In the year that saw the 20th
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide there are rising fears that similar power
struggles drawn on ethnic lines may precipitate another genocide in Africa. There
are certainly parallels between South Sudan and Rwanda not least the lingering
colonial legacy. There is also the exploitation of ethnic identity in times of political strife as well as a lack of
robust structures to deal with internal political conflict.
The current rift between Dinka
and Nuer and associated power-brokers and groups came to the fore with the
dismissal of Riek Machar as Vice President by President Salva Kiir in December
of last year. This put an end to the rather fragile, uneasy alliance fraught
with mistrust that existed between the two men and their factions since before independence.
Ethnically South Sudan boasts tens
of languages and almost as many tribes, but recent spates of violence are
forcing different groups within the country to align with one of only two sides
– with no guarantee of protection from either. Whilst it is evidently Machar’s
wish to gain more power and Kiir’s reluctance to concede it that has caused the
rift, the danger is that the many armed, militarised groups let loose in
populated areas have been encouraged to view their struggle as an ethnic one.
For his part Machar, a member of the
Nuer group, has long emphasised the ethnic dominance of the Dinkas in
government and previously in the SPLM/A as a sign of an attempt to gain ethnic
hegemony by the group. The Dinkas constitute the largest ethnic group of the South
Sudanese population.
Ethnically-based killing
particularly aimed at the Dinka group has happened before. The 1991 massacre in
which armed Nuer fighters, under Machar, killed around 2,000 Dinka in the town
of Bor, was a shameful episode in the South-South violence that characterised much
of the fighting during the civil war (1983-2005). Today, tensions are more
fraught and, in the absence of a common enemy, the stakes are much higher. As
an independent country South Sudan and its resources present a huge coup for
any group, but instead of being content with power-sharing both sides seem now to
be seeking full authority.
South Sudan suffers from inflation
rates at 50%, abject poverty and intense rivalry within an increasing number of
political factions. As the world’s
youngest country it may be forgiven (right now) for many of its political
short-comings but its inability or unwillingness to demilitarise its politics will
only catalyse ethnic warfare. With no strong institutions to govern, many power-brokers and generals
still essentially command their own forces, their loyalties to the government
fluctuating with their cut of oil revenues. This is largely a failing of
President Kiir’s government. Faith in his leadership has been steadily
dwindling. The fear now is that some in opposition, particularly rebels, may
not see the IGAD-mediated peace talks in Addis Ababa and the 2015 elections as
viable ways to address these failures. These
fears triggered the release of a letter to the IGAD mediation team from 39
Dinka tribal chiefs in which they cited the danger of attributing government
failures to the Dinka group as a whole and worries as to where this blame
culture will lead. It also discussed concerns over the lack of democratic
leadership in South Sudan and the dangerous precedence set by armed rebellion
in the fledgling country. IGAD would do well to consider these.
The slow pace at which efforts in Ethiopia seem
to be responding to events in South Sudan is also of concern given that
patience is not Riek Machar’s strong suit.
Having been at odds with Kiir’s predecessor Dr John Garang, Machar has
never liked playing second fiddle; particularly it seems to a Dinka. And
although he apologised publically for the Bor Massacre before taking office as
Vice President, there remains a strong sense of déjà vu. Machar, then as now,
has courted the favour of the government in Khartoum who not without a sense of
schadenfreude would perhaps enjoy giving support to the SPLM’s own
rebellion. In the long-term, however,
the Sudanese will need to be aware of the effects that destabilising South
Sudan will have on border communities, refugee flows and the proliferation of
small arms northwards into volatile regions beyond the border.
But history need not repeat
itself: South Sudan is not Rwanda nor does it need to relive its own dark past.
In some ways there is greater difficulty today in that both sides are killing each
other, leaving the potential for human loss immense. In the long run this would change the
demographics of the country and may well produce a power vacuum as, like many
of its neighbours, South Sudan has not cultivated a robust younger breed of
politicians. Instead power, and to a
great extent wealth, has been withheld by the old revolutionary commanders
giving rise to consistent two-horse races. Power-sharing must therefore be made
attractive to both sides right now and guarantees of representation must be
given for all groups in the long-run; after all South Sudan is yet to have its
first election. The 2010 ‘trial’
elections, seen largely as a precursor to secession, have not managed to build
trust and confidence in ‘government’ thus far; neither has it given Machar and
Kiir the safety to lay down their weapons, with their behaviour largely
unchanged since their military days. Practically,
as well as curbing the proliferation of arms throughout the country, opportunities
and resources have not been made available to all; something that a country
with the largest proportion of its population under 17 years of age cannot
afford.
However, silver linings do exist. While the slow pace of the IGAD process can
be exasperating, given the right incentives, it can provide the warring sides
with a chance to work through more of their deeply-rooted disputes, having been
denied the chance to do so during the CPA negotiations a decade ago. Faith in the African leadership of peace
talks and mediation efforts has not yet waned and if powerful actors are not
yet accountable to their own citizens then at least they will have to take note
of their neighbours. This is a continent quite aware of its recent violent
history and its status in the world. Africa is endeavouring to take ownership
of its issues – this regional effort must therefore not be undermined.
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