up to the Tripartite Memoranda of Understanding. The Tripartite Memoranda of Understanding includes the African Union, the League of Arab States and the UN. Its role is to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the war torn areas of Sudan, on the border with South Sudan, where aid has previously struggled to arrive. The SPLM-N is an offshoot of the SPLM, which fought for South Sudan’s independence. It’s a group which resists Sudanese control of the two provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, on the border with South Sudan. The group’s military wing is referred to as the SPLA-N as opposed to the political wing which is the SPLM-N. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon commended this development and said he hoped Sudan would quickly enable the delivery of aid to the people concerned.
 

The Secretary General is, however, disappointed that Sudan and South Sudan have not yet signed up to ‘The Roadmap’ which aims to ease tensions and start the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations. This is contained in Security Council resolution 2046, which was unanimously adopted on 2^nd May 2012. Indeed, there are other problems afoot. The agreement on oil has led to a substantial loss in revenue for the South Sudanese government. In a meeting on Tuesday with the Ambassador of the Netherlands, the South Sudanese Vice President, Riek Machar, said that they will lose a total of $12 billion dollars to Khartoum because of the deal. He also added that the agreement has forced the South Sudan to become “the biggest donor on earth to a single country, Sudan.” The resumption of oil production also takes time and it will take up to a year for South Sudan to be back at full capacity.

There are still many issues to be resolved between the two countries, mainly border issues and specifically in the Abyei region. As well as this, violence continues in Darfur, which has created a desperate situation for thousands of people forced to flee their homes and move into areas of South Sudan. However, the recent agreement should be used as a stepping stone for stability. If South Sudan is able to return to large scale oil exportation this will bring much needed revenue to the country (specifically from China which buys a lot of South Sudan’s oil). South Sudan will then have ‘something to lose’. If it feels as though it has the potential to develop and grow its government will not want to risk undermining this (for example by further supporting the SPLM – N, the claim that Sudan constantly levels at it). This in turn will make the Tripartite Memoranda of Understanding more likely to succeed because Sudan cannot accuse South Sudan of meddling in it. Moreover, if South Sudan sticks to the agreement and keeps paying Sudan the agreed rate for the transportation of oil, it will show the Sudan that peaceful coexistence with their southern neighbour is far better for them than conflict. The two countries must now make sure that this progress leads to something better for their people and that petty squabbling does not make it fall apart and lead the countries back to war.

Fighting in Sudan continues

12/06/12

Sudan blog:

            Preceding the recognition of South Sudan as being an independent country, president Omar al-Bashir of Sudan announced in the name of Sudan that “We will bless our brothers in the south over their country and we wish them success”. However, a warning was sent from the Sudanese people that foreshadowed the independence. The message was that neither one of the countries should interfere with one nor the others’ affairs and that both countries should stick to their borders, and especially, to keep them secure. Knowing the geopolitical bearings between the two nations and their enduring conflicts, the future between these two countries remains uncertain.

            In the province of South Kordofan in southern Sudan lies a burgeoning conflict between the SPLM (Sudan’s People Liberation Movement) and the federal state of Koradafan leaded by Ahmad Haroun who has already been indicted for crimes against humanity at the ICC for attacks that took place in Darfur. The reasons of the fighting in South Kordafan are several. According to Haroun, the conflict is religious. Arab-Muslim civilians from the Nuba region in South Kordofan have been given weapons to supposedly defend themselves against the growing threat coming from the South. Like Haroun, many of his followers perceive this war as religious, and fight in the name of God to protect their people. However, this is not the case and the growing conflict is a complex mix of greed, retaliation and fear of the bloodshed province. It is not an ethnic combat between black African Nubas against Arabs.

            The Nuba Mountains lie in the most southern tip of Sudan at the border between Sudan and South Sudan. This region is renowned for its abundant reserves of oil. The difficulty of the partition between Sudan and South Sudan lies within the division of the oil fields (98% of Sudan’s Government budget is paid from the direct revenue of its oil fields). Today, 75% of the whole Sudanese region’s oil belongs to South Sudan, and this is the primary factor in the fighting between the two nations. Sudan wants more oil. As the conflict keeps on growing, the rebels will find more reasons to continue fighting, such as the ethnic differences of the Nuba people.

