Sudan

The refugee camps in Chad

2012-01-16T06:55:00.000-08:00

On Sunday 15th Jan.in the Gaga refugee camp in Eastern Chad, Radio Dua Longawas told that the Police could not confirm that the refugees asked for International bodies would protect them or move them to more secure camps.
This was because it was thought that that the girls were arrested and being raped systematically by the guards.
Why isn't something being done about this? How can we continue living in this world where this sort of thing goes on. Remember your wife and daughters and mother what group can we call on? Please stop this in the name of humanity!

Final Sudan Report

2011-11-07T12:51:00.000-08:00

Key Observationas and Recommendations

After decades of civil war, on 9 July, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The Republic of the Sudan has recognised the new state and the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been fulfilled. In reality, however, several immediate and long term issues remain.

There are multiple flashpoints in frontline regions that were hardest hit during the civil war. Part of the boundary between the two states has been agreed but three contentious territories remain, at least one of which impacts the demarcation of the border. These are (the so-called ‘Three Areas’): Abyei, Southern Kordofan (specifically the Nuba Mountains) and the Blue Nile.

Of these, the Abyei issue clearly regards an unresolved decision as to sovereignty. Under the CPA, residents of South Kordofan and Blue Nile were to hold ill-defined “popular consultations” to determine their “constitutional future”.

In the midst of South Sudanese euphoria over independence, war-like events are unfolding in these border areas. This is largely due to the Sudanese Government’s fear that rebels loyal to the south are gaining strength in these areas. The Sudanese Government had hoped to quell secessionism in these areas before the South’s declaration of independence further inspired the rebels. The situation needs to be resolved to deal with the immediate humanitarian challenges, but also to prepare the way for a constructive relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. In order to resolve the conflicts the NCF makes three recommendations:

Recommendation 1: In addition to the need for an over-arching political solution to the Abyei question, the peoples of the Abyei region (both settled and nomadic) are in need of a flexible solution that allows for joint administration; complete demilitarisation; dual citizenship rights; guarantees of land usage rights for all inhabitants (permanent and nomadic); and a development plan. Critical to this flexible system of administration and mutual recognition of traditional rights is support for a process of reconciliation between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya tribes. In the latter part of this report the various options which may achieve this goal are discussed.

Essentially the NCF believes that the Abyei region should consider a shared sovereignty arrangement.

Recommendation 2: Autonomy arrangements should be pursued for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State within Sudan in order to protect minority rights. Autonomous areas would have control over: political organisation; economy; policing; education; religion; culture; and language. Equals rights need to be guaranteed for all inhabitants and Islamic law should not regard the non-Islamic peoples. In Southern Kordofan the Nuba people should have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.

Recommendation 3: Any approach should include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.

Background

All three areas lie north of the 1956 boundary[1], but have significant populations that feel politically closer to the south, often because of a shared history of grievance with the Khartoum government.

It was difficult to reach an agreement on the status of these areas in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and by way of compromise the agreement stipulated that a referendum should be held for Abyei, and some form of “popular consultations” should be held for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State. These consultations have yet to be completed and the statuses of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State remain disputed. At present, the Sudanese Government maintains de facto control, although the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other local forces aligned with South Sudan remain present.

The ethnic composition of the areas is highly complex (indeed there is some evidence that the people of the Nuba Mountains are ethnically linked to the Nuba in the extreme North of the country) but the main lines of conflict are between local Arabs who have their allegiance to the Republic of the Sudan and Africans who have their allegiance to South Sudan. Historically, the latter have been marginalised and fought alongside the SPLA during the civil war. They currently find themselves in limbo, outside of South Sudan. They do not all necessarily wish to become part of South Sudan (although many do). The local Arab groups fear that their rights to the land will not be recognised if the areas become part of South Sudan.

Abeyi

Abyei’s permanent population mainly consists of members of the Ngok Dinka tribe, who are majority Christians and animist with their allegiance predominantly to South Sudan. The other main group in the area are the Misseriya, Arab Muslims who are traditionally nomads and who pass through the area during the dry season (November-April) to graze cattle. Their allegiance is predominantly to North Sudan. The two groups lived together relatively peacefully for a long time, but relations deteriorated during the decades-long civil war. With the division of the country into a Northern and a Southern part, the question of which Abyei should belong to has been forced to the fore. The conflict over Abyei thus takes place on two levels:

1. At national level between:

a. Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) / the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)

b. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – the Southern Sudanese party and forces

2. At local level between

a. the Misseriya and

b. the Ngok Dinka.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The Abyei question was too complex to be fully negotiated in the CPA. The CPA limited itself to recognising a special administrative status for Abyei (which had formerly been part of Southern Kordofan state). The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retained “their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei”. The CPA also stipulated that, simultaneously with South Sudan’s referendum, a referendum was to be held in Abyei to determine whether it would remain a “special administrative” part of (North) Sudan or become part of the South Sudan. The borders of the area were to be demarcated by an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). This would inform who had the right to vote in the referendum.

The ABC’s July 2005 ruling was rejected by the NCP and the Misseriya. The NCP argued that the ABC had exceeded its mandate. Underlying the rejection was the fact that the ABC had located two oil fields, Heglig and Diffra, within Abyei rather than north of it. The Misseriya, on the other hand, argued that the ABC further diminished their power and territory. (Despite the fact that the ABC report had granted the Misseriya the right to graze in Abyei, the Misseriya erroneously came to believe that they had lost this right.) The NCP and Misseriya do not always agree. For example, the NCP’s interest in oil is not always shared by the Misseriya, who are most concerned with grazing rights.

After 2005, the situation in Abyei deteriorated. The SAF and Misseriya militias occupied and depopulated large parts of northern Abyei, consolidating their control of the oil fields in those areas. The SAF is in this way creating facts on the ground that may be beneficial in a potential future agreement. In May 2008 violence erupted between the SAF and SPLA causing dozens of deaths, massive displacement and considerable destruction in Abyei town. The Joint Integrated Units (JIU - composed of both SAF and SPLA forces), set up to maintain peace, were unable to do so.

In July 2009, the parties went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for a final and binding decision on the boundaries of Abyei. The PCA ruled that the ABC had exceeded its mandate, and reduced the size of Abyei. Most of the oil fields were given to the North. This also placed many Misseriya outside of Abyei, but the nomads would still have the right to graze in their traditional areas. The PCA’s decision was immediately rejected by the Misseriya who rightfully complained that they had not been consulted. The Sudanese government, despite some ambiguities in the beginning, also rejected the decision, while the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka accepted it. The demarcation work on the ground began, but this stalled due to threats from Misseriya militias.

2011 Referendum and Violence

The Abyei referendum which was to be held in January 2011 was never carried out due to disagreement between the NCP and the SPLM over how to determine eligibility to vote (the NCP argue that the USA-drafted “Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area” or Chapter IV, signed in Naivasha, Kenya on 26 May 2004 gave the Misseriya a share of the oil and representation in the administration. The NCP argues that the SPLA accepted that, recognizing that the nomads are resident in the area).

If the nomadic Misseriya are not considered residents, the majority Ngok Dinka will most vote to become part of Southern Sudan. If, on the other hand, the Misseriya are counted as residents, their votes may be sufficient to make Abyei remain part of the North.

Uncertainty over the Abyei referendum and subsequent failure to carry it out in January 2011 caused an increase in tensions. Misseriya militias (backed by the SAF) clashed with the SPLA in several locations during the first half of 2011, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. In May, the SAF and Misseriya militias seized and took full control of Abyei town. The campaign caused massive destruction and 100,000 people fled to the south. Almost no civilians remained in Abyei. The SPLA chose not to retake Abyei to avoid disturbing the imminent secession of South Sudan. 2011 was also the first year in living memory that the Misseriya did not graze their cattle at the river Kiir, south of Abyei town. Although both sides are publically committed to removing their troops, both continue to rearm. Several agreements between the parties were signed during these months, but to no avail.

More recently, peace talks were held in Ethiopia in June. The two sides came to an agreement which included bilateral demilitarisation of the area and joint administration by the two governments with AU facilitation. This included the establishment of a Joint Oversight Committee, consisting of two NCP-members and two SPLM-members. Furthermore, the UN Security Council mandated a deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers (UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) to the area. The agreed demilitarisation did not occur, however, on 8 September the AU brokered an accord whereby both sides committed to withdraw their troops by 30 September.

Both the NCP and SPLM have close relationships with their respective local constituencies and both countries include Abyei in their current constitutions.

Southern Kordofan

Southern Kordofan consists mostly of the African Christian Nuba people and Misseriya. The Nuba people live mostly in the Nuba Mountains, and have long been treated as second class citizens by the north, with reduced education and career prospects. In 1992, the Sudanese government launched a jihad against the Nuba rebels. Whilst many fought on the southern side during the civil war, the conflict here also represents the Nuba waging their own indigenous rebellion against the government. There are also lingering tensions from the civil war and much bad feeling between the residents of Southern Kordofan. Grazing rights and political issues are of particular note. The Nuba people continue to feel culturally and politically isolated and fear the imposition of full Sharia law.

The popular consultations stipulated in the CPA have not yet taken place. Locals are very critical of the CPA claiming that it has not provided any resolution the disputes at hand. In May 2011, the delayed gubernatorial election in Southern Kordofan was won by the NCP candidate, the incumbent governor Ahmed Haroun (who is one of three Sudanese leaders to be under indictment by the International Criminal Court, for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur), although the SPLM rejects the result, claiming that the vote was rigged.

The first half of 2011 saw increased militarisation of Southern Kordofan. After the January referendum on independence, the Sudanese government insisted that the SPLA (who the government now views as a foreign army, because of South Sudan’s independence) withdraw from Southern Kordofan. The SPLA, however, argues that there are no SPLA forces in Southern Kordofan to withdraw. The Sudanese Government has now declared opposition group, SPLM-North (which has ties to the SPLM) illegal and members of the party have been arrested.

Since June there has been a major humanitarian crisis in Southern Kordofan. Fighting has broken out between local SPLA forces and government forces/local militias. SAF has also engaged in heavy bombardment campaigns against the towns of Kadugli (capital of Southern Kordofan), Kauda and other areas, resulting in hundreds of deaths and at least 73,000 refugees. More than 150,000 people have had to flee from their homes. There have been reports of human rights abuses, targeting of civilians and ethnic cleansing committed by SAF and local militias loyal to the Sudanese Government. There are reports of forces going from house to house to carry out summary executions based on ethnicity, political affiliation and even skin colour. According to aid agencies, the Sudanese government’s ethnic cleansing is targeting the indigenous Nuba peoples. The government, for their part, claim that their campaigns are directed at protecting civilians.

On 28 June, the two parties met in Ethiopia and signed a ‘Framework Agreement’ on political and security arrangements. The accord, however, later collapsed as hardliners within NCP rejected it. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir renounced it on 7 July. SAF bombardments continue. President Bashir has said that the SAF will continue its military offensive until Southern Kordofan is purged and they have arrested the local SPLM leader.

The SAF has prevented UNMIS^{^[2]} and aid agencies from gaining access to civilians in need of assistance and on 11 July they threatened NGOs with expulsion. UNMIS’s mandate ended on 9 July, the day of South Sudan’s independence.

Blue Nile State

Blue Nile State was established by Presidential Decree in 1992. The institutional set up of the state was included in the Naivasha protocols of 2004, which became an integral part of the CPA. The state is 38,500 square kilometres with a population of 800,000. There are marked divisions between northern and southern parts of the state, recalling the main conflict lines. Southern areas are less developed, but have received a larger proportion of retunring refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia. Blue Nile State is home to the Roseires Dam, the main source of Sudan's hydroelectric power.

Instability in Darfur, the escalation of conflict in Abyei and the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) attempt to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir have all put pressure on Blue Nile State’s fragile stability.

The formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes that were delayed across the country began again in early 2009. Reintegration is expected to be challenging, given Blue Nile’s poor infrastructure and the weak economic environment. While Blue Nile State has developed a constitution and set up a legislative assembly in the four years since the CPA was signed, in practice, the political and civil service administration has not normalised.

The popular consultations stipulated by the CPA began in January 2011 in the form of more than 100 hearing centres across the state, but the results have not been published and the process has stalled indefinitely due to renewed hostilities.

The desire for autonomy in the region was very strong as was the Sudanese Government opposition to autonomy. The Carter Center observed the consultations and noted positive aspects including: broad participation (69,429 people in 108 locations); strong turnout by women; strong administration; few eligibility issues and good language accessibility. They also noted, however, that many individuals appeared to be coached by the major parties, that the views of minorities were not well represented and that self-determination was not an option.

Although the popular consultations were a unique opportunity for the people to articulate their interests and needs, their real practical value is still uncertain. The popular consultations, if successful, could also be a mechanism for negotiating wealth and power-sharing agreements on a national scale, including a remaking of its federal system, which could prove crucial for Sudan’s stability.

On 2 September the NCP declared a state of emergency in the Blue Nile State and sacked Governor Malik Agar, appointing an interim military ruler in his place. Fighting continues and the Sudanese Government has denied UN and other aid agencies access to Blue Nile state. The UN estimates over 50,000 civilians have had to flee the region.

An important issue, for long term peace, is what to do with the local, indigenous forces that fought with the SPLA during the civil war. The relationship between the NCP and the SPLM remains a source of tension. As mentioned above, the Sudanese Government has moved to ban the group.

SPLM/A North argue that they do not belong to South Sudan, but are northern. Since the popular consultations on the status of the state have not been completed, they do not recognise the sovereignty of the Sudanese government, and thus refuse to disarm (the CPA determined that they should be demobilized, demilitarized and reintegrated with civilian life - those still physically fit would be reemployed in the Army or Police).

Overarching Issues

All three conflicts are devastating for the local populations, but they also have a broader impact on the future stability of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. A war could damage the legitimacy of the new government in the South, which is already struggling to deal with the challenges of running a new country, and undermine its attempt to find stable economic footing. To a large extent, the ongoing conflicts are representative of the areas which the CPA failed to adequately address. Issues include: revenue sharing; border demarcation; arrangements on citizenship; and natural resource management. These all need to be solved if the two nations are to maintain a healthy post-divorce relationship.

The Bi-lateral relationship

The ‘three areas’ represent the biggest challenge to the newly forming bilateral relationship and will provide a litmus test for how future conflicts will be resolved. If they can be successfully negotiated it will pave the way for greater cooperation in the future. Current trends towards use of force by the Sudanese Government do not bode well for a peaceful diplomatic resolution. External actors need to get leaders back to the negotiating table with sufficient political will to contain the violence, including a cease-fire and strong security arrangements for the transitional states.

The conflict in Abyei centres on issues of revenue sharing, border demarcation, migration and citizenship rights, as well as minorities’ rights. These are all issues which the two countries will need to come to terms with in the long term through peaceful means.

Migration Rights, Citizenship, and Border Democracy

The Sudanese Foreign Minister has indicated that he would like to see a ‘soft border’ between Sudan and South Sudan. It is in both countries’ interests to have a border which allows for high levels of trade and investment, free movement of migratory groups, and easy movement for those who have traditionally operated on both sides of the border. In this context, some have proposed a buffer zone which belongs to neither country to allow for an easy flow of goods and people. The people of Sudan’s border territories have relied on a porous boundary for generations and any arrangement that inadvertently hardens the border could prove disastrous in the long run.

Further deterioration of relations could put a soft border further out of reach. Current security realities must be considered in light of the long-term social, political, and economic consequences of new barriers in border areas and more broadly across the two Sudans.

There are also questions of citizenship rights and the protection of minorities. Given the close connection between many residents and South Sudan, arrangements will need to be found that respect the wishes of all local groups. This includes Sharia law not having regard to non-Islamic peoples. In the end it is only the communities that can bring peace, and solutions need to be found to deal with their problems. This will require them to have a voice in negotiations.

Control of Resources

Oil is a crucial aspect of this conflict. Most of Sudan’s most productive oil resources are located in Southern Kordofan, and some in Abyei. Some argue that the rejection of a referendum in Abyei was driven primarily by fear of losing control over the oil resources in the area. The challenges in the conflict areas also mirror the critical importance of oil in the bilateral relationship. South Sudan inherited a large proportion of the oil resources, however, the majority of processing infrastructure and pipelines exist in the North. Both countries are economically reliant on oil and will need to come to a productive arrangement to develop and exploit these resources.

Options for the Future Governance of Abyei

The international Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) for the CPA recently recommended the following priorities: the deployment of UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei); the withdrawal of all other forces; the appointment of the new administration and oversight committee and the safe return of IDPs (i.e. refugees). In order for this to happen, it is crucial that the two governments cooperate and that the international community (particularly the AU, UN peacekeepers, donors and aid agencies) support efforts toward peace and stability. The AEC also states that the two countries should move forward on the basis of current temporary agreements. In the medium term, the focus needs to be on new negotiations on the borders, to include not only the two governments, but also the local populations (Ngok Dinka and Misseriya) and negotiations on who to include in referendum.

