After decades of civil war, on 9 July, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The Republic of the Sudan has recognised the new state and the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been fulfilled. In reality, however, several immediate and long term issues remain.
Recommendation 1: In addition to the need for an over-arching political solution to the Abyei question, the peoples of the Abyei region (both settled and nomadic) are in need of a flexible solution that allows for joint administration; complete demilitarisation; dual citizenship rights; guarantees of land usage rights for all inhabitants (permanent and nomadic); and a development plan. Critical to this flexible system of administration and mutual recognition of traditional rights is support for a process of reconciliation between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya tribes. In the latter part of this report the various options which may achieve this goal are discussed.
Essentially the NCF believes that the Abyei region should consider a shared sovereignty arrangement.
Recommendation 2: Autonomy arrangements should be pursued for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State within Sudan in order to protect minority rights. Autonomous areas would have control over: political organisation; economy; policing; education; religion; culture; and language. Equals rights need to be guaranteed for all inhabitants and Islamic law should not regard the non-Islamic peoples. In Southern Kordofan the Nuba people should have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.
Recommendation 3: Any approach should include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.
Background
All three areas lie north of the 1956 boundary[1], but have significant populations that feel politically closer to the south, often because of a shared history of grievance with the Khartoum government.
It was difficult to reach an agreement on the status of these areas in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and by way of compromise the agreement stipulated that a referendum should be held for Abyei, and some form of “popular consultations” should be held for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State. These consultations have yet to be completed and the statuses of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State remain disputed. At present, the Sudanese Government maintains de facto control, although the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other local forces aligned with South Sudan remain present.
The ethnic composition of the areas is highly complex (indeed there is some evidence that the people of the Nuba Mountains are ethnically linked to the Nuba in the extreme North of the country) but the main lines of conflict are between local Arabs who have their allegiance to the Republic of the Sudan and Africans who have their allegiance to South Sudan. Historically, the latter have been marginalised and fought alongside the SPLA during the civil war. They currently find themselves in limbo, outside of South Sudan. They do not all necessarily wish to become part of South Sudan (although many do). The local Arab groups fear that their rights to the land will not be recognised if the areas become part of South Sudan.
Abeyi
Abyei’s permanent population mainly consists of members of the Ngok Dinka tribe, who are majority Christians and animist with their allegiance predominantly to South Sudan. The other main group in the area are the Misseriya, Arab Muslims who are traditionally nomads and who pass through the area during the dry season (November-April) to graze cattle. Their allegiance is predominantly to North Sudan. The two groups lived together relatively peacefully for a long time, but relations deteriorated during the decades-long civil war. With the division of the country into a Northern and a Southern part, the question of which Abyei should belong to has been forced to the fore. The conflict over Abyei thus takes place on two levels:
1. At national level between:
a. Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) / the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
b. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – the Southern Sudanese party and forces
2. At local level between
a. the Misseriya and
b. the Ngok Dinka.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The Abyei question was too complex to be fully negotiated in the CPA. The CPA limited itself to recognising a special administrative status for Abyei (which had formerly been part of Southern Kordofan state). The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retained “their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei”. The CPA also stipulated that, simultaneously with South Sudan’s referendum, a referendum was to be held in Abyei to determine whether it would remain a “special administrative” part of (North) Sudan or become part of the South Sudan. The borders of the area were to be demarcated by an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). This would inform who had the right to vote in the referendum.
The ABC’s July 2005 ruling was rejected by the NCP and the Misseriya. The NCP argued that the ABC had exceeded its mandate. Underlying the rejection was the fact that the ABC had located two oil fields, Heglig and Diffra, within Abyei rather than north of it. The Misseriya, on the other hand, argued that the ABC further diminished their power and territory. (Despite the fact that the ABC report had granted the Misseriya the right to graze in Abyei, the Misseriya erroneously came to believe that they had lost this right.) The NCP and Misseriya do not always agree. For example, the NCP’s interest in oil is not always shared by the Misseriya, who are most concerned with grazing rights.