            The South Kordafan province has always been neglected and underdeveloped by the Sudanese Government. This is one of the reasons why the area is so prone to war. The Nuba people are significantly affected by this conflict, Nuba homes are continually shelled and destroyed by both Sudanese and South Sudanese forces. Development projects have also been affected, and forced migrations are common. 28 000 people were forced to flee the town of Talodi due to constant airstrikes from North Sudan against the SPLM’s rebel forces in the region. Meanwhile the people are suffering and hunger starts to set in the region.

            Since partition, Sudan has been hostile to South Sudan, and both countries have allied with the other’s rebels. A recent report by the NGO, Small Arms Survey, suggested that the Sudanese Government still shares close bonds with the rebels from the South, and Sudan has been accused of using rebel armies from South Sudan and the province of Darfur such as the SPLM, SSLA and the JEM. These groups have been seen in Khartoum on a regular basis. Both countries have been exchanging arms, provoking skirmishes by rebels in the other’s territory. The corruption between these two countries does not favor a peaceful relationship for their future. The population of the two countries is suffering and the countries are tearing themselves to shreds. It is hard to imagine that they will ever stop fighting.

Both Sudans pledge to end violence

Sudan and South Sudan finally gave assurances that both nations were ready to curtail hostilities.  The neighbouring countries were coming under increasing pressure from the international community to put an end to the growing violent clashes that erupted last month.  On the second of May the United Nations threatened both countries with sanctions if they failed to end the escalation of violence and restarted negotiations. 

The worst violence since South Sudanese independence followed the South’s invasion of the disputed Heglig oil fields on the 18^th of April, an act the UN described as “illegal”.  The South’s invasion was prompted by the North’s decision to demand a transport fee for the South Sudanese oil that is moved via pipeline through Sudan.  Violent clashes took place following the invasion along the border of Sudan's Kordofan state and South Sudan's Bahr el Ghazal state and left 22 soldiers dead.  Sudan then sent troops into the South and bombed border towns in retaliation.  Rather than backing down, both sides had seemed determined to ratchet up the tension, mobilizing militias and moving troops towards the conflict zone.

Tensions have existed since South Sudan gained independence from Sudan last year after two decades of civil war.  At the time of the separation the two states failed to agree on how to share the oilfields of the old unified country.  The border was never fully demarcated and both nations claim the oil rich Abyei region as their own.  Furthermore, Sudan feels that they should be compensated for the $7 billion of oil revenue they have lost since South Sudan seceded.    These issues have been the chief catalysts for the disagreements along with problems regarding the estimated 500,000 South Sudanese in Sudan and 80,000 Sudanese in the South, as well as accusations of each side supporting rebel groups in its rival’s territory.

Sudan and South Sudan’s willingness to cooperate with UN’s resolution is a step in the right direction; especially considering that many observers feared both countries were on the brink of war.  That said, it is vital that the international community takes an interest in the negotiations between the two rival states, possibly even meditating the discussions.  China, as the chief buyer of oil from both states, will be a key player in resolving disputes.  Previously, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Weimin, stressed the need for both sides to "avoid actions that will escalate tension".

Key to settling the problems between both Sudans will of course rest on agreeing on the shared boarder and distribution of the oil wealth the two countries once shared.  One must hope that involvement of the international community can ensure a productive out come to any negotiations; it would certainly be a relief for the citizens of both nations, who have only known conflict with one another for a generation.

Hopefully dialogue first before we let loose the dogs of war!

The London Daily Telegraph newspaper stated yesterday that the Sudanese president had "Threatened to Eliminate leaders of the South", this voiced  at a time when the situation is perilously teetering on the brink of full scale civil war!

The President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir was planning to rally his troops to defend his territory. "These people don't understand, and we will give  them the final lesson by force," he told his troops in El-Obeid, capital of Sudan's North Kordofan province.  All were concerned about the ownership of the oil in the province
But today the South Sudanese eased the tension by ignoring a number of provocations including the bombing of civilian targets. Bashir vows to free the south and retake Juba less than one year after giving public support and spirited agreement to the independence of the South. South Sudan said they would make an "orderly withdrawal" from the oilfields around Heglig in answer to urging from the UN. Heglig is in South Kordofan which is a disputed area in Sudan. A referendum is yet to take place to resolve the argument as to who manages this part of Sudan. The government would "create an environment for the resumption of dialogue"
Bashir on whose orders bombings were conducted, has been cited by the War Crimes Court in the Hague. He is a man whose situation is similar in so many ways to that of Bashar of Syria. How many innocent people's lives will be lost in both countries!