It is important, however, that all decisions include the people on the ground. This includes the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, as well as other groups that live in and are nomads in Abyei. The following options for future governance should therefore be presented to the leaders and to the peoples, and followed by a referendum. The NCF recommends the full development of Option 1 which entails shared sovereignty. Joint efforts could foster cooperation, build confidence and thus have a long-term positive impact on relations between the two governments and the peoples. It would also limit the importance of where the boundaries are drawn because the numerical majority would no longer determine which country Abyei was part of. Option 2 and 3 reflect recommended arrangements should sovereignty rest with either Sudan or South Sudan.

Any approach must include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.

Option 1: Shared Sovreignty

Model: Peru-Ecuador shared sovereignty over the bi-national park in the Amazon.

· Joint political and bureaucratic administration with power-sharing systems, in the beginning under the auspices of the AU/UN.

· Joint police force (perhaps an international force in the beginning).

· Complete demilitarisation of the area.

· Dual citizenship available for all the inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life and have access to the land.

· Continuation of CPA oil-sharing agreement, alternatively with minor changes (Government of Sudan 50%; Government of South Sudan 42%; Bahr el Ghazal region 2%; Western Kordofan 2%; locally with the Ngok Dinka 2%; locally with the Misseriya people 2%).

· Bi-national development plan: the governments would cooperate to develop Abyei and the surrounding areas in terms of human development, infrastructure, and ecological sustainable development. Meeting these challenges together is both necessary, since they are interlinked, and helpful because it fosters cooperation.

Option 2: Autonomy Within Sudan

· The Sudanese government full sovereignty over Abyei.

· Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution.

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Individuals all citizens of Sudan.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Abyei itself.

Option 3: Autonomy with Sudan

· South Sudanese full sovereignty over Abyei.

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Individuals all citizens of South Sudan.

· Nomadic peoples that use the land for parts of the year would have the option of being either Sudanese or South Sudanese citizens. In either case, they will have full and equal rights to access and use their traditional grazing land.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of South Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the Autonomous State of Abyei itself.

Options for the Future Governance of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State:

It is unlikely that Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State ever will become part of South Sudan. The opposition against such an outcome is too big within Sudan, and within the states themselves. Full independence for any of the states is also neither likely nor desirable. One may thus envision two options for the future governance of these two states:

Option 1: Autonomy within Sudan

· Areas of autonomy would be: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).

· Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.

· Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.

· Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.

· All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.

· Sothern Kordofan: Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Southern Kordofan itself.

· Southern Kordofan: the Nuba people will have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.

Option 2: Secular Federalism in Sudan

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State would be states in a reformed federal Sudan. Some argue that Sudan’s current type of federalism has shortcomings which include a lack of a genuine commitment to federalism and the ‘tyranny of the (religious) majority’. Certainly a truly national sense of identity has not been achieved.

Secular federalism is the right solution for Sudan because:

Federalism has a greater probability of success in upholding minority rights and deterring majority tyranny.
It allows the minority to be a majority within their state (unique opportunity for self-fulfilment and self-development of a minority through power sharing)
It provides protection from political and social domination

A well-functioning federal system based on secular values would indeed be the appropriate solution for Sudan. This would guarantee the rights and safety of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

[1] Sudan gained independence from Great Britain and Egypt on 1^st January 1956. The country was divided into a northern and a southern region, along the ‘1956 boundary’. North-south rivalry had been encouraged by the British for decades before independence.

[2] UNMIS is the United Nations Mission in Sudan, a peacekeeping force established in 2005 to oversee the implementation of the CPA. They were operational in six different sectors around the north-south border areas. Its mandate ended on July 9^th. Its equipment and personnel will be transferred to the UNMISS (UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan – established after South Sudan’s independence) and the UNISFA.

Draft Sudan Report (Comments Welcome)

2011-09-26T08:44:00.000-07:00

REPORT 51 dated 9 September 2011
Sudan and South Sudan: resolving ‘the Three Areas’ conflicts
Key Observations and Recommendations
After decades of civil war, on 9 July, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence. The Republic of the Sudan has recognised the new state and the provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have been fulfilled. In reality, however, several immediate and long term issues remain.
There are multiple flashpoints in frontline regions that were hardest hit during the civil war. Part of the boundary between the two states has been agreed but three disputed territories remain (the so-called ‘Three Areas’): Abyei, Southern Kordofan (specifically the Nuba Mountains) and the Blue Nile.
In the midst of South Sudanese euphoria over independence, war-like events are unfolding in these border areas. This is largely due to the Sudanese Government’s fear that rebels loyal to the south are gaining strength in these areas. The Sudanese Government had hoped to quell secessionism in these areas before the South’s declaration of independence further inspired the rebels. The situation needs to be resolved to deal with the immediate humanitarian challenges, but also to prepare the way for a constructive relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. In order to resolve the conflicts the NCF makes three recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The Abyei region should consider a shared sovereignty arrangement with: joint political and bureaucratic administration; complete demilitarisation; dual citizenship rights; equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants (permanent and nomadic); a bi-national development plan; and continuation of the CPA oil-sharing agreement.
Recommendation 2: Autonomy arrangements should be pursued for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State within Sudan in order to protect minority rights. Autonomous areas would have control over: political organisation; economy; policing; education; religion; culture; and language. Equals rights need to be guaranteed for all inhabitants and Islamic law should not regard the non-Islamic peoples. In Southern Kordofan the Nuba people should have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.
Recommendation 3: Any approach should include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.

Background
All three areas all lie north of the 1956 boundary , but have significant populations that feel culturally and ethnically closer to the south. It was difficult to reach an agreement on their status in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and by way of compromise the agreement stipulated that a referendum should be held for Abyei, and some form of “popular consultations” should be held for Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State. These consultations have yet to be completed and the statuses of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State remain disputed. At present, the Sudanese Government maintains de facto control, although the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other local forces aligned with South Sudan remain present.
The ethnic composition of the areas is highly complex but the main lines of conflict are between local Arabs who have their allegiance to the Republic of the Sudan and Africans who have their allegiance to South Sudan. Historically, the latter have been marginalised and fought alongside the SPLA during the civil war. They currently find themselves in limbo, outside of South Sudan but inside their homeland which does not seem to want them. They do not all necessarily wish to become part of South Sudan (although many do). The local Arab groups fear that their rights to the land will not be recognised if the areas become part of South Sudan.

Abyei
Abyei’s permanent population mainly consists of members of the Ngok Dinka tribe, who are majority Christians and animist with their allegiance predominantly to South Sudan. The other main group in the area are the Misseriya, Arab Muslims who are traditionally nomads and who pass through the area during the dry season (November-April) to graze cattle. Their allegiance is predominantly to North Sudan. The two groups lived together relatively peacefully for a long time, but relations deteriorated during the decades-long civil war. With the division of the country into a Northern and a Southern part, the question of which Abyei should belong to has been forced to the fore. The conflict over Abyei thus takes place on two levels:
1. At national level between:
a. Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) / the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
b. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – the Southern Sudanese party and forces
2. At local level between
a. the Misseriya and
b. the Ngok Dinka.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
The Abyei question was too complex to be fully negotiated in the CPA. The CPA limited itself to recognising a special administrative status for Abyei (which had formerly been part of Southern Kordofan state). The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retained “their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei”. The CPA also stipulated that, simultaneously with South Sudan’s referendum, a referendum was to be held in Abyei to determine whether it would remain a “special administrative” part of (North) Sudan or become part of the South Sudan. The borders of the area were to be demarcated by an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). This would inform who had the right to vote in the referendum.
The ABC’s July 2005 ruling was rejected by the NCP and the Misseriya. The NCP argued that the ABC had exceeded its mandate. Underlying the rejection was the fact that the ABC had located two oil fields, Heglig and Diffra, within Abyei rather than north of it. The Misseriya, on the other hand, argued that the ABC further diminished their power and territory. (Despite the fact that the ABC report had granted the Misseriya the right to graze in Abyei, an NCP disinformation campaign made the Misseriya believe that they had lost this right.) The NCP and Misseriya do not always agree. For example, the NCP’s interest in oil is not always shared by the Misseriya, who are most concerned with grazing rights.
After 2005, the situation in Abyei deteriorated. The SAF and Misseriya militias occupied and depopulated large parts of northern Abyei, consolidating their control of the oil fields in those areas. The SAF is in this way creating facts on the ground that may be beneficial in a potential future agreement. In May 2008 violence erupted between the SAF and SPLA causing dozens of deaths, massive displacement and considerable destruction in Abyei town. The Joint Integrated Units (JIU - composed of both SAF and SPLA forces), set up to maintain peace, were unable to do so.
In July 2009, the parties went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague for a final and binding decision on the boundaries of Abyei. The PCA ruled that the ABC had exceeded its mandate, and reduced the size of Abyei. Most of the oil fields were given to the North. This also placed many Misseriya outside of Abyei, but the nomads would still have the right to graze in their traditional areas. The PCA’s decision was immediately rejected by the Misseriya who rightfully complained that they had not been consulted. The Sudanese government, despite some ambiguities in the beginning, also rejected the decision, while the SPLM and the Ngok Dinka accepted it. The demarcation work on the ground began, but this stalled due to threats from Misseriya militias.
2011 referendum and violence
The Abyei referendum which was to be held in January 2011 was never carried out due to disagreement between the NCP and the SPLM over how to determine eligibility to vote. If the nomadic Misseriya are not considered residents, the majority Ngok Dinka will most vote to become part of Southern Sudan. If, on the other hand, the Misseriya are counted as residents, their votes may be sufficient to make Abyei remain part of the North.
Uncertainty over the Abyei referendum and subsequent failure to carry it out in January 2011 caused an increase in tensions. Misseriya militias (backed by the SAF) clashed with the SPLA in several locations during the first half of 2011, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. In May, the SAF and Misseriya militias seized and took full control of Abyei town. The campaign caused massive destruction and 100,000 people fled to the south. Almost no civilians remained in Abyei. The SPLA chose not to retake Abyei to avoid disturbing the imminent secession of South Sudan. 2011 was also the first year in living memory that the Misseriya did not graze their cattle at the river Kiir, south of Abyei town. Although both sides are publically committed to removing their troops, both continue to rearm. Several agreements between the parties were signed during these months, but to no avail.
More recently, peace talks were held in Ethiopia in June. The two sides came to an agreement which included bilateral demilitarisation of the area and joint administration by the two governments with AU facilitation. This included the establishment of a Joint Oversight Committee, consisting of two NCP-members and two SPLM-members. Furthermore, the UN Security Council mandated a deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers (UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) to the area. The agreed demilitarisation did not occur, however, on 8 September the AU brokered an accord whereby both sides committed to withdraw their troops by 30 September.
Both the NCP and SPLM have close relationships with their respective local constituencies and both countries include Abyei in their current constitutions. The SPLM, however, is slightly divided on the issue, and may not be willing to accept war in order to get Abyei. NCP, on the other hand, seems more war-prone.
Southern Kordofan
Southern Kordofan consists mostly of the African Christian Nuba people and Misseriya. The Nuba people live mostly in the Nuba Mountains, and have long been treated as second class citizens by the north, with reduced education and career prospects. In 1992, the Sudanese government launched a jihad against the Nuba rebels. Whilst many fought on the southern side during the civil war, the conflict here also represents the Nuba waging their own indigenous rebellion against the government. There are also lingering tensions from the civil war and much bad feeling between the residents of Southern Kordofan. Grazing rights and political issues are of particular note. The Nuba people continue to feel culturally and politically isolated and fear the imposition of full Sharia law.
The popular consultations stipulated in the CPA have not yet taken place. Locals are very critical of the CPA claiming that it has not provided any resolution the disputes at hand. In May 2011, the delayed gubernatorial election in Southern Kordofan was won by the NCP candidate, the incumbent governor Ahmed Haroun (who is one of three Sudanese leaders to be under indictment by the International Criminal Court, for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur), although the SPLM rejects the result, claiming that the vote was rigged.
The first half of 2011 saw increased militarisation of Southern Kordofan. After the January referendum on independence, the Sudanese government insisted that the SPLA (who the government now views as a foreign army, because of South Sudan’s independence) withdraw from Southern Kordofan. The SPLA, however, argues that there are no SPLA forces in Southern Kordofan to withdraw. The Sudanese Government has now declared opposition group, SPLM-North (which has ties to the SPLM) illegal and members of the party have been arrested.
Since June there has been a major humanitarian crisis in Southern Kordofan. Fighting has broken out between local SPLA forces and government forces/local militias. SAF has also engaged in heavy bombardment campaigns against the towns of Kadugli (capital of Southern Kordofan), Kauda and other areas, resulting in hundreds of deaths and at least 73,000 refugees. More than 150,000 people have had to flee from their homes. There have been reports of human rights abuses, targeting of civilians and ethnic cleansing committed by SAF and local militias loyal to the Sudanese Government. There are reports of forces going from house to house to carry out summary executions based on ethnicity, political affiliation and even skin colour. According to aid agencies, the Sudanese government’s ethnic cleansing is targeting the indigenous Nuba peoples. The government, for their part, claim that their campaigns are directed at protecting civilians.
On 28 June, the two parties met in Ethiopia and signed a ‘Framework Agreement’ on political and security arrangements. The accord, however, later collapsed as hardliners within NCP rejected it. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir renounced it on 7 July. SAF bombardments continue. President Bashir has said that the SAF will continue its military offensive until Southern Kordofan is purged and they have arrested the local SPLM leader.
The SAF has prevented UNMIS and aid agencies from gaining access to civilians in need of assistance and on 11 July they threatened NGOs with expulsion. UNMIS’s mandate ended on 9 July, the day of South Sudan’s independence.
Blue Nile State
Blue Nile State was established by Presidential Decree in 1992. The institutional set-up of the state was included in the Naivasha protocols of 2004, which became an integral part of the CPA. The state is 38,500 square kilometres with a population of 800,000. There are marked divisions between northern and southern parts of the state, recalling the main conflict lines. Southern areas are less developed, but have received a larger proportion of returning refugees from neighbouring Ethiopia. Blue Nile State is home to the Roseires dam, the main source of Sudan’s hydroelectric power.
Instability in Darfur, the escalation of conflict in Abyei and the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) attempt to prosecute President Omar al-Bashir have all put pressure on Blue Nile State’s fragile stability. The formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes that were delayed across the country began again in early 2009. Reintegration is expected to be challenging, given Blue Nile’s poor infrastructure and the weak economic environment. While Blue Nile State has developed a constitution and set up a legislative assembly in the four years since the CPA was signed, in practice, the political and civil service administration has not normalised.
The popular consultations stipulated by the CPA began in January 2011 in the form of more than 100 hearing centres across the state, but the results have not been published and the process has stalled indefinitely due to renewed hostilities. The desire for autonomy in the region was reported as very strong as was the Sudanese Government opposition to autonomy. The Carter Center observed the consultations and noted positive aspects including: broad participation (69,429 people in 108 locations); strong turnout by women; strong administration; few eligibility issues and good language accessibility. They also noted, however, that many individuals appeared to be coached by the major parties, that the views of minorities were not well represented and that self-determination is still not an option.
Although the popular consultations were a unique opportunity for the people to articulate their interests and needs, their real practical value is still uncertain. The popular consultations, if successful, could also be a mechanism for negotiating wealth and power-sharing agreements on a national scale, including a remaking of its federal system, which could prove crucial for Sudan’s stability.
On 2 September the NCP declared a state of emergency in the Blue Nile State and sacked Governor Malik Agar, appointing an interim military ruler in his place. Fighting continues and the Sudanese Government has denied UN and other aid agencies access to Blue Nile state. The UN estimates over 50,000 civilians have had to flee the region.
An important issue, for long term peace, is what to do with the local, indigenous forces that fought with the SPLA during the civil war. The relationship between the NCP and the SPLM remains a source of tension. As mentioned above, the Sudanese Government has moved to ban the group. SPLM/A North argue that they do not belong to South Sudan, but are northern. Since the popular consultations on the status of the state have not been completed, they do not recognise the sovereignty of the Sudanese government, and thus refuse to disarm.
Overarching Issues
All three conflicts are devastating for the local populations, but they also have a broader impact on the future stability of the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. A war could damage the legitimacy of the new government in the South, which is already struggling to deal with the challenges of running a new country, and undermine its attempt to find stable economic footing. To a large extent, the ongoing conflicts are representative of the areas which the CPA failed to adequately address. Such issues include: revenue sharing; border demarcation; arrangements on citizenship; and natural resource management. These all need to be solved if the two nations are to maintain a healthy post-divorce relationship.
The bilateral relationship
The ‘three areas’ represent the biggest challenge to the newly forming bilateral relationship and will provide a litmus test for how future conflicts will be resolved. If they can be successfully negotiated it will pave the way for greater cooperation in the future. Current trends towards use of force by the Sudanese Government do not bode well for a peaceful diplomatic resolution. External actors need to get leaders back to the negotiating table with sufficient political will to contain the violence, including a cease-fire and strong security arrangements for the transitional states.
The conflict in Abyei centres on issues of revenue sharing, border demarcation, migration and citizenship rights, as well as minorities rights. These are all issues which the two countries will need to come to terms with in the long term through peaceful means.
Migration rights, citizenship and border demarcation
The Sudanese Foreign Minister has indicated that he would like to see a ‘soft border’ between Sudan and South Sudan. It is in both countries interests to have a border which allows for high levels of trade and investment, free movement of migratory groups, and easy movement for those who have traditionally operated on both sides of the border. In this context, some have proposed a buffer zone which belongs to neither country to allow for an easy flow of goods and people. The people of Sudan’s border territories have relied on a porous boundary for generations and any arrangement that inadvertently hardens the border could prove disastrous in the long run.
Further deterioration of relations could put a soft border further out of reach. Current security realities must be considered in light of the long-term social, political, and economic consequences of new barriers in border areas and more broadly across the two Sudans.
There are also questions of citizenship rights and the protection of minorities. Given the close connection between many residents and South Sudan, arrangements will need to be found that respect the wishes of all local groups. This includes Sharia law not having regard to non-Islamic peoples. In the end it is only the communities that can bring peace, and solutions need to be found to deal with their problems. This will require them to have a voice in negotiations.
Control of resources
Oil is a crucial aspect of this conflict. Most of Sudan’s most productive oil resources are located in Southern Kordofan, and some in Abyei. Some argue that the rejection of a referendum in Abyei was driven primarily by fear of losing control over the oil resources in the area. The challenges in the conflict areas also mirror the critical importance of oil in the bilateral relationship. South Sudan inherited a large proportion of the oil resources, however, the majority of processing infrastructure and pipelines exist in the North. Both countries are economically reliant on oil and will need to come to a productive arrangement to develop and exploit these resources.
Options for the Future Governance of Abyei
The international Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) for the CPA recently recommended the following priorities: the deployment of UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei); the withdrawal of all other forces; the appointment of the new administration and oversight committee and the safe return of IDPs (i.e. refugees). In order for this to happen, it is crucial that the two governments cooperate and that the international community (particularly the AU, UN peacekeepers, donors and aid agencies) support efforts toward peace and stability. The AEC also states that the two countries should move forward on the basis of current temporary agreements. In the medium term, the focus needs to be on new negotiations on the borders, to include not only the two governments, but also the local populations (Ngok Dinka and Misseriya) and negotiations on who to include in referendum.
It is important, however, that all decisions include the people on the ground. This includes the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya, as well as other groups that live in and are nomads in Abyei. The following options for future governance should therefore be presented to the leaders and to the peoples, and followed by a referendum. The NCF recommends the full development of Option 1 which entails shared sovereignty. Joint efforts could foster cooperation, build confidence and thus have a long-term positive impact on relations between the two governments and the peoples. It would also limit the importance of where the boundaries are drawn because the numerical majority would no longer determine which country Abyei was part of. Option 2 and 3 reflect recommended arrangements should sovereignty rest with either Sudan or South Sudan.
Any approach must include restoration of traditional methods of local conflict resolution, such as the annual meetings between local governors, district commissioners and heads of the different tribes, during which they would resolve inter-tribal conflicts. This system was respected among the different tribes in the past, and should be reinvigorated as part of the new structure of governance.
Option1: Shared Sovereignty
Model: Peru-Ecuador shared sovereignty over the bi-national park in the Amazon.
• Joint political and bureaucratic administration with power-sharing systems, in the beginning under the auspices of the AU/UN.
• Joint police force (perhaps an international force in the beginning).
• Complete demilitarisation of the area.
• Dual citizenship available for all the inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
• Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
• All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life and have access to the land.
• Continuation of CPA oil-sharing agreement, alternatively with minor changes (Government of Sudan 50%; Government of South Sudan 42%; Bahr el Ghazal region 2%; Western Kordofan 2%; locally with the Ngok Dinka 2%; locally with the Misseriya people 2%).
• Bi-national development plan: the governments would cooperate to develop Abyei and the surrounding areas in terms of human development, infrastructure, and ecological sustainable development. Meeting these challenges together is both necessary, since they are interlinked, and helpful because it fosters cooperation.
Option 2: Autonomy within Sudan
• The Sudanese government full sovereignty over Abyei.
• Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution.
• Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
• Individuals all citizens of Sudan.
• Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
• Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.
• All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
• Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Abyei itself.
Option 3: Autonomy within South Sudan
• South Sudanese full sovereignty over Abyei.
• Areas of autonomy would regard: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).
• Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
• Individuals all citizens of South Sudan.
• Nomadic peoples that use the land for parts of the year would have the option of being either Sudanese or South Sudanese citizens. In either case, they will have full and equal rights to access and use their traditional grazing land.
• Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
• All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
• Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of South Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the Autonomous State of Abyei itself.