After 2005, the situation in Abyei deteriorated. The SAF and Misseriya militias occupied and depopulated large parts of northern Abyei, consolidating their control of the oil fields in those areas. The SAF is in this way creating facts on the ground that may be beneficial in a potential future agreement. In May 2008 violence erupted between the SAF and SPLA causing dozens of deaths, massive displacement and considerable destruction in Abyei town. The Joint Integrated Units (JIU - composed of both SAF and SPLA forces), set up to maintain peace, were unable to do so.
In July 2009, the parties went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for a final and binding decision on the boundaries of Abyei. The PCA ruled that the ABC had exceeded its mandate, and reduced the size of Abyei. Most of the oil fields were given to the North. This also placed many Misseriya outside of Abyei, but the nomads would still have the right to graze in their traditional areas. The PCA’s decision was immediately rejected by the Misseriya who rightfully complained that they had not been consulted. The Sudanese government, despite some ambiguities in the beginning, also rejected the decision, while the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka accepted it. The demarcation work on the ground began, but this stalled due to threats from Misseriya militias.
2011 Referendum and Violence
The Abyei referendum which was to be held in January 2011 was never carried out due to disagreement between the NCP and the SPLM over how to determine eligibility to vote (the NCP argue that the USA-drafted “Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area” or Chapter IV, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004 gave the Misseriya a share of the oil and representation in the administration. The NCP argues that the SPLA accepted that, recognizing that the nomads are resident in the area).
If the nomadic Misseriya are not considered residents, the majority Ngok Dinka will most vote to become part of Southern Sudan. If, on the other hand, the Misseriya are counted as residents, their votes may be sufficient to make Abyei remain part of the North.
Uncertainty over the Abyei referendum and subsequent failure to carry it out in January 2011 caused an increase in tensions. Misseriya militias (backed by the SAF) clashed with the SPLA in several locations during the first half of 2011, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. In May, the SAF and Misseriya militias seized and took full control of Abyei town. The campaign caused massive destruction and 100,000 people fled to the south. Almost no civilians remained in Abyei. The SPLA chose not to retake Abyei to avoid disturbing the imminent secession of South Sudan. 2011 was also the first year in living memory that the Misseriya did not graze their cattle at the river Kiir, south of Abyei town. Although both sides are publically committed to removing their troops, both continue to rearm. Several agreements between the parties were signed during these months, but to no avail.
More recently, peace talks were held in Ethiopia in June. The two sides came to an agreement which included bilateral demilitarisation of the area and joint administration by the two governments with AU facilitation. This included the establishment of a Joint Oversight Committee, consisting of two NCP-members and two SPLM-members. Furthermore, the UN Security Council mandated a deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers (UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) to the area. The agreed demilitarisation did not occur, however, on 8 September the AU brokered an accord whereby both sides committed to withdraw their troops by 30 September.
Both the NCP and SPLM have close relationships with their respective local constituencies and both countries include Abyei in their current constitutions.
Southern Kordofan
Southern Kordofan consists mostly of the African Christian Nuba people and Misseriya. The Nuba people live mostly in the Nuba Mountains, and have long been treated as second class citizens by the north, with reduced education and career prospects. In 1992, the Sudanese government launched a jihad against the Nuba rebels. Whilst many fought on the southern side during the civil war, the conflict here also represents the Nuba waging their own indigenous rebellion against the government. There are also lingering tensions from the civil war and much bad feeling between the residents of Southern Kordofan. Grazing rights and political issues are of particular note. The Nuba people continue to feel culturally and politically isolated and fear the imposition of full Sharia law.
The popular consultations stipulated in the CPA have not yet taken place. Locals are very critical of the CPA claiming that it has not provided any resolution the disputes at hand. In May 2011, the delayed gubernatorial election in Southern Kordofan was won by the NCP candidate, the incumbent governor Ahmed Haroun (who is one of three Sudanese leaders to be under indictment by the International Criminal Court, for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur), although the SPLM rejects the result, claiming that the vote was rigged.