Obama calls Kiir

Photo:  Edjane Obama

 

The United States has continued to keep the plight of South Sudan close to its heart. President Obama today called South Sudanese President Silva Kiir to express his concern at the violent fighting going on in the South Kordofan province and advise Southern Sudanese troops steer clear of the fighting along the border with Sudan. Obama also ‘expressed hope that the two countries' heads of state will meet soon at a summit’ (White House Briefing) though this seems unlikely given the current impasse on the oil question (see below).

Perhaps the call was triggered by a horrific piece of footage broadcast by Al Jazeera which shows the Governor of South Kordofan inciting Sudan Armed Forces, or SAF, soldiers to commit war crimes during a pep talk before they head into battle with SPLA North forces in the contrsted region. He openly instructs Sudanese troops to “ hand over the place clean. Swept, rubbed, crushed. Don’t bring them back alive. We have no space for them," Ahmed Harun, who is wanted for crimes against humanity by the ICC, goes on to justify the indiscriminate killing on the grounds that he wants no administrative costs” from the war in the Nuba mountains. A later interview with Sudanese government officials on Al Jazeera showed an institutional disregard for international law when the official did not even seem to realise that killing soldiers indiscriminately breeched the Geneva Convention!

But more likely, the call was simply a check up on the US’s long term ally with whom it shares a common dislike of Khartoum. US-Sudanese relations have long been strained and nothing indicates this better than the fact that Sudan remains on the ‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’ list compiled by the US State Department. The US has not forgotten the shelter Sudan provided for Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s and the support it gave to Al Qaeda. More recently, the US fumed at the Government of Sudan's continued complicity in unabated violence occurring in Darfur. The US has great sympathy for the South, who it sees as the helpless victim of persecution at the hands of it aggressive neighbour.

Bizarrely, South Sudan remains a bit of a political hot potato in Washington, with solid support from the Black Caucus, the Evangelical Christian lobby as well as George Clooney and his Hollywood supporters. Each have their own motivations for closely following South Sudan, but they all generally stem from an oversimplification of the crises affecting the region in the American political discourse and mainstream broadcast media. For many, the conflict between North and South has been portrayed as a moral battle between good and evil where a helpless group of black Christians are being persecuted by a tyrannical Arab Islamic regime. Having passionate, powerful but uninformed people involved in any African crisis is always risky, though South Sudan really does need any support it can get.

Business is not booming

Unsurprisingly, South Sudan is struggling to find investors to kick start its fragile economy. Barney Jopson reports here for the Financial Times on Riek Machar’s rather unsuccessful attempt to woo American investors in New York in July last year. But the North is also struggling. Rumours that the US has pulled out of an investors’ conference for Sudan were raised in a State Department press briefing yesterday in Washington after being all but confirmed by Reuters.

Both countries will struggle to make any economic progress as long as the dispute over oil transit fees continues. Just yesterday Sudan announced it would lower its transit fees from $36 to $32.20, but that is still some way away from the $1 per barrel the South is offering. Negotiations in Ethiopia have reached deadlock and South Sudan’s has kept its oil production on hold. Both countries urgently need oil revenue, so Sudan should wield the power arising from its monopoly of the supply of oil transportation with greater care in the future.

Worth having a look

The BBC has just put up a wonderful audio slideshow on Sudan which can be found here. Tim McKulka has spent five years putting together a collection of photographs which give a fantastic insight into parts of Sudan and South Sudan rarely seen on camera. Worth having a look.

A prolonged, messy divorce

After the divorce of Southern Sudan from Sudan, the authorities made it clear that dual nationality would not be an option.   Recently, it has been announced that a date has been set: on 8th of April, all those considered 'southerners' will be stripped of their citizenship.  The consequences of this will be huge, with as many as 1 million people becoming illegal settlers in their own country on the basis of their ethnicity, even if they had been born, had lived and had worked there all their life.  In general terms, the two countries identify themselves with Arab Muslim culture in the North, and Christian culture in the South, and it is along these rough lines that citizenship will be decided. There does not seem to be any clear arrangement for those 'southern' Sudanese who wish to stay in the North, with only vague talks of residency permits.  The reality for most will be an uprootment of their homes and lives to go and live in a strange country.