Options for the Future Governance of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State
It is unlikely that Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State ever will become part of South Sudan. The opposition against such an outcome is too big within Sudan, and within the states themselves. Full independence for any of the states is also neither likely nor desirable. One may thus envision two options for the future governance of these two states:
Option 1: Autonomy within Sudan
• Areas of autonomy would be: political organisation of the state; economy; administration and bureaucracy; policing (see below); education; cultural and language matters; religious matters; local conflict resolution (see below).
• Local police force composed of a fixed share of officers from each different local group.
• Equal rights, guarantees and duties for all inhabitants, permanent and nomadic.
• Islamic law does not regard the non-Islamic peoples.
• All groups are permitted to live their traditional way of life, have access to the land.
• Sothern Kordofan: Oil revenues would accrue partly to the Government of Sudan, and partly to the local groups and the autonomous state of Southern Kordofan itself.
• Southern Kordofan: the Nuba people will have a further degree of autonomy in the areas they inhabit.
Option 2: Secular federalism in Sudan
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State are states in a reformed federal Sudan. According to academic Ahmed T. el-Gaili, Sudan’s current type of federalism is deeply flawed. He points out the following shortcomings:

• Lack of constitutional safeguards and judicial enforcement
• Lack of geographical concentration of minority groups
• Lack of design of a typical federal system – differs little from the highly centralised unitary state that existed previously
• Lack of administrative and social integration
• Lack of genuine commitment to federalism
• Islamic federalism has not worked in Sudan – there is need for secular federalism
• Minorities have been oppressed – ‘tyranny of the (religious) majority’
• A national identity has not been achieved
• Political elites are ill-informed about value of federalism

He further argues that secular federalism is the right solution for Sudan, assuming there is an improvement on the abovementioned points, because:

• Federalism has a greater probability of success in upholding minority rights and deterring majority tyranny.
• It allows the minority to be a majority within their state (unique opportunity for self-fulfilment and self-development of a minority through power sharing)
• It provides protection from political and social domination
• Secularism is an additional prerequisite, especially in an Islamic context

A well-functioning federal system based on secular values would indeed be the appropriate solution for Sudan. This would guarantee the rights and safety of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

SPLM-North declared illegal

2011-09-07T07:54:00.000-07:00

The Sudanese Government has declared the SPLM-North opposition group (who had strong ties to South Sudan during the civil war) illegal. SPLM-North claim that several of its offices have been shut down and members of the party have been arrested.

This comes months after the Government forcefully took control of the contested border territory of Abyei and less than a week after they declared a state of emergency in Blue Nile removing Malik Agar, the leader of SPLM-North, from his elected post as state governor.

The moves represent an escalation of the conflicts in the key border areas. The Sudanese Government blames the conflict on South Sudanese support for the SPLM-North. South Sudan, however, denies any involvement. This throws into further doubt the possibility of finding a negotiated solution to the conflicts.

Darfur establishes 'Peace Office'

2011-09-02T08:49:00.000-07:00

Omar al- Bashir, the President of Sudan, just last week set up the Darfur Peace Follow- Up Office; in the hope of edging closer towards the international vision of peace for Darfur. Al- Bashir issued a presidential decree to establish the new office, appointing state minister Amin Hassan Omer at its head, in a move that is widely seen to be a further attempt at implementing the Doha Peace Agreement of July 14th 2011. In spite of this perceived reconciliation between Khartoum and some of the major rebel groups in Northern Darfur, strained relations in other areas bordering Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan still seem prevalent.
Just a few hours ago, there were reports of increased fighting in the Blue Nile State, with many residents having already fled the capital, Damazin. Similarly, neighbouring South Kordofan saw the exodus of 200,000 citizens amidst reports of summary executions, aerial bombardments and the shelling of neighbourhoods. Whilst the ceasefire last week in that region portrayed hopeful images of some sort of imminent settlement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have since accused the government of tactically using this time to prepare for the attack in the Blue Nile State.
On the one hand, whilst reports of communication between South Sudan's new leader, Salva Kiir, and the North's al- Bashir are encouraging, it seems that the border areas still have some way to go.

Ceasefire and Divorce

2011-08-03T08:59:00.001-07:00

The recently independent South Sudan has been taking measures this week to speed up the implementation of their new currency, a further step away from its neighbours in north Sudan. The division between the two has caused further problems, including ending the hotspots of violence and contesting the region of Abyei, which lies between both countries.

However perhaps a step towards peace has been reached today, as South Sudan’s SSLA Unity State rebel organisation declare a cease fire. The South Sudan Liberation Army is the most significant of the rebel groups in the south, who protest against corruption in government and the spending of vast oil revenues. The cease fire, if holds, will present huge progress and stability for the country, which has seen years of fighting and conflict.

Sudan and South Sudan: not quite peace

2011-07-26T05:02:00.000-07:00

On 14^th July, five days after its independence, South Sudan was welcomed as the 193^rd member of the United Nations. The international community has accompanied South Sudan in their struggle for independence since the peace process in the early 2000s and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. A lot has been accomplished, indeed. Yet as the 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers who are being deployed in the Abyei area know all too well – peace has not yet been achieved.

Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State are the so-called “Three areas” whose status was left undetermined by the CPA, and which continue to cause conflict betweent the two countries. Their status is still disputed – both Sudan and South Sudan claim to have the right to sovereignty over the areas, and the local populations are split. During the past months, the areas have been arenas for violence, killings, mass displacement and destruction. Despite several attempts at agreements between the two parties, none have proved sustainable.

All three areas share some of the same features. They are inhabited by a whole array of different ethnic groups, some of which consider themselves “northerners” (e.g. the Misseriya), and others who consider themselves “southerners” (e.g. the Dinka). Traditionally, conflicts between these local groups regarding land rights etc were solved on the local level, and they lived relatively peacefully side by side for long periods of time. During the civil war, however, they were caught up in the struggle between the north and the south. With the division of the country, the dispute is likely to solidify.

Southern Kordofan and to a certain degree also Abyei have significant oil resources, which adds another dimension to the conflict. Southern Kordofan is furthermore inhabited by the Nuba people, who have themselves waged an independence war against the Sudanese government. Many of the Nuba fought alongside the South in the civil war, but more due to the enemy they had in common than out of affinity with the South. They do thus not necessarily want to join South Sudan, nor would they remain in Sudan. Blue Nile State is also important due to its water resources and the energy it generates. These factors further complicate the picture.

Particularly Southern Kordofan and Abyei have experienced heavy fighting and displacement in the recent months. The situation in Blue Nile State is relatively stable compared to the other two, but is very fragile. The situations in the three areas are very interlinked, and developments in one will surely influence the others. Blue Nile State may therefore easily fall into violence as well.

Both countries seem set on insisting on their rights to these areas, and the militarization of the areas during the past months, including the heavy fighting, is a strong sign that neither party has excluded war as a potential means to achieve their goals. War would, however, be a tragic step for both sides, who only a few years ago ended decades of war. It is up to the parties and to the international community to find a path out of this situation of deadlock, and find a solution to the status of the three areas. UNISFA, the Ethiopian peacekeeping mission in Abyei, will hopefully maintain the peace there, but cannot provide a final solution. That must come from Khartoum and Juba. After all these efforts and hard-earned achievements, the international community must not abandon them at this point, when they are so close to what could become a sustainable peace.

Independence !

2011-07-13T06:41:00.000-07:00

On Saturday 9^th July, South Sudan finally gained independence from the North; which comes after decades of civil war during which over 1.5 million died.

People celebrated in the streets and spirits are high but this is not the end of the struggle for South Sudan.

Al-Bashir said his government had divided Sudan for the sake of peace, and that they have no intention of going back to war unless compelled to do so... but they may well be compelled to do so.

Border disputes continue, with both sides laying claim to the region of Abyei. Whilst peacekeeping forces will be moving in, this does not guarantee that the contestation will not lead to war.

South Sudan faces other difficulties. They are rich in oil but one of the poorest states in the world, with one in seven children dying before the age of 5. With the problems such as poverty, a lack of infrastructure and corruption, as well as the threat from the north, the new South Sudanese government will have plenty to worry about.

Problems concerning citizenship are also arising. South Sudan has agreed to allow all northern Sudanese living there to apply for citizenship but the same offer has not been extended to southern Sudanese living in the north. They will become foreigners and may have to return to South Sudan, even if they have never lived there which will divide families and friends.

But the government are making progress. They have called for the international community to support them and help them to build their country. They are looking for investment, in particular to strengthen their infrastructure which many hope will bring with it security. Glencore are helping under a new deal to develop the countries national oil company and market its oil.

And the people are behind the government. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a referendum was held on independence, which was favoured by more than 99% of voters. So whilst the new government will face struggles, it is the hope of the world that they can be successful in their endeavours and settle their disputes with Sudan peacefully, with the backing of their people who have fought for independence for so long.

The potential for war looms over the Sudans

2011-07-07T07:46:00.000-07:00

As July 9^th (the planned date for the secession of Southern Sudan from the rest of the country) is approaching, the dispute over the Abyei area continues. The contested area has never been addressed properly, and is now increasingly becoming a headache for the efforts being made for a peaceful separation of the country. Following the Northern army’s seizure of Abyei and the displacement of at least 100,000 people since May (according to UNHCR), the North and the South have now agreed to demilitarize the area, under the auspices of 4,200 Ethiopian UN peacekeepers (UNISFA). These measures are yet to be put in place.

It is unlikely that the overall plan of secession will be shattered by the Abyei dispute and violence. After all, it has been known from the days before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that Abyei is a particularly problematic case (it was not included in the CPA and in the referendum earlier this year). The president of Sudan, the infamous war criminal Omar al-Bashir, confirmed as late as today that he supports the secession to take place on July 9^th. The separation of the country, then, will most likely take place without Northern interference.

Due to border conflicts, however, what happens after independence remains very unclear, and Abyei, in addition to the ethnically-divided Northern state of South Kordofan, is one of the potential hot spots that may lead the two soon-to-be-born countries on a path toward war. The borders between the North and the South are far from being mutually agreed upon. The complex ethnic composition of the people living in the border areas, in addition to the valuable oil resources continue to create obstacles to peaceful relations. Al-Bashir himself stated recently that he is ready for war, and the SPLM seems to be on the same track. The recent military clashes in the border areas are clear testaments to this. As if this weren’t enough of a concern, the many inter-tribal conflicts add an additional violent dimension to the imminent independence of the South.

For these reasons many aid agencies are currently calling upon the international community to provide additional UN peacekeepers to Southern Sudan. Most things remain uncertain, but one could safely say this: even though independence for Southern Sudan is surely necessary and desirable, it is not sufficient to bring immediate peace to a part of the world which has been haunted by war for most of its postcolonial history. And although peacekeepers do have an important role to play, they cannot create peace.

100 days on violent protests continue

2011-06-24T09:07:00.000-07:00

100 days have passed since the Syrian uprising began and like every Friday since its start, thousands of anti government protestors have taken to the streets to rally against Bashar Al-Assad and his brutal government. Protestors have gathered to show a unified front chanting “Our revolution is strong! Assad has lost legitimacy!”

However, these protests have proven especially violent. In total 1,400 people have reportedly been killed and today 10 more are said to have died as a result of the uprising. If reports are to be believed, at least 15,000 people held a protest on the highway linking Damascus and Aleppo, which would make it the largest protest since the uprising began. It is widely believed that the demise of the government will be strongly apparent if such protests are held in Damascus and Aleppo, Syria’s two largest cities.

Friday’s protests come after Bashar’s latest speech to Syria and the international community. In his speech he announced a further amnesty and pledges to open a national dialogue with the opposition. However the people on the streets have rejected what they see as purely symbolic speech, mainly to appease the international community growing impatience with his oppressive and brutal regime.

Peace talks between Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir do not transpire to the 60,000 civilians

2011-06-17T06:43:00.000-07:00

There were peace agreements and negotiations. There was new found hope that the 22 years of relentless, sometimes indiscriminate bloodshed would end with the approved North-South secession. What do the much publicised and internationally celebrated negotiations of peace and ceasefire between the North and South have to show? Earlier this month, the northern army - the Sudanese Armed Forces launched a 2 week long operation of intensive air strikes in South Kordofan. South Kordofan is north of what will be the separating border from July 9^th; it is home to many pro-south and non-Muslim civilians, including the Nuba tribe who have long supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army.