The first half of 2011 saw increased militarisation of Southern Kordofan. After the January referendum on independence, the Sudanese government insisted that the SPLA (who the government now views as a foreign army, because of South Sudan’s independence) withdraw from Southern Kordofan. The SPLA, however, argues that there are no SPLA forces in Southern Kordofan to withdraw. The Sudanese Government has now declared opposition group, SPLM-North (which has ties to the SPLM) illegal and members of the party have been arrested.
Since June there has been a major humanitarian crisis in Southern Kordofan. Fighting has broken out between local SPLA forces and government forces/local militias. SAF has also engaged in heavy bombardment campaigns against the towns of Kadugli (capital of Southern Kordofan), Kauda and other areas, resulting in hundreds of deaths and at least 73,000 refugees. More than 150,000 people have had to flee from their homes. There have been reports of human rights abuses, targeting of civilians and ethnic cleansing committed by SAF and local militias loyal to the Sudanese Government. There are reports of forces going from house to house to carry out summary executions based on ethnicity, political affiliation and even skin colour. According to aid agencies, the Sudanese government’s ethnic cleansing is targeting the indigenous Nuba peoples. The government, for their part, claim that their campaigns are directed at protecting civilians.
On 28 June, the two parties met in Ethiopia and signed a ‘Framework Agreement’ on political and security arrangements. The accord, however, later collapsed as hardliners within NCP rejected it. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir renounced it on 7 July. SAF bombardments continue. President Bashir has said that the SAF will continue its military offensive until Southern Kordofan is purged and they have arrested the local SPLM leader.
The SAF has prevented UNMIS[2] and aid agencies from gaining access to civilians in need of assistance and on 11 July they threatened NGOs with expulsion. UNMIS’s mandate ended on 9 July, the day of South Sudan’s independence.
Blue Nile StateBlue Nile State was established by Presidential Decree in 1992. The institutional set up of the state was included in the Naivasha protocols of 2004, which became an integral part of the CPA. The state is 38,500 square kilometres with a population of 800,000. There are marked divisions between northern and southern parts of the state, recalling the main conflict lines. Southern areas are less developed, but have received a larger proportion of retunring refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia. Blue Nile State is home to the Roseires Dam, the main source of Sudan's hydroelectric power.
Instability in Darfur, the escalation of conflict in Abyei and the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) attempt to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir have all put pressure on Blue Nile State’s fragile stability.
The formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes that were delayed across the country began again in early 2009. Reintegration is expected to be challenging, given Blue Nile’s poor infrastructure and the weak economic environment. While Blue Nile State has developed a constitution and set up a legislative assembly in the four years since the CPA was signed, in practice, the political and civil service administration has not normalised.
The popular consultations stipulated by the CPA began in January 2011 in the form of more than 100 hearing centres across the state, but the results have not been published and the process has stalled indefinitely due to renewed hostilities.
The desire for autonomy in the region was very strong as was the Sudanese Government opposition to autonomy. The Carter Center observed the consultations and noted positive aspects including: broad participation (69,429 people in 108 locations); strong turnout by women; strong administration; few eligibility issues and good language accessibility. They also noted, however, that many individuals appeared to be coached by the major parties, that the views of minorities were not well represented and that self-determination was not an option.
Although the popular consultations were a unique opportunity for the people to articulate their interests and needs, their real practical value is still uncertain. The popular consultations, if successful, could also be a mechanism for negotiating wealth and power-sharing agreements on a national scale, including a remaking of its federal system, which could prove crucial for Sudan’s stability.
On 2 September the NCP declared a state of emergency in the Blue Nile State and sacked Governor Malik Agar, appointing an interim military ruler in his place. Fighting continues and the Sudanese Government has denied UN and other aid agencies access to Blue Nile state. The UN estimates over 50,000 civilians have had to flee the region.