The effect of this effectively forced mass 'repatriation' are especially salient in light of the recent developments in what the New York Times called "an exceedingly dangerous game of brinkmanship over billions of gallons of oil". South Sudan announced in January that it was halting its oil output following a row with the Sudan.  The South containts a majority of the previously united Sudan’s oil reserves, but the north has the refineries and pipelines; conventional wisdom argues that the two sides need each other for their economies to survive.  They are unable to do so, with the North claiming huge charged for transport and the South refusing, as President Salva Kiir said, to continue to hand over its oil revenues to the old enemies in Khartoum.

This halting of oil output has meant that the South's administration has also announced that it will be halving its spending on everything but salaries to compensate.  Who is going to provide for the influx of those crossing the border from Sudan into South Sudan?  An already tumultuous, underdeveloped and unstable state will have to deal with hige and sudden stream of people, most likely leading to a humanitarian crisis.

A cynic would argue that this is part of the North's tactic to gain control of the oil regions, weakening the South by using humanitarian needs as a weapon.  Though the contract may be signed, the messy divorce of this long-unhappy union is far from finished.

The refugee camps in Chad

On Sunday 15th Jan.in the Gaga refugee camp in Eastern Chad, Radio Dua Longawas told that the Police could not confirm that the refugees asked for International bodies would protect them or move them to more secure camps.
This was because it was thought that that the girls were arrested and being raped systematically by the guards.
Why isn't something being done about this? How can we continue living in this world where this sort of thing goes on. Remember your wife and daughters and mother what group can we call on? Please stop this in the name of humanity!

Final Sudan Report

Key Observationas and Recommendations

After decades of civil war, on 9 July, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The Republic of the Sudan has recognised the new state and the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been fulfilled. In reality, however, several immediate and long term issues remain.

There are multiple flashpoints in frontline regions that were hardest hit during the civil war. Part of the boundary between the two states has been agreed but three contentious territories remain, at least one of which impacts the demarcation of the border. These are (the so-called ‘Three Areas’): Abyei, Southern Kordofan (specifically the Nuba Mountains) and the Blue Nile.

Of these, the Abyei issue clearly regards an unresolved decision as to sovereignty. Under the CPA, residents of South Kordofan and Blue Nile were to hold ill-defined “popular consultations” to determine their “constitutional future”.

In the midst of South Sudanese euphoria over independence, war-like events are unfolding in these border areas. This is largely due to the Sudanese Government’s fear that rebels loyal to the south are gaining strength in these areas. The Sudanese Government had hoped to quell secessionism in these areas before the South’s declaration of independence further inspired the rebels. The situation needs to be resolved to deal with the immediate humanitarian challenges, but also to prepare the way for a constructive relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. In order to resolve the conflicts the NCF makes three recommendations:

Recommendation 1: In addition to the need for an over-arching political solution to the Abyei question, the peoples of the Abyei region (both settled and nomadic) are in need of a flexible solution that allows for joint administration; complete demilitarisation; dual citizenship rights; guarantees of land usage rights for all inhabitants (permanent and nomadic); and a development plan. Critical to this flexible system of administration and mutual recognition of traditional rights is support for a process of reconciliation between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya tribes. In the latter part of this report the various options which may achieve this goal are discussed.

Essentially the NCF believes that the Abyei region should consider a shared sovereignty arrangement.

Recommendation 2: Autonomy arrangements should be pursued for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State within Sudan in order to protect minority rights. Autonomous areas would have control over: political organisation; economy; policing; education; religion; culture; and language. Equals rights need to be guaranteed for all inhabitants and Islamic law should not regard the non-Islamic peoples. In Southern Kordofan the Nuba people should have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.

Recommendation 3: Any approach should include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.

Background

All three areas lie north of the 1956 boundary[1], but have significant populations that feel politically closer to the south, often because of a shared history of grievance with the Khartoum government.

It was difficult to reach an agreement on the status of these areas in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and by way of compromise the agreement stipulated that a referendum should be held for Abyei, and some form of “popular consultations” should be held for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State. These consultations have yet to be completed and the statuses of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State remain disputed. At present, the Sudanese Government maintains de facto control, although the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other local forces aligned with South Sudan remain present.

The ethnic composition of the areas is highly complex (indeed there is some evidence that the people of the Nuba Mountains are ethnically linked to the Nuba in the extreme North of the country) but the main lines of conflict are between local Arabs who have their allegiance to the Republic of the Sudan and Africans who have their allegiance to South Sudan. Historically, the latter have been marginalised and fought alongside the SPLA during the civil war. They currently find themselves in limbo, outside of South Sudan. They do not all necessarily wish to become part of South Sudan (although many do). The local Arab groups fear that their rights to the land will not be recognised if the areas become part of South Sudan.