The southern army (SPLA) was targeted 11 times in the course of one morning, during which the UNMIS base evaded destruction by only 150m. 60,000 civilians are fleeing the area; some of whom are travelling to UN confines in a desperate, but futile attempt of refuge. The UNMIS claims that it cannot offer protection to any of the innocent civilians, even though there was much international anticipation of violence and casualties during the determination of Abyei’s ownership. The air strikes are not only a total violation of the 2005 CPA, but also a possible confirmation of Bashir’s ethnic cleansing programs. Vice-President Riak Machar has alerted the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council of the situation in South Kordofan’s Nuba Mountains; warning them that Sudan could eventually mirror the Rwanda genocide. It is certainly in the US’s favour to assist the southern and tribal civilians – especially if Abyei can be claimed by the SPLA and their unsanctioned oil trading availability. The outbreak occurred shortly after Ahmed Haroun was elected governor of South Kordofan; regardless of being wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity (including ordering militia to rape and torture civilians) and in turn triumphing over an SPLA candidate.

Should Sudan sacrafice peace for Abyei?

2011-06-08T06:52:00.000-07:00

After 22 years of civil war in Sudan, independence will be given to the south in July. While the UN Security Council does not see conflict in Abyei as significant regarding the planned partition between the north and the south, an outbreak of violence in this region would surely stall the prospects for peace.

Abyei is a small region that divides the border between north and south Sudan. In 2005 it was granted special status until a concrete decision is made by referendum as to who has claims to the region. Once significant for its oil outputs, it faces depleting resources. An important oil pipeline travels through it which is still seen as vital for exportation. However, the main source of conflict can be seen as ethnic tensions between the southern group, the Dinka Ngok, and northern nomads, the Misseriya.

On the 21st of May troops from North Sudan moved into the Abyei’s capital, named Abyei Town. There have been many reports of looting and burning resulting in the fleeing of 20, 000 southern Sudanese residents.

A referendum should be held to determine who has legal claims over Abyei to avoid further catastrophe. Now that Sudan has a real chance at peace, it would be illogical and disastrous for renewed conflict over such a limited piece of land to disrupt these efforts.

How It Came To Be

2011-05-19T04:29:00.000-07:00

The conflict in Sudan is a particularly complex one, involving a plethora of incidents and high profile figures which have had varying levels of influence across different parts of the country. The below report aims to give a brief overview of some of the factors that have lcontributed to the situation leading up to the referendum for secession of Southern Sudan.

ONCE UPON A TIME...

After gaining independence from Egypt and the UK in 1956, Sudan suffered 17 years of civil war during 1955 - 1972 followed by ethnic, religious and economic conflicts which led to the second civil war from 1983 - 2005. The origins of war lay in colonially initiated policies of separate administrative rule and unequal development which allowed the predominantly Muslim North to become a lower middle income market economy whilst the rest of the country remained underdeveloped. In 1955, in anticipation of independence and fear of Northern domination, Southern army officers mutinied. Military regimes continued into 1969 when General Nimeiri led a successful coup. The South was eventually granted autonomous status under the Addis Ababa Agreement.

In 1983, President Nimeiri attempted to create a federated Sudan including states in Southern Sudan, thereby violating the Addis Ababa Agreement. Inspired by Hasan Turabi's vision of an Islamist Sudan, Nimeiri imposed Islamic law, which was bitterly resented by predominantly non-Muslim Southerners. The conflict between central government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was reignited. After widespread popular unrest, Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985.

Omar al-Bashir was brought to power after a coup in 1989. Under Bashir's leadership, political parties were banned and Islamic legal code was introduced on a national level. Bashir transformed Sudan into an Islamic totalitarian single-party state and created the National Congress Party (NCP) with a new parliament and government drawn solely from members of the NCP. NCP divided the unified Southern Sudanese government into provincial governments, undermining the power of the tribal clients of the old parties.

In July 2005, after 30 months of negotiations, the NCP-led government and the SLPM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA provided a political framework for a permanent ceasefire between the government's forces and the SPLM. It promised a new Government of National Unity in Khartoum including both the SPLM and the NCP, a semi-autonomous government for the South with a Southern constitution based on non-Islamic customary laws and values, exemption of non-Muslims from the Islamic penal code, and 50% of oil revenues to go to the South. It was hoped that these measures would make unity attractive to Southern Sudanese whilst reserving their right to vote for self-determination in a referendum in January 2011.

The CPA excluded the oil-rich province of Abyei - largely inhabited by Arabic nomads and African settlers; located on the border between the North and South - which was to have its own referendum to decide whether to join the North or the South. The CPA also ignored imbalances elsewhere in the country, including Eastern Sudan and the Darfur region of Western Sudan.

MEANWHILE...

Even before it was signed, the CPA was overshadowed by the crisis in Darfur - longstanding tensions between African agrarian tribe settlers and Arab nomads that turned into a full-scale uprising in 2003. The dispute began when rebel groups including the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) comprising predominantly African agrarian tribe settlers, and the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM) comprising predominantly Arab nomads, took up arms against the government - claiming the region was being neglected. In 2006, the Minni Minawi faction of the SLM signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the Central Government. Most other rebel groups refused to sign, vowing to fight on until the government agreed to share power and wealth in the region. In 2008, Djibril Bassolé was appointed as the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur.

In 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Bashir on charges of genocide. This followed the ICC's previous issue of an arrest warrant for Bashir on war crimes and crimes against humanity, on the basis that Bashir masterminded a plan to destroy 3 tribal groups in Darfur - the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa - because of their ethnicity.
The charges against Bashir have been strongly rejected by a number of prominent players in the Middle East. The Arab League condemned the warrant for undermining the unity and stability of Sudan, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference denounced the warrant as unwarranted and totally unacceptable.

MORE RECENTLY...

In January 2011, the promised Referendum of the 2005 CPA went ahead. Official results were announced on 7 February 2011; almost 99% of registered Southern Sudanese voted for secession. Secession is due to be implemented at the end of the CPA on 9 July 2011. President Bashir signed a decree confirming his government's acceptance of the results as the legitimate expression of the will of the people of South Sudan. A senior official from the NCP also reported that Bashir will not seek re-election.

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Haile Menkerios, described the Referendum as "probably the single most important foundation for the future of peace and stability of Sudan and of the entire region". Nonetheless, unresolved CPA issues remain including the Abyei Referendum, border demarcation, border management, citizenship arrangements, and wealth sharing - particularly regarding oil reserves and revenues. 82% of the total oil is located in the South, but Khartoum in the North owns the pipelines that carry it to ports.

Since the Referendum, hundreds have been left dead as a result of a surge in bloody clashes in South Sudan between the army and rebel forces loyal to General Athor -previously a senior member of the SPLM during the war against the north, but turned renegade since losing the election for Governor of Jonglei in April 2010. Following attacks by Athor's forces on the town of Malakal, the SPLM announced they would suspend all talks and contacts with the NCP, accusing the North of arming rebels in the South in an attempt to destabilise the emerging independent state of South Sudan. SPLM also unveiled confidential documents detailing NCP's alleged plot to overthrow the Southern government by arming, training and financing militias. Bashir's advisers denied SPLM's allegations, and claimed the SPLM was seeking a scapegoat for a Southern problem.

Thao Mbeki, former South African President and Chairman of the African Union High-Level Panel on Sudan, appealed to Southern President Salva Kiir to resume negotiations. An emergency meeting was chaired by Mbeki, at which both Kiir and Bashir agreed to examine the documents offered as proof that NCP was backing rebel militias. The UK provided funding to the AU High Level Implementation Panel in support of President Mbeki's efforts to facilitate agreement on post-referendum issues.

UNTOLD TALES...

Of course there are many more factors which have significantly contributed to the situation in Sudan, that have not been outlined here. This report does not claim to cover all of them but intends to offer a condensed version of the main events in some of the more high profile areas. Further comments and contributions are most welcome.

Clashes in South Sudan leave 70 dead

2011-03-25T05:27:00.000-07:00

Fighting in South Sudan between the South Sudanese army (SPLA) and rebel forces loyal to General Athor resulted in 70 casualties, according to the SPLA. The fighting, which took place on Thursday the 18th and Friday the 19th of March, occured in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei States in the North Eastern part of South Sudan. A spokesman for the SPLA said 36 rebels and 34 SPLA soldiers had been killed.

General Athor fought with the SPLA during the struggle for independence, but rebelled last year after losing a governatorial election in Jonglei state. These clashes are concerning for two main reasons, the challenge they pose to a critically underdeveloped state-to-be and the implication of Northern involvement in the latest round of violence.

South Sudan is preparing for independence from the North, with official seperation planned to take place on the 9th of July. Althoug rich in natural resources the region has suffered as a result of decades of civil war and chronic underdevelopment. Governance structures throughout the new state are weak, and a rebellion presents a real challenge to a South Sudanese government struggling to assert its authority in a state with limited infrastructure. Despite being the size of France, South Sudan has only 4000 kilometers of roads.

One of the concerns regarding the separation of the North and the South is the ability of South Sudan to form a viable state. The persistance of General Athor's rebellion, and the fact that it seems to be growing in popularity rather than diminishing a year after it began, both indicate that central government in South Sudan is not sufficently advanced to maintain control over swathes of its territory.

General Athor claims that he lost the election, which he contested as an independent, as a result of unfair electoral practices. That this is the justification for the rebellion is concerning for two reasons. First, the allegation that the elections are being rigged is a damaging one that undermines confidence in the ruling SPLA government. Although Athor's claims are contested, raising the question undercuts the credibility of the SPLA, credibility it desperately needs to assert its authority over South Sudan. Secondly, the precedent set is dangerous. If recourse to violence is seen as a valid way to achieve political power in South Sudan, fears of a descent into anarchy in the region could become a reality. Although a ceafire was signed between the government and rebels in January, this broke down in February. This year hundreds have been killed as a result of clashes between the two sides.

The second source of concern is allegations of Northern invovlement. Following attacks by Athor's forces on the town of Malakal the SPLA government suspended talks with the Northern government about the upcoming separation, accusing the North of arming rebels in the South. The SPLA government has specifically identified arms used by a rebel militia led by a man called Oliny, as originating in the North. President Bashir's government denies these claims, and the President has publicly accepted the secession of the South from the North.

One of the concerns during the run up to the referendum on secession was that the North would be loath to see the oil-rich South secede. The South alleges that the North is attempting to destabilise as it apporaches independence, perhaps with a view to ultimately regaining control over the South . The resources of the South certainly present as incentive for Northern interfence. The last thing a new state needs is an interfering neighbour exacerbating its weaknesses.

These concerns are serious and would be destabilising for any country, the real problem in South Sudan is that they add to a long list of developmental concerns the state alredy had to contend with. It is tempting to conclude that an avaricous North is to blame for this problem, but the solution to the problem seems to lie with strengthening the South Sudanese government rather than railing against the North. However, like many problems in the new state, the solution is much easier to propose than to execute.

Bashir's Billions

2011-02-15T16:05:00.000-08:00

The following note was sent to us by Khalid at the Sudan Embassy. We flag it up without comment:

“Laws are like cobwebs;

Where the small flies are caught
and the great break through”
Francis Bacon 1561 – 1626

Francis Bacon could be contributing to a 21st century debate if we replaced the words “Laws are” with the modern acronym “The ICC” (International Criminal Court). His assertion that the law only applies strictly to the underdog is prescient.

While weighing the pros and cons of a United Nations Security Council deferral of ICC charges against President Omar H.A. al-Bashir, the Financial Times investigative journalists wrote that a deferral would undermine the position of the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo by delaying his most high-profile case and “could add to criticism that the ICC is used as an instrument of western policy.”

Let us consider the validity of these two reservations.
Firstly: The position of the ICC prosecutor has already been irreparably shaken. The highly respected Joshua Rosenberg, legal advisor of the Daily Telegraph, has called (17 July 08) for Mr. L.M. Ocampo’s resignation in the wake of the sexual harassment case that resulted in the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO holding him personally responsible for a “breach of due process” and awarding the whistle blower whom he dismissed more than £100,000 (paid by the ICC!). Rosenberg wrote 4 articles exposing other examples of Ocampo’s legal incompetence.

Secondly: The prosecutor has transformed himself into an activist, campaigning and taking part in demonstrations with armed groups. He even declared openly that he was involved in a plan to hijack a Sudanese aeroplane. The cop has become the robber! In a way, a very accurate representation of the International Order that chose him as a “front”.

Thirdly: He has insisted on exaggerating numbers of casualties in Darfur in a manner that earned him a rebuke from Doctors without Borders. Its President R. Brauman wrote on 23 July 08: “It is true that during his statement to the UN Security Council on June 5, the prosecutor went so far as to describe the refugee camps as sites where genocide was being perpetrated – which is, strictly speaking, insane.” He described Ocampo’s attitude as “intellectual incontinence” and asked:”Under such circumstances, one can wonder what exactly is the purpose of international law?”

Fourthly: Wikileaks has dealt his credibility (or what little that remained of it) a mortal blow. The Guardian published 18 December 10 the US cables which show that he held discussions with US Embassy officials on 24 March 09 in which he claimed that President al-Bashir stashed $9 billion in a London (Lloyds) Bank. The honest Guardian writer A. Hirsch asked the Bank which denied Ocampo’s claim. In an interview with Julian Marshall for the BBC World Service Radio 18 December 10, L.M. Ocampo changed his claim and said that the money was not in London. When the matter was raised at the British House of Lords, Her Majesty’s Government made the following statement on 2 February 11:

Lord Sassoon: “Lloyd’s Banking Group has conducted their own internal investigation into the claim that President al-Bashir holds accounts with the Group and is confident that the Group does not hold any account for Mr. al-Bashir or any individuals or entities associated with him. The Financial Services Authority has viewed this report and has not raised any further concerns.”

Ocampo should have resigned as a result; but he didn’t.

What about the other objection to the deferral being considered, namely that it will prove that the ICC is an instrument of power politics?

The President of the ICC, Judge Sang-Hyun Song told the European Parliament on 15/10/09: “We are a judicial institution operating in a political world.”

The honourable judge is right. The political world’s balance of power is in the UN Security Council, which has three members who do not recognize the ICC (The USA, Russia, China) out of five members; but the UN Security Council nevertheless empowered the ICC to investigate Sudan’s Darfur crisis, despite the fact that Sudan like the three UNSC members is not a party to the Rome Statute that created the ICC! It is a well-known fact in international law that states are only bound by the treaties they sign.

The almost comical twist is that the USA has passed a law under George Bush to invade the ICC offices if the court dared to try an American citizen!

We thus see the unaccountable, unelected and highly discredited Luis Moreno-Ocampo unleashed to tarnish the reputation of an elected head of State who has shown the statesmanship and wisdom to put an end to a destructive civil war, and simultaneously, transform his country democratically.

Surely, this ICC prosecutor can only thrive in a World Order that is standing on its head. Even Kofi Anan has dared to say that the present World Order needs reform.

It is a World Order in which the laws are only applicable to African underdogs; but never to those who commit the crime of aggression or invade other nations with pretexts like “weapons of Mass Destruction” that are never found.

Finally, A former Israeli ICC official (Nick Kaufman) knows the machinations of the ICC. He told Haaretz Newspaper (28 February 2010) that the Goldstone Report about Israeli crimes in Gaza would not reach the ICC and most importantly he said: “Ocampo’s position is not strong. He has been hit by strong criticism of his performance, as he has failed to convict even one person in the ICC during his tenure. I estimate that his position is unstable.”

We rest our case, knowing that the biased and discredited Ocampo, hanging on the tails of the great powers, will never be caught by the cobwebs of Law, because International law is designed for Africans and others who are seen as weak and fair game.

Yemen Government bombs rebels

2010-11-27T08:13:00.000-08:00

It seems that the Yemen government are responsible for the suicide attack against the communities from which the Huthi rebels are drawn - the first on a convoy of pilgrims on 24th November. The second on a funeral on 26th November. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to blame "Al Qaidah". Credible allegations of government culpability will strengthen the hand of the insurgents.

Contradictions in Yemen scare

2010-10-30T07:20:00.000-07:00

Another story that is so spun and so full of unanswered questions that we shall never know the truth. There were no explosives in the toner cartridges destined for the Chicago Jewish community. Or were there? The world is awash with disinformation at present. On this particular little story, early versions, such as that below, do not tally with later versions:

“There have been no threats made or received indicating that anyone or any location in Chicago is at risk,” Ross Rice, spokesman for the FBI’s Chicago office, told AFP in an e-mail.

“The two suspicious packages did not contain explosives.”

Further Setbacks in Sudan as Abyei poll Delayed

2010-10-15T07:57:00.000-07:00

Fears expressed in this blog earlier this month over the Sudanese referendum were today confirmed when a spokesman for the National Congress Party (NCP) said it was extremely unlikely that the poll in Abyei would occur on the 9th January.