An important issue, for long term peace, is what to do with the local, indigenous forces that fought with the SPLA during the civil war. The relationship between the NCP and the SPLM remains a source of tension. As mentioned above, the Sudanese Government has moved to ban the group.
SPLM/A North argue that they do not belong to South Sudan, but are northern. Since the popular consultations on the status of the state have not been completed, they do not recognise the sovereignty of the Sudanese government, and thus refuse to disarm (the CPA determined that they should be demobilized, demilitarized and reintegrated with civilian life - those still physically fit would be reemployed in the Army or Police).
Overarching Issues
All three conflicts are devastating for the local populations, but they also have a broader impact on the future stability of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. A war could damage the legitimacy of the new government in the South, which is already struggling to deal with the challenges of running a new country, and undermine its attempt to find stable economic footing. To a large extent, the ongoing conflicts are representative of the areas which the CPA failed to adequately address. Issues include: revenue sharing; border demarcation; arrangements on citizenship; and natural resource management. These all need to be solved if the two nations are to maintain a healthy post-divorce relationship.
The Bi-lateral relationship
The ‘three areas’ represent the biggest challenge to the newly forming bilateral relationship and will provide a litmus test for how future conflicts will be resolved. If they can be successfully negotiated it will pave the way for greater cooperation in the future. Current trends towards use of force by the Sudanese Government do not bode well for a peaceful diplomatic resolution. External actors need to get leaders back to the negotiating table with sufficient political will to contain the violence, including a cease-fire and strong security arrangements for the transitional states.
The conflict in Abyei centres on issues of revenue sharing, border demarcation, migration and citizenship rights, as well as minorities’ rights. These are all issues which the two countries will need to come to terms with in the long term through peaceful means.
Migration Rights, Citizenship, and Border Democracy
The Sudanese Foreign Minister has indicated that he would like to see a ‘soft border’ between Sudan and South Sudan. It is in both countries’ interests to have a border which allows for high levels of trade and investment, free movement of migratory groups, and easy movement for those who have traditionally operated on both sides of the border. In this context, some have proposed a buffer zone which belongs to neither country to allow for an easy flow of goods and people. The people of Sudan’s border territories have relied on a porous boundary for generations and any arrangement that inadvertently hardens the border could prove disastrous in the long run.
Further deterioration of relations could put a soft border further out of reach. Current security realities must be considered in light of the long-term social, political, and economic consequences of new barriers in border areas and more broadly across the two Sudans.
There are also questions of citizenship rights and the protection of minorities. Given the close connection between many residents and South Sudan, arrangements will need to be found that respect the wishes of all local groups. This includes Sharia law not having regard to non-Islamic peoples. In the end it is only the communities that can bring peace, and solutions need to be found to deal with their problems. This will require them to have a voice in negotiations.
Control of Resources
Oil is a crucial aspect of this conflict. Most of Sudan’s most productive oil resources are located in Southern Kordofan, and some in Abyei. Some argue that the rejection of a referendum in Abyei was driven primarily by fear of losing control over the oil resources in the area. The challenges in the conflict areas also mirror the critical importance of oil in the bilateral relationship. South Sudan inherited a large proportion of the oil resources, however, the majority of processing infrastructure and pipelines exist in the North. Both countries are economically reliant on oil and will need to come to a productive arrangement to develop and exploit these resources.
Options for the Future Governance of Abyei
The international Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) for the CPA recently recommended the following priorities: the deployment of UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei); the withdrawal of all other forces; the appointment of the new administration and oversight committee and the safe return of IDPs (i.e. refugees). In order for this to happen, it is crucial that the two governments cooperate and that the international community (particularly the AU, UN peacekeepers, donors and aid agencies) support efforts toward peace and stability. The AEC also states that the two countries should move forward on the basis of current temporary agreements. In the medium term, the focus needs to be on new negotiations on the borders, to include not only the two governments, but also the local populations (Ngok Dinka and Misseriya) and negotiations on who to include in referendum.