Abeyi

Abyei’s permanent population mainly consists of members of the Ngok Dinka tribe, who are majority Christians and animist with their allegiance predominantly to South Sudan. The other main group in the area are the Misseriya, Arab Muslims who are traditionally nomads and who pass through the area during the dry season (November-April) to graze cattle. Their allegiance is predominantly to North Sudan. The two groups lived together relatively peacefully for a long time, but relations deteriorated during the decades-long civil war. With the division of the country into a Northern and a Southern part, the question of which Abyei should belong to has been forced to the fore. The conflict over Abyei thus takes place on two levels:

1. At national level between:

a. Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) / the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

b. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – the Southern Sudanese party and forces

2. At local level between

a. the Misseriya and

b. the Ngok Dinka.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The Abyei question was too complex to be fully negotiated in the CPA. The CPA limited itself to recognising a special administrative status for Abyei (which had formerly been part of Southern Kordofan state). The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retained “their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei”. The CPA also stipulated that, simultaneously with South Sudan’s referendum, a referendum was to be held in Abyei to determine whether it would remain a “special administrative” part of (North) Sudan or become part of the South Sudan. The borders of the area were to be demarcated by an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). This would inform who had the right to vote in the referendum.

The ABC’s July 2005 ruling was rejected by the NCP and the Misseriya. The NCP argued that the ABC had exceeded its mandate. Underlying the rejection was the fact that the ABC had located two oil fields, Heglig and Diffra, within Abyei rather than north of it. The Misseriya, on the other hand, argued that the ABC further diminished their power and territory. (Despite the fact that the ABC report had granted the Misseriya the right to graze in Abyei, the Misseriya erroneously came to believe that they had lost this right.) The NCP and Misseriya do not always agree. For example, the NCP’s interest in oil is not always shared by the Misseriya, who are most concerned with grazing rights.

After 2005, the situation in Abyei deteriorated. The SAF and Misseriya militias occupied and depopulated large parts of northern Abyei, consolidating their control of the oil fields in those areas. The SAF is in this way creating facts on the ground that may be beneficial in a potential future agreement. In May 2008 violence erupted between the SAF and SPLA causing dozens of deaths, massive displacement and considerable destruction in Abyei town. The Joint Integrated Units (JIU - composed of both SAF and SPLA forces), set up to maintain peace, were unable to do so.

In July 2009, the parties went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for a final and binding decision on the boundaries of Abyei. The PCA ruled that the ABC had exceeded its mandate, and reduced the size of Abyei. Most of the oil fields were given to the North. This also placed many Misseriya outside of Abyei, but the nomads would still have the right to graze in their traditional areas. The PCA’s decision was immediately rejected by the Misseriya who rightfully complained that they had not been consulted. The Sudanese government, despite some ambiguities in the beginning, also rejected the decision, while the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka accepted it. The demarcation work on the ground began, but this stalled due to threats from Misseriya militias.

2011 Referendum and Violence

The Abyei referendum which was to be held in January 2011 was never carried out due to disagreement between the NCP and the SPLM over how to determine eligibility to vote (the NCP argue that the USA-drafted “Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area” or Chapter IV, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004 gave the Misseriya a share of the oil and representation in the administration. The NCP argues that the SPLA accepted that, recognizing that the nomads are resident in the area).

If the nomadic Misseriya are not considered residents, the majority Ngok Dinka will most vote to become part of Southern Sudan. If, on the other hand, the Misseriya are counted as residents, their votes may be sufficient to make Abyei remain part of the North.

Uncertainty over the Abyei referendum and subsequent failure to carry it out in January 2011 caused an increase in tensions. Misseriya militias (backed by the SAF) clashed with the SPLA in several locations during the first half of 2011, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. In May, the SAF and Misseriya militias seized and took full control of Abyei town. The campaign caused massive destruction and 100,000 people fled to the south. Almost no civilians remained in Abyei. The SPLA chose not to retake Abyei to avoid disturbing the imminent secession of South Sudan. 2011 was also the first year in living memory that the Misseriya did not graze their cattle at the river Kiir, south of Abyei town. Although both sides are publically committed to removing their troops, both continue to rearm. Several agreements between the parties were signed during these months, but to no avail.