Abyei is an oil rich region that is currently claimed by both North and South Sudan. It is seen as crucial for the future wellbeing of the South if it were to split from the north as it would need the oil wealth that the region would bring.

But now it seems less and less likely that even if the North lets the South secede successfully it will happen either without the south or require a significant of bargaining. "It is very clear that right now it is not possible to have the Abyei referendum on 9 January, 2011. We all agree that this is no longer practical," Didiri Mohammad Ahmad of the NCP.

"We agreed that in the next talks we will try to look for other alternatives" and he later conceded that the territorial row might be settled without a poll. People in the South are sceptical if there would be any chance of it joining the potential new state of South Sudan if the dispute was settled with no referendum.

The President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, also warned recently that a new civil war might break out if disputes, especially territorial ones, are not settled. This does seem to suggest a poorly veiled threat from the president that if Politicians in the south do not concede over the issue of Abyei trouble may ensue.

Again it appears that the prospect of the South rendering itself from the North peacefully seems less and less likely.

Sinking into the Sand: How Yemen is slowly Collapsing

2010-10-07T07:34:00.001-07:00

The latest spate of terrorism within Yemen has led many to question the stability of the poorest of the Middle Eastern States.

On the morning of Wednesday the 6th of October two related attacks hit the capital of Yemen, one on a British embassy motorcade and another on a gas company that employed Westerners. The terrorism is not unheard of in Yemen, it was blamed for housing the terrorists that attempted to blow up a plane flying over Detroit on Christmas Day and in April a suicide bomber attacked the car of the British Ambassador. But this most recent outbreak of terrorism is seen as being indicative of further problems within the state.

US experts at the State Department recently compared Yemen's future to that of the failed state of Somalia; a civil war that has been ongoing for 6 years, the hub of al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsular, oil revenue that is steadily decreasing and an incompetent central government lend to a bleak outlook for the desert state.

Yemen's government relies on oil exports for nearly all of it's revenue but at the current rate of extraction and assuming no further oil wells are found it seems likely that Yemen's supplies will run out by 2017. This means that unless Yemen's government performs a remarkable turnaround and reforms its public expenses, unlikely in a country where 40% of the population live on less than $2 a day, it will go bankrupt and become a failed state. That is if it survives the current insurgencies on multiple fronts for that long.

The Obama administration has been keen to bring the world's attention to the plight of Yemen with a senior advisor pointing out "One failed state on the Gulf of Aden is bad enough". If Yemen does fail it seems that al-Qaeda would be able to use it as a base to distable other countries in the region, notably Saudi Arabia, people would take note but by then it would be too late.

Fears Grow over Referendum

2010-10-01T06:54:00.000-07:00

Tensions are rising in Southern Sudan over the further delay of registration for the referendum on secession which is supposed to be held on January 9th. The registration which was supposed to take place in late October has now been delayed three weeks until the 15th of November. Observers are starting to worry about the possiblilty of conflict restarting if southerners feel that Khartoum is attempting to delay or disrupt the vote in Southern Sudan, which is oil rich but one of the least developed regions in the world.

The referendum was promised as part of the peace deal which was signed in 2005 but it now looks like the North are trying to sabotage the referendum by delaying it and therefore stirring up passions in the South. It is feared that the delay in registration is part of a ploy by President Omar Bashir's government to delay the vote indefinitely. He hopes that by doing so it will lead to protests that could make any result in the referendum void and not recognised internationally or cause the referendum to be forgotten.

Despite insistence that Khartoum will accept the outcome of the referendum many international observers are doubtful.

2011 Sudanese Referendums

2010-09-03T04:10:00.000-07:00

This is a working draft report and comments are welcome:

REVISED REPORT 41, dated 27 August 2010

2011 Sudanese Referendums

Key Observations: In January 2011, two referendums necessary under the terms of 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) will take place. In one, the South will decide on whether to establish an independent southern state. In the other, citizens from the Abyei area, located on the still un-demarcated border between North and South, will decide on which of these to join.

The South will vote in favour of partition in the upcoming January 2011 referendum. Whilst partition does not make war inevitable, there remains a substantial risk of conflict. Equally war is all but inevitable if a referendum is denied or tampered with. It is possible that in the limited time before the referendum, the government in Khartoum could sway the outcome towards unity with two simultaneous concessions: removing Islamic Law from the constitution and establishing a new, inclusive national government, headed by a Southerner. Such concessions pose their own considerable risks. First, it must be recognized that there is a time constraint. Secondly, such reforms may not be accepted by the government in Khartoum.

It is important to note that both Western oil companies and the United States government have created the impression that they favour partition. The U.S.A has implied it is in favour of a strong and independent South. In reference to the election, US Special Envoy, Gen. Scott Gration stated, “the US hopes that election will set the stage for a civil divorce and not a civil war”. For the Western oil companies it would enable them to enter into and develop South Sudan. Under current sanctions multinational companies are prevented from operating freely within Sudan. Through partition, Western oil companies will be able to curb the dominance of the Chinese in the South Sudanese oil fields, who are not restricted by the sanctions.

Nonetheless, if the international community, and in particular the United States, engages with the government in Khartoum it is possible that Sudan could be persuaded to undertake actions that could potentially alter the expected results of the referendum. In addition, if the results of the referendum are to be credible, the international community needs to immediately focus on creating conditions that would ensure a free and fair referendum in January 2011.

Why Encourage A Vote for Unity?

Several key stakeholders, in particular the United States, are perceived as advocating the partition of Sudan. It is clear that the people of the South are likely to vote for partition in January 2011. However, even those who are encouraging partition recognize that this path could result in further conflict. In September 2009 an IKV Pax Christi/Cordaid report on Sudan 2012 identified four possible post-referendum scenarios for Sudan in 2011:[1]

1. A war and a united Sudan

2. A war and secession

3. No war and a united Sudan

4. No war and secession

Many observers do not expect the National Congress Party (NCP) to allow a harmonious secession to take place. Additionally, some fear that whilst the NCP may accept the result of the Southern referendum, they may disregard the result in the oil-rich province of Abyei, which could potentially lead to conflict. Overall, it is difficult to see the NCP accepting any outcome that sees it relinquishing significant oil revenues, which have been integral to enabling the NCP to retain its power in the North. Furthermore, despite pursuing peaceful measures the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) has also been upgrading its military capabilities in anticipation of a conflict resulting from the outcome of the January 2011 referendum.

If secession was to happen in Sudan, it is quite possible that this could have an impact on other nations like Iraq and Yemen, where there already exist fully fledged secession movements. In Southern Yemen[2], many people have aspirations for independence, whilst this is felt to a lesser extent by the Kurds[3] in Iraq who would settle for national autonomy.

The International Stage

Another Sudanese conflict could also embroil its neighbours:

Uganda, an unambiguous supporter of South Sudan’s independence, seeks a stable buffer on its Northern border, primarily to ensure that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency does not return.

Kenya has invested in South Sudan, including a new railway network connecting Juba to Kenya and an extension of the Trans-African Highway Network linking South Sudan to Kenya’s Mombasa port. More recently, it is in discussions with Toyota Tsusho and the Government of South Sudan over a US$1.5 billion oil pipeline project that will create an alternative to the existing export route (which runs north to Port Sudan).

Chad has come under fire for failing to arrest Sudanese President Bashir when he was recently in the country. As a signatory of the International Criminal Court, Chad has a responsibility to arrest those charged with war crimes. Bashir has been charged with three counts of genocide and crimes against humanity.[4] Chad’s reluctance to arrest Bashir may be due to recent improvements in relations since Chadian President, Idriss Deby, visited Khartoum in February 2010. An estimated 250,000 to 300,000 Darfurian refugees are believed to be in Chad and the Central African Republic.

China also has an interest in how the 2011 referendum plays out, as well as a certain level of influence. Though nothing has ever come before the ICJ, a wealth of evidence supports the claim that China sent military equipment to Sudan after the arms embargo in 2005.[5]

China has a strong, if controversial, diplomatic and economic relationship with Sudan. China is the most significant partner in Sudan’s oil industry having 40 per cent of shares in Sudanese oil. Despite international criticism of China for continuing to do business with Sudan while the atrocities in Darfur continue, it is unlikely China would ever attempt to influence Bashir to moderate his government’s actions as Oil means more to China than Human Rights.

China will be a keen observer of the upcoming referendum and will not hesitate to intervene on behalf of the Government. If China were willing, they have more than enough influence in the region - and with Bashir - to help positively come January. Instead of supporting the Sudanese Government if it decided to block a secessionist drive, China could lean the other way and encourage Bashir to accept secession. However, China’s relationship with Sudan is, ultimately, based on oil, and if China sees a threat to that supply they will wield military influence in order to secure it.

Strategies to Reduce the Likelihood of Partition

Removal of Islamic Law

It has been suggested[6] that if Islamic Law was to be abrogated from the national Constitution, the South would not vote as strongly in favour of secession. Though the South is no longer subject to Islamic Law, this would serve as a symbolic gesture: non-Muslims would be put on an equal footing with Muslims in the governance of the State.

Islamic Law imposed in 1983 under Gaafar Nimeiry was bitterly resented by secularized Muslims and the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. Non-Muslims have continued to voice concerns about what they perceive to be their second-class status in Sudan.

It must be recognized that the North took significant steps in signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which awarded the South semi-autonomy, and exempted non-Muslims from the Islamic penal code. The legal accords of the CPA have largely been implemented with success; Christian populations (and other confessional communities) in the North are not interfered with on a day-to-day basis. The CPA mandated the creation of the Commission for Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital (CRNNC). The CRNNC was initially designed to advise the courts on how to fairly apply Islamic Law to non-Muslims, and though it made little progress in effecting changes in government policy it did, nevertheless, open a previously non-existent forum for discussion on religious matters.

A renewed call for the removal of Islamic Law from the Sudanese constitution may be perceived as violating the letter and spirit of the CPA, which, since its inception, has at least fostered relative peace between the government and the erstwhile Southern rebels. The North may view evocation of the Islamic Law debate as a renunciation of its original concessions. To posit a new, completely secular, Sudan would inevitably strike discord among some Muslims, and could also be untenable for the current government. Moreover, by ostracising the Muslim North through the negation of Islamic Law, there is a possibility of further social unrest – potentially more potent than that of the scattered riots of the non-Muslims in recent years.[7]

If Islamic Law was no longer enshrined in the constitution it could reduce the strength of the vote for separation, but it would not be sufficient on its own to produce a pro-unity outcome. The period before the referendum is crucial; the government still has an opportunity to alter its stance.

A New Presidency: Southern President, Northern Vice-President?

In tandem with a sensitive reconstruction of its judicial system, the establishment of a new, inclusive, national government headed by a southerner[8] would be a meaningful step towards reducing prospects for partition.

In January 2009, and again in February of 2010, the SPLM and opposition presidential candidates called on President Al-Bashir to step down and hold consultations to form a new national government.

A nuanced political strategy is necessary as the removal of Al-Bashir would ostracise an already belligerent NCP. If Al-Bashir was to resign from government altogether the NCP, known for its kleptocratic rule, would be destabilized. Al-Bashir’s government is centred on his authority, and if he were to go powers within the government will, by force, compete to ensure their own security. This could elicit greater factionalism and violence.

Nonetheless, unlike the current condominium in place that confines matters of governance to the NCP and SPLM, an inclusive Pax Sudanica would draw in all the disparate political entities of Sudan.

Promisingly, in the months before the national elections, six presidential candidates made a concerted bid for President Al-Bashir to hold a conference with the country’s key forces to choose a competent leader for a new national government. Notwithstanding Khartoum’s initial rejection, such a proposal, albeit modified, still offers a pragmatic answer to Sudan’s many political confrontations.

A Southerner could be nominated as President of Sudan. The NCP could retain its foothold as a parliamentary majority, but without the power of veto over all others. Likewise, the SPLM would not be given a monopoly over Southern affairs; this would resonate particularly well with the Equatorians, who have already challenged an independent South Sudan governed by the ethnic Dinkas.

This proposal necessitates a rapid restructuring of the ruling elite prior to the referendum. Furthermore, this transformation must be agreed upon willingly by all members of Sudan’s political establishment, which currently looks improbable. Calls for Al-Bashir’s resignation have been rebutted by the NCP. Rabie Abdel Ati, an NCP member, interprets the motion towards Al-Bashir’s resignation as an attempt to destroy the ruling government of national unity, and as a direct breach of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In addition, he also notes that proposals asking for Bashir to resign only arose after Luis Moreno-Ocampo, an International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor, filed 10 charges against Al-Bashir: three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. The Sudanese president is accused of masterminding a campaign to get rid of the African tribes in Darfur: the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa.

However, the NCP could be persuaded to support a new Southern president if the international community engaged with them in the following ways:

· The United States removed sanctions on the government in Khartoum (see next section for deeper discussion on US sanctions)[9].

· Normalisation of relations between Khartoum and Washington, as well as other Western nations.

III

Current Sanctions on the Sudan

Successive American governments have halted all financial aid to Khartoum. The US government has also persuaded both its Western allies and the World Bank to cut off financial help. Khartoum last received assistance from the International Monetary Fund in 1985, and between the years of 1994-2004 it received only $96 million cumulatively in foreign budgetary support – equating to roughly sixty cents per person per year.

US sanctions penalize corporations and individuals who trade with the Sudan, although there are exceptions in place for the regional government of Southern Sudan. However, China is not reliant on American patronage. China is estimated to import 50 to 60 per cent of Sudan’s oil (comprises roughly 30 per cent of China’s oil supplies).

Were a partition of Sudan to occur, Western oil companies would be able to move into Southern Sudan, while the United States freely engages with the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and capitalise on the South’s oil reserves. 82 per cent of Sudan’s total oil reserves are thought to lie in the South (though the North holds considerable reserves of natural gas).

Preparing for the Referendum

Sudanese General Election 2010

In light of the criticisms of the recent general elections, concerns have been raised over the probity of January’s referendum. It is valuable to first identify some of the shortcomings of the April 2010 elections, and thereafter offer possible remedies.

This should have been Sudan’s first multi-party polls in twenty four years. The Arab League and African Union insist that the 2010 elections were free and fair. However Sudan Democracy First, an umbrella organisation in the North, suggested strong rigging by President Al-Bashir’s NCP. The SPLM[10], which serves in a coalition at national level with Bashir, boycotted the general election over fraud and security, irrespective of the threat by Bashir to cancel the referendum if the SPLM boycotted the election. However both the SPLM and other parties who pulled out of the presidential race overestimated their hand. It was believed that their withdrawal would rob Bashir of the opportunity to legitimise his rule. However Bashir’s 68% share of the vote was convincing and his party swept the North.

There are concerns over the behaviour of the SPLM in the South during the elections. There were accusations that SPLM-controlled security forces tortured people who opposed them[11]. Candidates opposed to the SPLM said that they were often detained or stopped from campaigning. If only a fraction of these accusations are true, it raises worrying questions about the impending referendum, and about how the South would be governed if it became independent.

Indeed, many restrictions were also noted by Western observers - the EU and the Carter Centre - that prevented the occurrence of a free and fair election[12]:

· The SPLM were prevented from entering Darfur.

· Political parties also had to seek official permission 72 hours in advance of any public meeting (reduced to 36 hours in mid March).

· 250,000 Darfurian refugees were displaced in Chad. The 2008 Census stated that the three Darfur states comprise 19 per cent of the total Sudanese population. Consequently, the complete organizational disarray in the Darfur regions cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the 2010 Sudanese national elections.

The Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (SUNDE) pointed out harassment and intimidation was by no means confined to the North. Worryingly, the SPLM has been accused of facilitating the torture of southerners who did not vote for Salva Kiir, and detaining opposition campaigners.

The Referendum

The key details of the referendum are as follows:

· A vote of fifty per cent plus one is required for secession or unity to occur.

· A sixty per cent turnout is necessary for the result of the referendum to be deemed legitimate.

· Southerners residing in the North will be allowed to vote in the North if they were born before 1956, the year of Sudanese independence. If born after this date, the individual will have to travel to the South to vote.

· The date of the referendum has been set for the 3^rd- 5^th January 2011.

In order to ensure that the referendum is free and fair and thus give the resolution of the CPA the best possible chance of succeeding, it is necessary to resolve a number of outstanding issues.

The army has been designated as the supervisor of January’s referendum. This role should be given to the police force, or the United Nations. This would give credibility to the process, and encourage greater civilian participation.

The chief of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), Derek Plumbly, stressed that, unlike the general elections which were delayed by a year, the referendum should take place on time. In the delay that preceded April’s elections, increasingly vocal and restless opposition prompted rioting and reciprocal government violence.

If the outcome of the referendum was against secession, it is possible that the South could declare unilateral independence. Given the recent International Court of Justice ruling on Kosovo, that its unilateral independence did not break international law, the unilateral action taken by the South could be recognised by the international community.

