Key People in Sudanese politics

Omar Hassan al-Bashir

President of Sudan since the coup of 1989. He is the head of the National Congress Party (NCP) which broke away from Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) is the early 90s. He has been indicted for war crimes and genocide by the ICC but maintains the support of his African and some of his Arab neighbours.  No country he has visited whether a signatory to the ICC like Kenya or not like Saudi, has enforced any measures to expedite his arrest. Domestically he has waning support after the September 2013 riots saw at least 100, mostly young people, killed.  The yearly floods in July and August are consistently poorly mananged and the corruption surrounding the distribution of humanitarian aid that is brought in from neighbouring countries is, for many, a yearly reminder of his government’s inability to put national interests first.

Hassan al-Turabi

Leader of the Popular Congress party. Former ‘supreme leader’ and architect of the 1989 coup, he has since fallen in and out of favour with Bashir on several occasions spending time in prison or under house arrest.  Recently he and Bashir have had a public rapprochement signalling to many the return of more Islamist policies in Sudan.  He angered many when sometime after the CPA he said that those Sudanese soldiers who died fighting in the Civil war were not martyrs after all.  He had incited many to join the Sudanese Armed Forces and defend the North under a religious pretence.

Ghazi Salah Eldin al Attabani

Formerly high-ranking NCP advisor, now leader of the Reform Now Party a break-away from the NCP. He is a member of the national dialogue committee. Many see his party as a possible replacement to the ruling government although his history with Bashir leaves him open to derision.

Al Sadig al Mahdi

Leader of the National Umma Party (NUP).  Since his arrest in May and the signing of the Paris declaration he has been living in Cairo. He is seen by many as weak and treated with contempt because suspicions of a rapprochement between NCP and NUP.  Al Mahdi’s Umma party has fractured into 5 parties, 4 of which have been co-opted by the government.  His power lies mainly with the traditionally loyal groups in peripheries; his links with the international community and the traditional role of the Mahdi family originating during colonial era Sudan.

Abdal Rahman al Mahdi

Son of Al Sadig.  Traditionally an army man, he is now one of President Bashir’s advisors much to the chagrin of his former part-mates at the NUP. This has put his father in a difficult decision.  His father, however, has since made comments that seem to praise his son, despite his career move into politics.

Yassir Arman

Leader of the SPLM-North which after the secession of South Sudan has continued to fight with Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.  Arman stood for the SPLM candidate in 2010 election but withdrew shortly before the elections out of protest.  This move was largely criticised, even though the results were widely believed to have been fixed.

Minni Arko Minawi

Leader of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).  The SRF is an umbrella group consisting of groups from Darfur the Justice and Equality movement (JEM); Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdul Wahid and Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi as well as rebels from Blue Nile and South Kordofan states under the SPLM-North. They are seen by the regime as counter to national unity efforts and agents of foreign powers and Bashir has vowed to quash their rebellion before year’s end.

Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani

Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party which has Arab Nationalism as an ideology from pre-independence days. The DUP began as a merger of the National Unionist Party and People’s Democratic Party.

In 2011, after South Sudan’s independence the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), formed a government with Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP). In August al-Mirghani ruled out his party’s participation in the 2015 general election unless a comprehensive national consensus is reached.  Like Al-Mahdi, al-Mirghani’s power base derives from traditionally loyal Khatmiyya sect followers.  His influence with his power base (like Al-Sadig’s), is also waning. He currently resides in London.