More recently, peace talks were held in Ethiopia in June. The two sides came to an agreement which included bilateral demilitarisation of the area and joint administration by the two governments with AU facilitation. This included the establishment of a Joint Oversight Committee, consisting of two NCP-members and two SPLM-members. Furthermore, the UN Security Council mandated a deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers (UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) to the area. The agreed demilitarisation did not occur, however, on 8 September the AU brokered an accord whereby both sides committed to withdraw their troops by 30 September.

Both the NCP and SPLM have close relationships with their respective local constituencies and both countries include Abyei in their current constitutions.

Southern Kordofan

Southern Kordofan consists mostly of the African Christian Nuba people and Misseriya. The Nuba people live mostly in the Nuba Mountains, and have long been treated as second class citizens by the north, with reduced education and career prospects. In 1992, the Sudanese government launched a jihad against the Nuba rebels. Whilst many fought on the southern side during the civil war, the conflict here also represents the Nuba waging their own indigenous rebellion against the government. There are also lingering tensions from the civil war and much bad feeling between the residents of Southern Kordofan. Grazing rights and political issues are of particular note. The Nuba people continue to feel culturally and politically isolated and fear the imposition of full Sharia law.

The popular consultations stipulated in the CPA have not yet taken place. Locals are very critical of the CPA claiming that it has not provided any resolution the disputes at hand. In May 2011, the delayed gubernatorial election in Southern Kordofan was won by the NCP candidate, the incumbent governor Ahmed Haroun (who is one of three Sudanese leaders to be under indictment by the International Criminal Court, for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur), although the SPLM rejects the result, claiming that the vote was rigged.

The first half of 2011 saw increased militarisation of Southern Kordofan. After the January referendum on independence, the Sudanese government insisted that the SPLA (who the government now views as a foreign army, because of South Sudan’s independence) withdraw from Southern Kordofan. The SPLA, however, argues that there are no SPLA forces in Southern Kordofan to withdraw. The Sudanese Government has now declared opposition group, SPLM-North (which has ties to the SPLM) illegal and members of the party have been arrested.

Since June there has been a major humanitarian crisis in Southern Kordofan. Fighting has broken out between local SPLA forces and government forces/local militias. SAF has also engaged in heavy bombardment campaigns against the towns of Kadugli (capital of Southern Kordofan), Kauda and other areas, resulting in hundreds of deaths and at least 73,000 refugees. More than 150,000 people have had to flee from their homes. There have been reports of human rights abuses, targeting of civilians and ethnic cleansing committed by SAF and local militias loyal to the Sudanese Government. There are reports of forces going from house to house to carry out summary executions based on ethnicity, political affiliation and even skin colour. According to aid agencies, the Sudanese government’s ethnic cleansing is targeting the indigenous Nuba peoples. The government, for their part, claim that their campaigns are directed at protecting civilians.

On 28 June, the two parties met in Ethiopia and signed a ‘Framework Agreement’ on political and security arrangements. The accord, however, later collapsed as hardliners within NCP rejected it. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir renounced it on 7 July. SAF bombardments continue. President Bashir has said that the SAF will continue its military offensive until Southern Kordofan is purged and they have arrested the local SPLM leader.

The SAF has prevented UNMIS^[2] and aid agencies from gaining access to civilians in need of assistance and on 11 July they threatened NGOs with expulsion. UNMIS’s mandate ended on 9 July, the day of South Sudan’s independence.

Blue Nile State

Blue Nile State was established by Presidential Decree in 1992. The institutional set up of the state was included in the Naivasha protocols of 2004, which became an integral part of the CPA. The state is 38,500 square kilometres with a population of 800,000. There are marked divisions between northern and southern parts of the state, recalling the main conflict lines. Southern areas are less developed, but have received a larger proportion of retunring refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia. Blue Nile State is home to the Roseires Dam, the main source of Sudan's hydroelectric power.

Instability in Darfur, the escalation of conflict in Abyei and the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) attempt to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir have all put pressure on Blue Nile State’s fragile stability.

The formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes that were delayed across the country began again in early 2009. Reintegration is expected to be challenging, given Blue Nile’s poor infrastructure and the weak economic environment. While Blue Nile State has developed a constitution and set up a legislative assembly in the four years since the CPA was signed, in practice, the political and civil service administration has not normalised.