Border Demarcation

Critically, the demarcation of the North-South borders should be completed before the upcoming referendum. Professor Al-Tayib Zain Al-Abdin, a Sudanese political analyst, does not hold demarcation to be a hindrance to the referendum. He does not foresee an immediate resolution to the North-South border demarcation.

The Vice President of the Government of South Sudan, Dr. Riek Machar, has stated that disputes over border demarcation should not delay the January’s referendum. Two phases of the demarcation process have already been completed: the collection and compilation of information and the description and drawing of boundary lines on paper.

Dr. Machar contends that 80 per cent of the North-South border has been agreed upon by the joint committee of the CPA partners, the remaining 20 per cent, which includes contentious oil fields and agricultural lands, will not pose a significant risk to derailing the referendum or regional peace. Moreover, it is argued that since Sudan already has some experience in dealing with border issues (such as those with Ethiopia, Egypt and Kenya), a post-referendum agreement could be negotiated amicably. However recent developments could further delay the demarcation process, which realistically could mean that it would not be completed before the referendum. The reason for this delay (possibly until next October) is the rainy season, which will affect the terrain and logistics. The implications of this delay are substantial because the NCP has stated that the referendum would have to be delayed until the demarcation process is completed. On the other hand, the SPLM was quick to dismiss the condition set by the NCP to conduct the referendum.

However, such a view is optimistic. Following neighbouring Eritrea’s vote for independence from Ethiopia in a 1993 referendum, an otherwise peaceful separation turned into a violent border dispute over a small, resourceless tract of land. Taking into account the Sudanese propensity for military action, any contestations for land, post-secession, are at risk of becoming armed offensives. The NCP’s downplaying of the issue of demarcation poses a risk to a peaceful separation.

The process of demarcation needs to be resolved as quickly and fairly as possible. Regardless of the outcome of the referendum, absolute definition of the boundaries would consolidate stability in the Sudan.

Also note that Sudan’s border with Kenya is still not demarcated. Borders between Sudan and Ethiopia are yet to be demarcated, since most of the Al-Fashaga area is being farmed by Ethiopians’ who are renting it from Sudanese farmers. Similarly, Sudan still disputes the Halayib Triangle with Egypt.

Three Areas

The so-called Three Areas – Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei – will be potential flashpoints. They are critical to long-term stability and economic development in Sudan due to their wealth of natural resources, as well as their geographical location. The CPA agreement (which demarcated the border between North and South Sudan) excluded Abyei. This is an area defined ethnically and geographically as the nine Chiefdoms of the Dinka-Ngok, and the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile (now Blue Nile) State.

Abyei will have its own referendum[13]. However, the demarcation of the province has stalled and already there are signs that opposition to any result is probable. The North Misseriya community, for example, has been placed outside of the borders of Abyei. Their leaders have denounced the actions as deliberate manoeuvres designed to deny the North Misseriya community their right to some share of the provinces oil revenues. Furthermore, Abyei is prone to conflict. In May 2008, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) displaced over 60,000 people and destroyed almost all of the town of Abyei.

Kordofan and the Blue Nile are also entitled to “popular consultations” under the terms of the CPA. These are to be implemented by the State Assembly, elections for which were cancelled in response to a dispute regarding the 2008 census. Therefore, considerable obstacles, in relation to the 2011 referendum, remain in the Three Areas. The appointment of a high-level individual sanctioned by the African Union, Arab League and other Western organizations is required to ensure problems pertaining to the Three Areas are decided in a timely fashion before the referendum takes place.

Oil

It is estimated that 82 per cent of Sudanese oil is located in the South (though there are massive natural gas reserves in the North, located not far from the Southern border). Oil comprises 98 per cent of the government of South Sudan’s budget and 60 per cent of the total national budget. The CPA required that oil revenue be shared 50-50 between the government in Khartoum and the government in South Sudan. This arrangement will come to an end in January 2011.

Whatever the outcome of the referendum a new formula will need to be developed. Even if partition was to occur in the short term the new country would be landlocked and dependent on North Sudan to export its oil, something Khartoum may refuse to do. It will not be possible for at least a few years to export oil via Kenya as it will require construction of a pipeline.

Therefore, it is recommended that:

· A financial audit of the oil sector is undertaken to ensure that an equitable agreement, if necessary, can be implemented.

· Whatever agreement is made on how to share oil revenues, third party monitoring will be required. Under the CPA, discrepancies have been rife resulting in substantial loss of revenues for the Government of South Sudan.[14]

Comment: One of Sudan’s main challenges is that domestic issues are dealt with by major foreign powers on a piecemeal basis. When there is trouble in the South, that issue comes to the fore; when fighting erupts in Darfur or Beja, that becomes the dominant subject. Until a truly comprehensive approach is undertaken, Sudan will continue to be problematic. A national conference could be called to address issues such as the borders and the fairer distribution of resources. That might, in turn, give the disparate regions in the Sudan a greater interest in national unity. Post referendum, some in the international community are backing a “confederation” to foster unity and there is growing support for this approach within Sudan. End Comment.

[1] http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/UK/below_regional_africa_sudan_sudan_documentation.h

[2] South Yemen was reunited with the North in 1990, after having been independent since 1967 from the North. Pro-independence demonstrations have multiplied in the south in recent months amid a worsening economic situation and complaints of discrimination in favour of northerners by the Sanaa government

[3] The Kurds of Iraq have achieved self-rule in part of the country since 1991.

[4] The UN puts the death toll at 300,000 with more than 2.7 million displaced. The Sudanese government puts the death toll at 10,000.

[5] Security Council resolution 1591 came into affect 29 March 2005 and included an arms embargo, travel ban and an assets freeze.

[6] This approach is strongly advocated by General Joseph Lagu, former Southern rebel leader

[7] In light of the current political climate in Sudan, it might be more practicable to reinforce Islamic Law as a Muslim phenomenon (but not constitutionally) and to offer non-Muslims a medium by which they can have increasing legal self-determination. This would serve the government’s obligation to the Muslim North, as well as appeasing Southern jurists who wish to consolidate their autonomy. In addition, by modifying the in-place legal channels, the existing governmental framework in Khartoum can be taken advantage of. Thus, a moderate and nuanced legal strategy in Sudan might be more conducive to stability in the region.

[8] Salva Kiir, the current President of the Southern region, would be inappropriate

[9] Conditional one-year suspensions of the International Criminal Court warrants could be offered.

[10] The SPLM joined the unity government in 2005 as part of the peace deal.

[11] In the end, the SPLM boycotted the Presidential elections but still fielded candidates for the National Assembly elections.

[12] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10679943

[13] The Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict provides for an interim period of a few years following the signing of the CPA, during which Abyei shall have special administrative status under the institution of the Presidency and shall be administered locally by an Executive Council. During this interim period, residents of Abyei shall be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal states, with representation in both legislatures. Oil revenues from Abyei will be divided six ways.

At the end of the interim period, residents of Abyei will vote whether to retain their special administrative status in the North or to become part of Bahr el Ghazal State in the South. The Abyei referendum will coincide with the referendum for Southern Sudan. The Abyei Protocol also requires the Presidency to establish two commissions in preparation for the Abyei referendum. The Abyei Referendum Commission is responsible for conducting the Abyei referendum, including establishing criteria for residence in Abyei and, consequently, eligibility for participation in the referendum.

[14]http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/804/en/fuelling_mistrust_the_need_for_transparency_in_sud

This is a working draft and comments are welcome!

Demographic Alert

2010-08-25T08:50:00.000-07:00

Sudan is facing the return of around 1.5 million South Sudanese for the referendum to decide whether the South should secede from the North. This throws up certain demographic tensions which have ignited the old struggle between the two sections of Africa’s largest country.
A returning Sudanese man wrote, “I agreed with the proposal of going home before the referendum because it is better to be poor but free in our own country. The referendum lies in the hands of all South Sudanese including those of us outside South Sudan. We must go home because home is home no matter what it takes. We are tired of being mistreated and used as second class citizens by the Arabs in the North. It is better to eat mushrooms in freedom than to eat meat in slavery.”
This raises two crucial issues with the plan. Firstly, North-South tensions are expected to get worse, and many South Sudanese are wary of their Northern counterparts, expecting violence. The largely Christian Southerners have always been rumoured to be grossly mistreated by the Muslim Northerners, and allegations of slavery have been flatly denied as attempts to slander Arabs worldwide. However, these allegations have some grounding in truth – the northerners do look down on the Southerners, and the GoSS’s attempt to secede will probably re-ignite the tension.
Secondly, poverty is very possible for those returning home. The Sudanese authorities need around $25 million to make their plan “Come Home and Choose” effective. This would include development and reconstruction, which would benefit the 2 million South Sudanese that have returned home since 2005 (many of whom are still living in poverty). This is furthered by the South Sudanese government’s failure to implement an effective social services program and minimise local and tribal tensions. Indeed, neither the GoSS nor the United Nations Mission in Sudan has ever had a strategy for the reintegration of returning Sudanese.
So, if South Sudan does secede, the new, independent country will have to work hard to combat these prevailing issues.

Qatar tries to step in on Yemen too

2010-08-18T17:50:00.000-07:00

Doha to host Yemen talks with rebels

Gulf Times - 18 August, 2010
Yemeni officials and northern Shia rebels will go to Doha in the next two days to try to shore up a fragile northern truce with the help of Qatari mediation, officials from both sides said yesterday.

For more information click here

Qatar vs. Egypt in Sudan

2010-07-12T07:16:00.000-07:00

On Sunday it was announced that Qatar is donating approximately $13.7 million dollars worth of humanitarian aid to Sudan’s conflict-plagued Darfur region. This has come after a flurry of Qatari economic activity in Sudan. Most notable is the Al Difaf project, situated on the banks of the Nile River, a prime location in Khartoum. The project stretches over 200,000 square metres and will comprise of offices, residential and retail units in addition to a five-star hotel. Nasser Hassan Al-Ansar, CEO of the Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company that is in charge of the project, recently addressed an audience pronouncing that the “Sudanese are our brothers and we are not strangers here. We are feeling perfectly at home here”. Indeed, Qatar is clearly “at home” in Sudan. In an economic environment that many Western governments find inhospitable, it is conservatively estimated that Qatar has pledged to invest billions of dollars in Sudan. Of comparable significance is Sudan’s role as mediator between the Darfuri rebels and the Khartoum government, traditionally regarded as Egypt’s prerogative in part due to its geographical proximity. So why does Qatar have a role in Sudan? Firstly, it must be noted that this development has happened with the blessing of the United States which views Egypt as too involved in Sudanese politics to act as an “honest broker”. For Qatar, such mediation offers a mean gaining prestige and recognition as a major player in Middle Eastern and international diplomacy (only last month, Qatar was accepted as a mediator in the border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti).

However, Egypt has not relinquished its role as the mediator in Sudan without a fight. Angry editorials in Al-Gomhouriyya have accused Qatar of bribing the rebels to participate in negotiations. Likewise, the Qatari media have vehemently retaliated by ignoring any Egyptian-led breakthroughs. Qatar-based Sudanese Al-Raya columnist Hamed Ibrahim Hamid openly stated that Egypt’s motives for interfering Sudan were dubious: “A question arises that the Sudanese must answer before the Egyptians, namely, what Egypt seek in Darfur? Does it really wish to resolve the crisis through their latest initiatives, whose object, it contends, is to unite Darfuri armed movements? Both of these articles hint at positions articulated at the highest levels in both the Qatari and Egyptian political elites. Yet such polemic is unhelpful in the actual settlement of the Sudanese crisis. Egypt’s role as Sudan’s patron is inescapable and therefore must be respected. Nevertheless, precisely as a result of this Egypt is compromised. Therefore, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United Nations must persuade Egypt to, at the very least, remain silent whilst Qatar attempts to negotiate between the rebels and the Khartoum-based government in Sudan. Not do so endangers the tentative peace agreements that are already in place. If the participants in the Sudanese conflict are given mixed signals by the Egyptians even the referendum on Southern Sudan’s independence expected in 2011 could be endangered.

Sudan Peace - Really?

2010-02-24T15:24:00.000-08:00

The Qataris have brokered a partial peace in Dharfur. This kind of cherrypicking is of dubious value. I just wish they could have done better - but the nature of the process is flawed if you don't go for national reconciliation. So the Qataris have brought an end to Dharfur violence? I sincerely doubt it:

Qatar's diplomatic initiative has brought to an end seven years of violence and bloodbath in Darfur, a terrain of Sudan blessed with immense yet unutilised natural resources.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Qatar Peace Talks Begin

2009-11-19T06:47:00.000-08:00

Talks in Qatar to put an end to the violence in Sudan are upon us. The Qatari Prime Minister stressed how important these talks are in order to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan. However, as the talks begin, reports come in of another 47 killed in the south of Sudan as a result of clashes over cattle. When people are fighting and dying over scarce resources in the country, one wonders what hope these talks can produce.
The problem of scarce resources is exacerbated by the cycle of violence that has prevented a stable system of agriculture to develop. It is hard enough to grow crops in the region due to deteriorating environmental conditions, aside from the threat of fatal clashes with rival groups.

There are a multitude of groups that have taken up arms in the country supporting regional rebel movements or simply defending their villages. Unfortunately, neither the Sudanese government nor important rebel factions have bothered to turn up for the opening of the talks in Doha. One suspects that attention was focused on a matter of far more importance, perhaps that football match that took place in Khartoum yesterday, set to determine whether Egypt or Algeria makes it to the world cup (It was Algeria, incidentally).

In a face saving move, these talks have been billed as a conference to lay the groundwork for eventual peace talks to end the fighting in Sudan. Despite the commendable efforts of Qatar, it seems the most we can expect from these talks is more talks. The need for settlement is especially pressing in view of April’s election and 2011’s referendum on independence for the South.

Any peace talks must include all groupings if any agreement is to be reached. UN mediators and Sudanese civil society organisations are present in Doha, indicating perhaps we must look to these groups, rather than the government, to be agents of political rapprochement.

Abbas Sudan visit hypocrisy?

2009-09-01T06:20:00.000-07:00

The recent visit of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to Khartoum for talks with Omar al-Bashir, the first visit of a Palestinian president to Sudan, could be seen as hypocrisy, especially given the ICC arrest warrant issued for Bashir in March and in light of the request by Abbas in Feburary for the ICC to investigate Israel's conduct in its invasion of Gaza.

This visit, however, despite the interpretation that it is a show of support for the Sudanese government, is more significant. Abbas's Fatah party is pursuing a policy of improving relations with those governments that support, and therefore have leverage over, Hamas in Gaza. This is also evidenced by the approval of a proposal at the Fatah conference last month to develop a strategic channel with Iran.

In working to improve relations with Hamas's supporters, Abbas is working to end or reduce foreign support (especially military support) for Hamas with the ultimate aim of isolating Hamas and forcing them to the negotiating table while also providing a better platform form which to negotiate for humanitarian aid for the people of Gaza.

Things get worse and worse and worse

2009-08-11T04:19:00.000-07:00

This appeal came in from Khadiga. If any of you have any feedback let us know either by commenting on this item or by e-mailing us:

The situation in the Sudan is becoming increasingly volatile. The main issue that is a real source of concern to the Sudanese, irrespective of their political affiliation, is whether the country will remain united. Its survival is in doubt. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is very slow due to the hesitation of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in doing so. In addition, the junior partner, Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), has failed to exert genuine pressure on NCP to do more to have the CPA implemented. NCP has since the signature of the CPA made it a point to violate its provisions. It is consistently violating any attempt to establish democratic rule by refusing to amend the laws restricting public freedoms in violation of the CPA and the National Interim Constitution (NIC) of 2005. NCP has in many cases repudiated the CPA and refused to abide by it. It is deliberately making unity an unattractive for the Southern Sudanese so that they vote for separation. NCP instigated some tribal elements in the South in order to weaken SPLM and preoccupy it with the problems in the South at the expense of the progress SPLM is achieving in the North.

The situation in Darfur is worsening and the claim of the regime that the security situation has improved of late is shear fabrication. Mass killings, rape, eviction of the local population from their villages and implanting of foreigners, of Arab origin, from West Africa, making the Janjaweed stronger militarily and politically and the expulsion of the foreign humanitarian organizations are all facts that defeat the official allegations that things are improving in Darfur. It has failed miserably to establish peace, order and security in Darfur.

There are many regional movements in the Northern State which are opposing the policy of the regime in constructing dams. There is the National Committee for Conflict Resolution, the Popular Committee Against Kajbar Dam, the Nubian Committee for Development , the National Committee Against Dal Dam, the Executive Committees of the Manaseer and Hammadab affected by Merowi Dam and other groups are airing their opposition to the regime and show their readiness to fight for their cause.

The economic situation is, to say the least, unmanageable. The country faces a serious economic problem reaching the stage of famine. The regime destroyed the basic development institutions and schemes. Under the pretext of privatization, it sold the public corporations such as Sudan Airways, the Railways, different agricultural schemes, etc.. The total expenditure on education in 2007 budget was 2.4%. and on health 2.3% while on the armed forces and security about 70%.