It is important, however, that all decisions include the people on the ground. This includes the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, as well as other groups that live in and are nomads in Abyei. The following options for future governance should therefore be presented to the leaders and to the peoples, and followed by a referendum. The NCF recommends the full development of Option 1 which entails shared sovereignty. Joint efforts could foster cooperation, build confidence and thus have a long-term positive impact on relations between the two governments and the peoples. It would also limit the importance of where the boundaries are drawn because the numerical majority would no longer determine which country Abyei was part of. Option 2 and 3 reflect recommended arrangements should sovereignty rest with either Sudan or South Sudan.
Any approach must include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.
Option 1: Shared Sovreignty
Model: Peru-Ecuador shared sovereignty over the bi-national park in the Amazon.
· Joint political and bureaucratic administration with power-sharing systems, in the beginning under the auspices of the AU/UN.
· Joint police force (perhaps an international force in the beginning).
· Complete demilitarisation of the area.
· Dual citizenship available for all the inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life and have access to the land.
· Continuation of CPA oil-sharing agreement, alternatively with minor changes (Government of Sudan 50%; Government of South Sudan 42%; Bahr el Ghazal region 2%; Western Kordofan 2%; locally with the Ngok Dinka 2%; locally with the Misseriya people 2%).
· Bi-national development plan: the governments would cooperate to develop Abyei and the surrounding areas in terms of human development, infrastructure, and ecological sustainable development. Meeting these challenges together is both necessary, since they are interlinked, and helpful because it fosters cooperation.
Option 2: Autonomy Within Sudan
· The Sudanese government full sovereignty over Abyei.
· Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution.
· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
· Individuals all citizens of Sudan.
· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.
· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Abyei itself.
Option 3: Autonomy with Sudan
· South Sudanese full sovereignty over Abyei.
· Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).
· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
· Individuals all citizens of South Sudan.
· Nomadic peoples that use the land for parts of the year would have the option of being either Sudanese or South Sudanese citizens. In either case, they will have full and equal rights to access and use their traditional grazing land.
· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of South Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the Autonomous State of Abyei itself.
Options for the Future Governance of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State:
It is unlikely that Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State ever will become part of South Sudan. The opposition against such an outcome is too big within Sudan, and within the states themselves. Full independence for any of the states is also neither likely nor desirable. One may thus envision two options for the future governance of these two states:
Option 1: Autonomy within Sudan
· Areas of autonomy would be: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).
· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.
· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
· Sothern Kordofan: Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Southern Kordofan itself.
· Southern Kordofan: the Nuba people will have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.
Option 2: Secular Federalism in Sudan
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State would be states in a reformed federal Sudan. Some argue that Sudan’s current type of federalism has shortcomings which include a lack of a genuine commitment to federalism and the ‘tyranny of the (religious) majority’. Certainly a truly national sense of identity has not been achieved.
Secular federalism is the right solution for Sudan because:
- Federalism has a greater probability of success in upholding minority rights and deterring majority tyranny.
- It allows the minority to be a majority within their state (unique opportunity for self-fulfilment and self-development of a minority through power sharing)
- It provides protection from political and social domination
A well-functioning federal system based on secular values would indeed be the appropriate solution for Sudan. This would guarantee the rights and safety of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State.
[1] Sudan gained independence from Great Britain and Egypt on 1st January 1956. The country was divided into a northern and a southern region, along the ‘1956 boundary’. North-south rivalry had been encouraged by the British for decades before independence.
[2] UNMIS is the United Nations Mission in Sudan, a peacekeeping force established in 2005 to oversee the implementation of the CPA. They were operational in six different sectors around the north-south border areas. Its mandate ended on July 9th. Its equipment and personnel will be transferred to the UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan – established after South Sudan’s independence) and the UNISFA.
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