The popular consultations stipulated by the CPA began in January 2011 in the form of more than 100 hearing centres across the state, but the results have not been published and the process has stalled indefinitely due to renewed hostilities.

The desire for autonomy in the region was very strong as was the Sudanese Government opposition to autonomy. The Carter Center observed the consultations and noted positive aspects including: broad participation (69,429 people in 108 locations); strong turnout by women; strong administration; few eligibility issues and good language accessibility. They also noted, however, that many individuals appeared to be coached by the major parties, that the views of minorities were not well represented and that self-determination was not an option.

Although the popular consultations were a unique opportunity for the people to articulate their interests and needs, their real practical value is still uncertain. The popular consultations, if successful, could also be a mechanism for negotiating wealth and power-sharing agreements on a national scale, including a remaking of its federal system, which could prove crucial for Sudan’s stability.

On 2 September the NCP declared a state of emergency in the Blue Nile State and sacked Governor Malik Agar, appointing an interim military ruler in his place. Fighting continues and the Sudanese Government has denied UN and other aid agencies access to Blue Nile state. The UN estimates over 50,000 civilians have had to flee the region.

An important issue, for long term peace, is what to do with the local, indigenous forces that fought with the SPLA during the civil war. The relationship between the NCP and the SPLM remains a source of tension. As mentioned above, the Sudanese Government has moved to ban the group.

SPLM/A North argue that they do not belong to South Sudan, but are northern. Since the popular consultations on the status of the state have not been completed, they do not recognise the sovereignty of the Sudanese government, and thus refuse to disarm (the CPA determined that they should be demobilized, demilitarized and reintegrated with civilian life - those still physically fit would be reemployed in the Army or Police).

Overarching Issues

All three conflicts are devastating for the local populations, but they also have a broader impact on the future stability of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. A war could damage the legitimacy of the new government in the South, which is already struggling to deal with the challenges of running a new country, and undermine its attempt to find stable economic footing. To a large extent, the ongoing conflicts are representative of the areas which the CPA failed to adequately address. Issues include: revenue sharing; border demarcation; arrangements on citizenship; and natural resource management. These all need to be solved if the two nations are to maintain a healthy post-divorce relationship.

The Bi-lateral relationship

The ‘three areas’ represent the biggest challenge to the newly forming bilateral relationship and will provide a litmus test for how future conflicts will be resolved. If they can be successfully negotiated it will pave the way for greater cooperation in the future. Current trends towards use of force by the Sudanese Government do not bode well for a peaceful diplomatic resolution. External actors need to get leaders back to the negotiating table with sufficient political will to contain the violence, including a cease-fire and strong security arrangements for the transitional states.

The conflict in Abyei centres on issues of revenue sharing, border demarcation, migration and citizenship rights, as well as minorities’ rights. These are all issues which the two countries will need to come to terms with in the long term through peaceful means.

Migration Rights, Citizenship, and Border Democracy

The Sudanese Foreign Minister has indicated that he would like to see a ‘soft border’ between Sudan and South Sudan. It is in both countries’ interests to have a border which allows for high levels of trade and investment, free movement of migratory groups, and easy movement for those who have traditionally operated on both sides of the border. In this context, some have proposed a buffer zone which belongs to neither country to allow for an easy flow of goods and people. The people of Sudan’s border territories have relied on a porous boundary for generations and any arrangement that inadvertently hardens the border could prove disastrous in the long run.

Further deterioration of relations could put a soft border further out of reach. Current security realities must be considered in light of the long-term social, political, and economic consequences of new barriers in border areas and more broadly across the two Sudans.

There are also questions of citizenship rights and the protection of minorities. Given the close connection between many residents and South Sudan, arrangements will need to be found that respect the wishes of all local groups. This includes Sharia law not having regard to non-Islamic peoples. In the end it is only the communities that can bring peace, and solutions need to be found to deal with their problems. This will require them to have a voice in negotiations.

Control of Resources

Oil is a crucial aspect of this conflict. Most of Sudan’s most productive oil resources are located in Southern Kordofan, and some in Abyei. Some argue that the rejection of a referendum in Abyei was driven primarily by fear of losing control over the oil resources in the area. The challenges in the conflict areas also mirror the critical importance of oil in the bilateral relationship. South Sudan inherited a large proportion of the oil resources, however, the majority of processing infrastructure and pipelines exist in the North. Both countries are economically reliant on oil and will need to come to a productive arrangement to develop and exploit these resources.