It is with great concern that some of us felt the urgent need for the Sudanese to get together and discuss the roots of the problems engulfing us and agree on the minimum solutions that can be acceptable to all. It is indeed essential that they come up with the solutions they deem fit to attempt solve these problems. The best way to reach that end, we thought, is gathering as many intellectuals and public workers as possible, representing all schools of thought and different political and ideological groupings to sit together and agree on the minimum platform and a national agenda that can be a basis for a long term, one time solution to these issues.

Some of us deliberated on the venue for such meeting. Continental Europe was suggested but it was thought that the participants may find it difficult to get entry visas. Some suggested Kampala and Asmara but they were voted out as there were other considerations taken into account. Cairo was equally ruled out due to the heavy-handedness of the Egyptians when dealing with the Sudanese issues. It was agreed that the best venue can be UK for obvious reasons amongst them the mere fact that the British show great interest in the developments that take place in the Sudan. The total number of participants will be in the neighbourhood of 130 persons representing almost all political parties and civil society organisations as well as the trades union and active professional leagues notably that of the Doctors’ Union, Advocates’ Union, Engineers’ Association, Sudanese Women Groups, Workers’ Unions, Farmers’ Associations, Students’ Union, Academics’ Associations, Pensioners’ Unions, National Association for Purged Civil and Military Servants, etc..

I am writing to you seeking the kind assistance of your Group in financing this important activity knowing the close relationship you maintain with many organizations in the Sudan and the keen interest you show in the developments, mainly negative, there. We are well aware that the demand for your organizations’ assistance is high and that your resources are limited. In spite of we are approaching you to extend to us your helping hand in having this platform achieve its objective. From our part let me state here that about 75 participants will be in a position to finance their trip and will not be in need of assistance from your side except in helping them, if need arises, obtain their entry visas to UK through your missions.

Learn, Build and Share "New Tactics in Human Rights"

2009-06-30T08:51:00.001-07:00

Share and learn new advocacy tactics to denounce human rights abuses and protect human dignity.

Join New Tactics in Human Rights: a community for people committed to Actio on Human Rights
http://www.newtactics.org/en/community

St. Antony's College, Oxford - Conference, Sudan Programme,'Four Years of Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)'

2009-06-28T05:59:00.000-07:00

On 13 June St. Antony’s College hosted a talk on ‘Four years of Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)’. St. Antony’s College has a proud tradition of supporting Sudan and of giving a voice to the Sudanese Diaspora. Dr. Ahmed Al-Shahi, in his opening remarks, spoke of the college’s reputation for educating both Sudanese students and British students headed for Sudan. Participants from all over Sudan and from all Sudan’s major political parties attended. Some had travelled from Sudan to come to the conference. With elections looming in Sudan this appeared to be a critical moment to debate the future of the country.

The first speaker was Sir Derek Plumby, Chairman of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Sir Derek was upbeat and optimistic. He did list some of the problems of the past: the ICC ruling might appear to have weakened the agreement; the drop in global oil prices had come at the expense of South Sudan; and the war in Darfur had drawn funds as well as attention away from CPA implementation. And he urged that all parties move with caution. The Abiyei Protocol was not secure; nor was the demarcation between North and South of Sudan. But ultimately, he assured the audience, the CPA was a success. War between North and South had not re-started and a new era of cooperation had dawned on Sudan. He gave thanks to all those involved in CPA implementation.

When Pagan Amum, Secretary-General of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), came to speak the tone changed. The CPA, he declared, “had been implemented in letter but had been killed in spirit”. He repeated this remark several times in the course of his speech. SPLM1 had a long list of grievances against the National Congress Party: Southerners were not adequately represented in either the government or the civil service; wealth-sharing provisions had not been implemented; and the NCP had continued to arm particular ethnic groups. Even after the signing of the CPA, war had broken out in many parts of Sudan and attempts had been made by the NCP to destabilise and divide the SPLM.

The mood changed once again with the talk of Dr. Sayyid Al-Khateeb. Sudan had two choices: war or sustainable peace. He spelled out the requirements for peace:

Political Will

Empathy

Alliance-Building

Cessation

Execution

He assured the audience that a tremendous effort was being made to uphold all the provisions of the CPA. He was aware that this was a difficult time and that a number of different issues had piled up. It was not humanly possible, he stated, to address all these issues at once but there was no lack of effort nor was there was no lack of good will. He rebutted several of the accusations made by Pagan Amum. Southern member of the audience did not appear to take him seriously. Many of them burst out in laughter.

Lunch was to follow. Participants were eagerly scribbling down notes for the afternoon session. After lunch audience came comments/questions. There were many with much to say.

Yassin Hassan of the Census Commission outlined the commission’s findings and stated that the census had been a success. Later Pagan Amum claimed that the findings were unbelievable. The figures vastly under-estimated the number of Southerners living in the North.

A young South Sudanese woman, Golda Abbe, speaking on behalf of Sudanese youth thanked the speakers for coming to the talk, but demanded of all Sudanese politicians of all parties that they stop playing political games. This was an important moment for Sudan. She said extreme caution was needed. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement had collapsed. History must not be allowed to repeat itself.

Suah Sharif, of the Umma Party, remarked upon the emphasis of both speakers on ‘multi-party’ democracy. Yet no mention had been made of any party but the SPLM or the NCP.

Much was made of the issue of unity. Several Northerners stated that unity was desirable for both North and South but had not been made attractive. A Southerner responded that the North was engaged in a long-standing occupation of the North. Unity could never be made attractive – ‘it was too ugly’.

Much was crammed into the final session of the day. Many points were made from the audience and not all were answered directly from the floor.

One audience member talked about voter education. There had been a lack of effort to build up citizenship skills before the election.

An Irish journalist spoke about the importance of international engagement. This had been essential to creating peace in Ireland. Sir Derek agreed in no uncertain terms. He said that there had been confusion in what the speakers had been saying. Many had assumed that unity demanded international engagement but the issues were separate. International engagement was indeed imperative to successful CPA implementation whether or not the South of Sudan was going to gain independence. At times the meeting was highly charged and Sir Derek was consistently diplomatic. “Finger pointing”, he declared was ‘not productive”.

Pagan Amum talked in depth about the problem of corruption. He referred to the Transparency International report, which listed Sudan as the fifth worst country in Africa. Ending corruption, he argued, was the fundamental challenge to the implementation of the CPA.

Dr. Sayyid Al-Khateeb was clearly very frustrated by the end of the talk. He stated that the opposition to the National Congress Party were making wild accusations and doing nothing to support the claims they had been making.

Bona Malwal, of the St. Antony’s Sudan Programme and SPLM advisor to the Presidency of Sudan, closed the meeting. He stated his opposition to Bashir but also to the ICC ruling against him. The indictment, he argued, represented an unfair demand on those trying to carry forward the CPA. He went on to make the point that while many Southerners are demanding independence from the North and while separation does indeed seems very likely, these was still reason to build a healthy relationship with those from the North. Good relations would seem to be the key to lasting peace.

Israel bombed Sudan

2009-03-29T15:57:00.000-07:00

All of the Grad models of Katushas fired from Gaza at Israel - without exception - were of Chinese manufacture. None were from Iran. All were supplied via Khartoum. Of course think-tank mythology buys into disinformation that the weapons are Iranian.

UK Parliamentary discussion on (lack of) human rights in Sudan

2009-03-15T02:05:00.000-07:00

Why are there still no human rights in Sudan?
An Article by Peter Wiggins

On 28 January Liberation, the left-wing British campaign group, hosted a talk about human rights in Sudan in a committee room of British House of Commons.

Salih Mohmoud, the Darfuri Human Rights Lawyer, was billed as the first speaker but unluckily he was not able to attend. So Ahmed Duraj, Governor of Darfur from 1982 to 1986, read the speech that Mr. Mahmoud had prepared. He focused on development of the legal system of Sudan. Upon independence, Sudan had inherited from the British a Common Law system, which was regarded as being on of the best in Africa. But political manoeuvrings had led to the adoption of Islamic shari’a laws: first in 1982 under General Ja'afar al Nimiery and then again in 1989 under the present Omar al-Bashir administration. Mahmoud argued that no shari’a system could no uphold human rights. And he went on to explain how a climate of complete impunity had taken hold in Sudan. In Darfur 400,000 citizens had been killed and 2.5 million had been displaced. Grave war crimes had been committed. Victims had no form of legal redress. Incidents of mass rape had become commonplace. In order to convict, rape victims had to have four male witnesses or eight female witnesses.

The next speaker was Mohamed Mahmoud, a Sudanese Scholar. He focused on the political situation in Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The CPA had brought peace between the North and the South of the country and the worst restrictions on civic life had been relaxed. But the CPA had helped the Northern government by weakening opposition. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement SPLM, the best-organised opposition to government, was now part of the political power system. The SPLM had not done enough to highlight injustice e.g. in Darfur. The CPA was a mixed blessing. Real progress in Sudan, particularly on the issue of human rights, was yet to come.

Next came the Cooperative Labour Party MP David Drew, chairman of the Associate Parliamentary Group on Sudan (APGS). Mr. Drew described himself as a devotee to the nation of Sudan but he hastened to add that he made no pretence to fully understand the country’s problems. He recognised the immense complexity of the country. Highlighting the importance of the coming year and his commitment to carrying forward the CPA, he urged the audience to pay attention to Sudan. In the global media, the war in Palestine may have overshadowed everything else but in Sudan too blood is spilt. He drew attention to the South’s referendum for separation. If the South did break away, what would be the implications for human rights in Sudan?

Mohamed Suliman, Director of Institute for African Alternative, was the next speaker but he too was unable to attend. Arshaid Fayd-Ahmed, of the Sudanese Communist Party, read out the speech Mr. Suliman would have given. Bashir’s government, he argued, represented an ideological mix of the kind of Neo-Nasserite Arab nationalism and Islam-ism. The Northern government had never ruled on behalf of citizens it did not see as ‘true Arabs’. Meanwhile, Islam was used as a tool of political propaganda. The government was ruling without accountability and it felt able to make truly absurd claims -- such as that there are only 9,000 causalities from the war in Darfur. The government could not be taken seriously. He urged resistance against it from the Sudanese not just in Sudan but from all over the Diaspora.

Audience discussion followed with Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn in the chair. Several South Sudanese voiced their longing to see a separate South Sudan. They claimed that Sudan had never been one country. One speaker drew attention to the human rights situation in South Kordofan where it is clear further war crimes are being committed.
A young Sudanese woman drew attention to the importance of civil society in exposing the lies of the government. A journalist pointed to the irony of the discussion. Elections in Sudan seem to be the first step in the establishment of human rights but they would add to the legitimacy of the ruling National Congress Party, who are complicit in so many crimes.

Author: Peter Wiggins (pwiggins79@yahoo.co.uk)

An Open Letter from Monim Elgak to Salah Gosh: regarding my arrest, torture and the International Criminal Court

2009-01-14T01:53:00.000-08:00

On 12.01.09, writes Monim Elgak, a well-known Sudanese human rights activist:

Dear Friends & Colleagues;

Two weeks after I had begun to recover from my arrest and torture by the Sudanese National security service (NISS) I drafted the attached letter to Salah Gosh, the Head of the NISS in Arabic. The letter was widely published in Arabic language media outlets and on Sudanese websites.

Colleagues in the human rights tribe advised that I should arrange have an English translation of the text and suggested that the letter could be used as an advocacy tool in the current intense environment in Sudan. The letter can also be viewed as an encountering response to yesterday's [11.01.09] statement by Gosh, once again threatening severe repercussions, including on members of the international community, if there are indictments in the upcoming decision by the ICC.

Please find attached a copy of the letter in both English and Arabic. Please feel free to use it as appropriate and send it to your contacts in the media, INGOs and officials concerned with justice, peace and democracy in Sudan.

Salam, Monim

TEXT OF THE LETTER

An Open Letter from Monim Elgak to Salah Goush: regarding my arrest, torture and the International Criminal Court (ICC)

19th December 2008

Subject: regarding my arrest, torture and the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Dear Sir Salah Abdullah (Gosh), Director General of Sudanese Security and Intelligence

I am writing to you a little later than would be expected. The torture and interrogation by your officers at the national security service has left me weak. This is an open letter, addressed to you personally equally as it is addressed to your colleagues, both at the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and your ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP). Although the letter recounts my own personal experience it also echoes I believe the reactions of hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of people who were horrified at my arrest and torture.

I and my colleagues Amir Suleiman and Osman Hummaida were arrested at midday on Monday 24th November 2008 on the basis of the “accusation” that we had been cooperating with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its case on Darfur. It is only now that have I managed to gather some of my energies, as part of a gradual recovery, to take my pen and to write to you while I still feel the wounds and find myself reliving the memories of this incident that may have changed me irrevocably. At the same time, what I suffered with your thugs in the NISS is millions of times less than what millions of my people in South Sudan suffered during the time of your ideological obsession and the fire of war and torture rained upon them. It is also less than what is now being faced by millions of my people in Darfur, that land which you raped forcibly after you lost your direction. What I have suffered is a thousand times less than that endured by the true lovers of this country in your ghost houses during the 90s. What I have suffered is so much less than that this good country has borne, with its good men and women, since your bloody night of darkness on 30th July 1989.

I address this letter to you Mr. Salah Gosh, while I am forced to stay a while outside the reach of your ruling oppressive institutions. Once again, more than a decade later, I am compelled by terror to leave my country. The first time was after the killing by your colleagues of the martyr and defender of student rights, a student of law at that time in Khartoum University, my friend and follower in the leadership of the Medani Students Association, Mohamed Abdelssalam. When Mohamed Abdelssalam was killed your colleague now in the cabinet was the then President of the University of Khartoum, and the instigator of its insane jihad, Professor Al Zubar Bashir Taha. He drafted and signed my certificate of dismissal from the final year, sending your security men to hound me until I was forced to knock on the door of exile!

Mr. Gosh, more than ten years later your security body is still practising torture and killing, and violating rights. There will be no statute of limitations on these crimes: the loss of Mohamed Abdelssalam left sorrow and pain which is still felt. Once again your security body is practising the same with me and trying to push me from my homeland. But you will not succeed. Molana Abil Aleir was insightful in his commentary “Non-stop breaking of covenants”. What agreements do you respect? With my arrest and torture you are loudly declaring that your regime and your ruling party does not intended to change. It is stuck in its cycle of repression, torture and terror—even as you practice cooperation with the United States in the so called ‘war on terror,’ an issue that would benefit from much deeper discussion on another occasion. Your regime, Mr Gosh, is like the cobra in its annual transformation, changing only the outer layers, its skin and its fangs.

You might be surprised, and in your arrogance, questioning where am I going with this discourse? What might be the motivation and interest of my letter? This letter is driven by, and addresses, a range of interests. One of them is to ensure that I, and we, will never forget what happened. You may also consider it as a complaint, to you and against you. In addition the letter is an attempt to inform people in this country about my experience and to make them listen to the sounds of the torture and terror that I suffered at the hands of your thugs, stained with shame and blood. I want them to hear the message that you were trying to send through my body, a message of terror and threat to the real life-blood that maintains the heart of this country, the civil society organisations, the democrats and enlightened forces—although you will not succeed in your intended effect.

When I first thought about addressing you Mr Gosh, I remembered a similar letter written in the early times of your dark period, a letter from the well known and respected Professor Faroug Mohamed Ibrahim, published eighteen years ago. He was complaining of his torture under the supervision of his colleague at the university at that time, Mr Nafie Ali Nafie, the one in whose chair you now sit at the NISS and who is now an assistant to the President. Do you not find it strange Mr Gosh that two persons find themselves drafting almost the same letter in substance, with a span of almost 18 years between the incidents? There is complete stagnation in the river of your regime Mr Gosh despite the many agreements promising movement. It is as a fetid lake with a permanent odour changing only the colour of its algae bloom. I am drafting this open letter, therefore, in an attempt to oxygenate this water in which for two decades, skulking at its rotten sedges, you have conducted your conspiracy, torture and killing.

My writing to you is to air publically some of the issues you raised in your interrogation of me, in addition to some analysis of your torture practices. It is not only on my own behalf that I should break the silence as these issues concern thousands. It is also a unique opportunity to express my unlimited appreciation thanks and love to my close and extended family, to my friends, colleagues, and hundreds of others I have not yet had the honour of knowing in person, and tens of others with whom I had lost communication for years, in addition to institutions, organisations, political parties and individuals from my country and all over the world. While your officers were intent on violating my dignity, my body and my privacy these people were crying out in solidarity with Osman, Amir and I, expressing our pain, and drafting documents urging our release, in a confirmation of the existence of true humanity. Even after leaving your den of torture these people continued their care, salving my body, providing protection and balsam for my spirit. They of course are not waiting for thanks from me but do you not agree that these honourable people deserve a letter acknowledging their generous humanity in as much as this one which counterpoints your animalism? A letter that soothes their pure hearts and consciousness against all things that violate dignity, justice and law?