Options for the Future Governance of Abyei

The international Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) for the CPA recently recommended the following priorities: the deployment of UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei); the withdrawal of all other forces; the appointment of the new administration and oversight committee and the safe return of IDPs (i.e. refugees). In order for this to happen, it is crucial that the two governments cooperate and that the international community (particularly the AU, UN peacekeepers, donors and aid agencies) support efforts toward peace and stability. The AEC also states that the two countries should move forward on the basis of current temporary agreements. In the medium term, the focus needs to be on new negotiations on the borders, to include not only the two governments, but also the local populations (Ngok Dinka and Misseriya) and negotiations on who to include in referendum.

It is important, however, that all decisions include the people on the ground. This includes the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, as well as other groups that live in and are nomads in Abyei. The following options for future governance should therefore be presented to the leaders and to the peoples, and followed by a referendum. The NCF recommends the full development of Option 1 which entails shared sovereignty. Joint efforts could foster cooperation, build confidence and thus have a long-term positive impact on relations between the two governments and the peoples. It would also limit the importance of where the boundaries are drawn because the numerical majority would no longer determine which country Abyei was part of. Option 2 and 3 reflect recommended arrangements should sovereignty rest with either Sudan or South Sudan.

Any approach must include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.

Option 1: Shared Sovreignty

Model: Peru-Ecuador shared sovereignty over the bi-national park in the Amazon.

· Joint political and bureaucratic administration with power-sharing systems, in the beginning under the auspices of the AU/UN.

· Joint police force (perhaps an international force in the beginning).

· Complete demilitarisation of the area.

· Dual citizenship available for all the inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life and have access to the land.

· Continuation of CPA oil-sharing agreement, alternatively with minor changes (Government of Sudan 50%; Government of South Sudan 42%; Bahr el Ghazal region 2%; Western Kordofan 2%; locally with the Ngok Dinka 2%; locally with the Misseriya people 2%).

· Bi-national development plan: the governments would cooperate to develop Abyei and the surrounding areas in terms of human development, infrastructure, and ecological sustainable development. Meeting these challenges together is both necessary, since they are interlinked, and helpful because it fosters cooperation.

Option 2: Autonomy Within Sudan

· The Sudanese government full sovereignty over Abyei.

· Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution.

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Individuals all citizens of Sudan.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Abyei itself.

Option 3: Autonomy with Sudan

· South Sudanese full sovereignty over Abyei.

· Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Individuals all citizens of South Sudan.

· Nomadic peoples that use the land for parts of the year would have the option of being either Sudanese or South Sudanese citizens. In either case, they will have full and equal rights to access and use their traditional grazing land.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of South Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the Autonomous State of Abyei itself.

Options for the Future Governance of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State:

It is unlikely that Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State ever will become part of South Sudan. The opposition against such an outcome is too big within Sudan, and within the states themselves. Full independence for any of the states is also neither likely nor desirable. One may thus envision two options for the future governance of these two states:

Option 1: Autonomy within Sudan

· Areas of autonomy would be: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Sothern Kordofan: Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Southern Kordofan itself.

· Southern Kordofan: the Nuba people will have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.

Option 2: Secular Federalism in Sudan

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State would be states in a reformed federal Sudan. Some argue that Sudan’s current type of federalism has shortcomings which include a lack of a genuine commitment to federalism and the ‘tyranny of the (religious) majority’. Certainly a truly national sense of identity has not been achieved.

Secular federalism is the right solution for Sudan because:

• Federalism has a greater probability of success in upholding minority rights and deterring majority tyranny.
• It allows the minority to be a majority within their state (unique opportunity for self-fulfilment and self-development of a minority through power sharing)
• It provides protection from political and social domination

A well-functioning federal system based on secular values would indeed be the appropriate solution for Sudan. This would guarantee the rights and safety of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

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[1] Sudan gained independence from Great Britain and Egypt on 1^st January 1956. The country was divided into a northern and a southern region, along the ‘1956 boundary’. North-south rivalry had been encouraged by the British for decades before independence.

[2] UNMIS is the United Nations Mission in Sudan, a peacekeeping force established in 2005 to oversee the implementation of the CPA. They were operational in six different sectors around the north-south border areas. Its mandate ended on July 9^th. Its equipment and personnel will be transferred to the UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan – established after South Sudan’s independence) and the UNISFA.