Your security agents, Sir, Director General of the Security, just as they violated my dignity and my body, have also continuously violated justice and the rule of law since your coming to power 1989. I have drafted this letter therefore to address the public on some of the implications of my arrest and torture. It is both a right and a duty of mine. Permit me then in what remains of this letter to reflect on some observations and lessons made and learned in your den of torture, in addition to some of the issues which were raised by your officials during my interrogation, and which may be of interest to the public.

I will first reflect on some of the circumstances surrounding my arrest and torture.

Let me begin, Mister Director of the Security and Intelligence Apparatus, with an educational comparison between the practices of your agents in arresting and torturing me, and the practices of the ICC, the institution which was consistently mentioned with opprobrium during my interrogation. The Statute of the ICC sets out in article 55 the rights of those questioned by the ICC:

“In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person (a) shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt; and (b) shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.

It goes without saying that what your agents did to me violated to the letter each provision of this article. But I hope that this exposition on the Statute has given confidence to the members of your ruling regime—those accused and potential accused persons—that any engagement they have with the ICC will ensure the protection of their personal and physical dignity and the inviolability of their bodies. They will never be exposed to what I have.

In this context therefore to what do you refer when you speak of the ICC as posing “a threat to Sudanese sovereignty and dignity”? Did you see pictures of my torture? The officer in charge of my interrogation ironically questioned how I had managed to get blood on my face, legs, shirt and left hand, asserting that it was likely due to my getting drunk and quarrelling with other drunks. With what sovereignty and dignity were your security officials concerned when that same officer gave orders to the four men in that small room in the third floor, pointing to where precisely on my body they should direct their blows, and with what instrument, spilling water on my head, kicking my face with his shoe and pointing his cigarette at my eye, saying he would blind me. In attempting to terrorise me about the work of the ICC this officer of yours confirmed that you had reached the very bottom of degradation, when he tried to threaten me by ordering his soldiers to rape me. The response came in the coarsest of language, however, that I was a “fag” already and would only enjoy it. So by God, can I be exaggerating if I say that you and your regime have eroded your own dignity in your attempt to compel me to incriminate myself which respect to illusory crimes which do not exist but in the imagination of your confused and analysis-weak “intelligence” service.

Mister Director General of the Security Apparatus let me now move to two observations the implications of which I regard as more important that the particular circumstances of my detention, of which I had only rumours before I visited your den of iniquity. The first is that your security agents appear to suffer from a dangerous form of schizophrenia: the officer who intensively beat me was able to turn in a moment into a solicitous bearer of water, enquiring whether I felt comfortable in my seat, apologising and saying that he regretted his behaviour. I fail to understand the meaning of “maalish”, in this context, and in that place. Further, do you know that another of your men sent me his regards and his apologies to me through my other colleagues who were detained, asserting that he intended to visit with me and my family later on to ensure that I had recovered. With what kind of insanity and unbalanced behaviour have you riven this ruined country?

My second observation and one I wish earnestly would be corrected, Sir Lieutenant General Salah Abdullah Gosh, is that ethnicity and racism are clearly the reference points for the constitution and operation of your intelligence and security apparatus. I remember during the attack on Omdurman in late May 10th, when I was working as one of the founders of the civil society National Committee for the Protection and the Defence of the Affected People of 10th May that your incensed security personnel were hunting down all who appeared to be of Darfurian appearance. I was horrified by the torture scars of many of those who were subsequently detained (including of women and children) and, as I recall them now, know that they are much greater than mine, the protected Arab Northerner. This is despite the fact that I believe that the director and supervisor of our torture in both cases was the same, and the charges similar: “attacking the State’s capital” in the first and “providing information against the State’s sovereignty” in mine—and with respect to a common territory – Darfur! Is Darfur the locus of such fear for you?

There were seven individuals who participated in arresting, interrogating and torturing me, two of whom clearly gave the orders and provided the supervision of the others. There were the ‘white-collar’ officers, as we define them in social science and both were of Arab Northern appearance. The rest of the group, to whom was delegated the sweaty work of beating, torture and terrorizing, carried the characteristics of those from what you would term the “African” or non Northern parts of Sudan. Pardon me Mister Lieutenant General Director of the Security Apparatus, but cultural analysis and observation is my specialization in Anthropology—and incidentally a point of amusement for your agents during my interrogation—hence my more detailed focus on this point which could be the theme for an interesting research on “The ‘Racialisation of the Politics of Torture in Sudan”!

I now wish to turn to the issue which was at the core of my interrogation: the ICC and the case of Darfur.

Thank you, Mister Lieutenant General Salah Abdullah Gosh, for your patience in reading this long letter. I do believe that the details it includes are important, not just for your attention, but for others to hear, especially matters which would not have come to light if I and my colleagues Amir Suleiman and Osman Hummaida had not been arrested, interrogated and tortured. I will not address the details of my interrogation and the “allegations” about my relationship to the ICC, my alleged cooperation in providing information and documents, and the threats under torture to disclose this “information”. I will not dignify these illusory scenarios, and the charges of treason, espionage and disloyalty with which your soldiers threatened and insulted me, with further exposition. Suffice to say that your interrogation techniques were irrelevant to both the subject and object of your perceived “traitor”. Let me simply characterise the interrogation process as unskilled, the questions as prosaic and empty, questions which, while having the capacity to wound, only revealed a scandalous ignorance of the reality of the Court, its processes and the situation of Darfur. Ironically one of the officers seemed to view himself as a true intellectual. Let me give you an example of the sophistication of his analysis: “What is happening in Darfur is part of the Zionist conspiracy against us” he said. “The ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ assert that.” Hundreds of thousands of victims and thousands of raped women in our territory, and the Zionists and the foreign conspirators are the guilty ones! Others of your men were also sure they had unshakeable proof of my treachery when they found three hundred dollars in my wallet! I wonder how many millions of oil rich dollars you have Mr Gosh and why these dollars are not considered evidence of your own betrayal of our country.

It is clear to me now that without doubt the ICC terrifies your regime very much, Mr Lieutenant General. You are confused as to whether to pursue a strategy of cooperation or confrontation. While you prevaricate I shall use the opportunity Mr Gosh to raise awareness about human rights, international humanitarian law and the work of ICC. Human rights advocate will continue to be my profession, as before, during and now after my interrogation and torture. In this regard I would like to thank you for you help in this mission: as a result of your treatment of me many more people will read this letter. As you know I have written frequently about this Court, human rights, and about Darfur, but the majority of these writings could not find the light as a result of your war on freedom of expression and exertions of your petty censorship officials.

Mr Gosh, I am puzzled by the chaotic approach of your regime to the simple issue of justice, a bewilderment only deepened by my arrest. You should be the first to understand that justice and accountability are essential factors for the revitalization of Darfur and that the policy of searching for pretexts to buy time will only bring failure. Since 2004, the centrality of accountability was clear to you in the National Congress Party. You sent a national fact-finding commission to Darfur, formed special courts, and appointed public prosecutors for Darfur. Your efforts were not genuine but it was not possible to blind everyone to your intent. Your government, for example, did not deny that crimes took place in Darfur but determined the number of dead in a manner which was not only factually incorrect but lacked basic human and political sensitivity. Your colleagues, including the Head of the State, confessed that there were “only” 10,000 victims in Darfur. Do you know that the war crimes trials which took place in the former Yugoslavia were conducted on the basis of a lesser number of bodies? Such insensitive logic cannot fathom the concepts of war crime victims, crimes against humanity, International humanitarian law and Human Rights law!

Your confusion is manifest elsewhere: you cooperated with the United Nations Commission on Enquiry in 2004 and were quietly happy with its findings which you interpreted as determining you innocent of genocide. At the same time you were confused with how to respond to Resolution 1593 (the referral of the situation in the Darfur to the ICC) subsequently cooperating in the initial period, meeting its staff and submitting documents, even permitting the interrogation of some of your officials. In fact Mr. Gosh, the cooperation of your regime with the process of international justice is much greater than that with which you “accused” us three innocent citizens, and on which basis you subjected us to terror, and through us, the terrorization of millions. Your government was until lately a signatory to the Statute of the ICC since September 2000 and to bilateral agreements concluded under its provisions. You also participated as observers at the ICC Assembly of State Parties until last year.

Mister General Director of the Intelligence and Security Apparatus, the position of Sudan vis a vis the ICC must be consistent, as the Statute of the Court consists of principles, systems and mechanisms that humanity has developed for its own progress in order to prevent and punish the most atrocious crimes, and in which task consistency is a vital principle. Based on my belief and chosen profession, I have steadfastly advocated for and spread awareness about the principles of this mechanism of international justice. I reveal no secrets when I mention that since 2004 I have been advocating for the referral of the Darfur case to the ICC as opposed to the activation of the Genocide Convention or the mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. Mister Lieutenant General Director of the Security and Intelligence Apparatus, if your tactic now is to confront, arrest, torture and assassinate everyone who cooperates with the ICC, then logic and consistency dictate that you should begin inside your own home and those of the members of your dominant regime, rather than confronting innocent individuals like ourselves. I would not, however, advise this confrontation as you are likely to be on the losing side.

Mr Gosh, I have not failed to hear the message you have been trying to send through arresting and torturing me and my colleagues. But you know better than I that these messages will not have the intended effect. Your intensified harassment of journalists and war of freedom of expression through the censorship, arrest and interrogation of independent writers, have not worked. These actions have produced only isolation and critique as they make testament to the lack of seriousness of your regime’s commitment to democratic transition and transparency in this country. I think you know, Mister Lieutenant General, to what extent the commitment of your regime and party to protection of freedom of expression is an important criterion in measuring your credibility with respect to expressed commitments to tackling other obligations such as building peace and justice in Darfur.

This brings me to a second message which you wanted to send through our arrests, this time to members of Sudanese civil society and the human rights movement. I am sorry to say that this effort will also fail. The timing of your current attack on three well known human rights defenders (both nationally and internationally) was an attempt to exploit the ICC as a pretext to found a new wave of harassment of civil society, an opportunity to fissure elements within the independent human rights movement. The history of the Sudanese human rights movement is well known to you as it has paralleled your own ascendancy from the battle for civil and political rights, to the dark time of the ghost houses, the efforts to promote women’s rights and crack the walls of racism, to our struggle to unveil the massive violations of human rights in Darfur.

Our arrest and torture also sends another message: your desire to impose your unconstitutional law, a law inconsistent with the web of international conventions to which your regime has committed itself. If you neither fear God nor respect the people of this country, you must at least fear for your survival in the face of these obligations. Resisting will be your doom.

Mr Gosh, I would like to offer some advice, and indeed not only to you but to the Sudanese society and international community and all those concerned with the issue of peace, justice and democracy in Sudan. I think that I am now in a position to offer advice after you raised my profile, a profile which I had always intended to keep low as I prefer to work quietly. My advice does not differ from that from your partners in Government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which is to positively cooperate with the ICC, to engage legally with the Court and its Statute on its own terms. I also urge that you generate the genuine political will to implement the following package of measures and commitments:

- achieve a fair political solution that responds practically to the demands of the Darfur people, with clear international and regional participation in the guarantee of its implementation;
- reverse the slow suffocation of the spirit of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through the full and active implementation of its provisions;
- amend the legislation essential for the democratisation process, particularly the laws regulating the security services and the media in order also to ensure conformity with the Interim National Constitution and international conventions;
- ratify and domesticate the relevant international conventions on human rights;
- guarantee free and fair national elections, safe from any trace of conspiracy, elections with which ensure equal and full geographic representation to all parts of the country, including Darfur;
- strive unceasingly to make unity an attractive option for the people of Southern Sudan, making the issue of development in the South a national priority and firmly shutting the door on the war option, in particular calling a halt to your efforts to destabilise and exacerbate internal tensions;
- revive the suggestion of the SPLM at the Naivasha talks—a suggestion that you had strongly rejected at the time—to begin a comprehensive national process of transitional justice, benefiting from international experience and paying attention to the differences in the Sudanese contexts, in particular the diverse nature of the violations and grievances suffered respectively in the West, South, East, far North and at the Centre, ensuring that this process does not become a pretext for amnesties or the consolidation of impunity, and aiming at the goal of reparation and healing for ongoing historical injustices, especially that of the rampant social and institutional racism that is crippling our national body.

Mister Lieutenant General, this is a package of advice that must be taken as a whole – as we say in the human rights literature: indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.

Finally, in conclusion Lieutenant General Gosh, the day after I was tortured I talked to the BBC. At that time I was unable to move without extreme pain as a result of your torture. The presenter asked me, and it was live, if I would make a formal complaint against the NISS for my loss. My answer was simple: a summary of the package of changes needed in Sudan, the advice I have just offered you, and in the heart of which, you must understand, is implied my right of redress. What might be your answer?

Monim Elgak

Sudan 'could face new Darfur war'

2008-10-26T11:24:00.000-07:00

Peace in Darfur is still far from being achieved; an upsurge in fighting having recently displaced thousands of civilians. Yet another conflict is brewing, this time in the region of South Kordofan. The situation in the state is volatile, with tensions between the different ethnic groups rising. It is critical that the situation is diffused before elections in 2009. Otherwise circumstances could spiral violently out of control.

Rebels Condemned to Death Penalty

2008-08-21T06:06:00.000-07:00

Alleged Darfur rebels have been condemned to death by a Sudanese court, over attacks carried out on Khartoum on the 10th of May. The special court, found the rebels guilty under the criminal and counter-terror law. However, the court has come under immense criticism from Amnesty International, who claim that the court is holding hundrds of people without charge.

Amnestey internation have called the courts a "travesty of justice" with claims that many of those held were tortured and forced to confess. Defence lawyers also argued that their clients legal rights were violated and the UN has called for Khartoum to abolish capital punishment.

International Crisis Group Statement on the ICC call for Sudan's President Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant

2008-07-18T03:09:00.000-07:00

New ICC Prosecution: Opportunities and Risks for Peace in Sudan

Brussels, 14 July 2008: Today’s application by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a warrant of arrest for Sudanese President Omar Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur creates both big opportunities and big risks for peace in Sudan.
These are the first charges of genocide and the first charges against a head of state to be brought before the ICC. The judges will now have to weigh the Prosecutor’s evidence and decide – a process that could take some months – whether to issue the arrest warrant.
In seeking this warrant, the Prosecutor is acting within his mandate under the Rome Statute and from the UN Security Council, which in 2005 referred crimes committed in Darfur to him for investigation and prosecution. That mandate has been consistently frustrated by the Sudanese government – not least in its refusal to hand over the government minister, Ahmad Harun, and Janjaweed commander, Ali Kushayb, against whom warrants were issued in April 2007 – and it is important for the Prosecutor to protect the credibility of the Court by pursuing further prosecutions.
It may also prove to be the case that in initiating this process the Prosecutor will be advancing the interests of peace. That is not his official role – which is rather to act, in the interests of justice, to end impunity for those believed guilty of atrocity crimes. But it may be that the increased pressure now placed on the NCP governing regime will lead it to take long overdue steps to cease all violence, implement genuine and credible measures to resolve the Darfur crisis – including allowing the full and effective deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping force – and fully carry out its side of the bargain to implement the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
The problem for international policymakers is that the Prosecutor’s legal strategy also poses major risks for the fragile peace and security environment in Sudan, with a real chance of greatly increasing the suffering of very large numbers of its people. Hard-liners on all sides may be reinforced, with the governing regime and other actors reacting to today’s application, and any subsequent warrant, in ways that seriously undermine the fragile North-South peace process, bring an end to any chance of political negotiations in Darfur, make impossible the effective deployment of UNAMID, put at risk the humanitarian relief operations presently keeping alive over 2 million people in Darfur, and lead to inflammation of wider regional tensions. These are significant risks, particularly given that the likelihood of actually executing any warrant issued against Bashir is remote, at least in the short term.
The best way through this dilemma may be for the UN Security Council to take advantage of the likely two to three month window before the judges’ decision on the arrest warrant, to assess whether genuine and substantial progress is in fact being made in stopping the continuing violence for which the governing regime bears responsibility, engaging in genuine peace negotiations in Darfur, expediting UNAMID deployment and advancing the CPA. If it believes such progress is being made, and that the interests of peace justify this course being taken, the Security Council could – even if the Prosecutor and the ICC wanted to proceed – exercise its power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend any prosecutions, for an initial twelve months but with such suspension able to be renewed indefinitely.
Such a decision would have to be made in light of the regime’s history of repeatedly flouting agreements it has entered into. But the need for any Article 16 deferral to be renewed on an annual basis would provide an incentive, hitherto lacking, for the regime to abide by commitments made under threat of ICC prosecution.
This is not the time to be relieving pressure on the Bashir regime – or the rebel groups who are making their own major contribution to conflict in Darfur. But the most critical of all needs is to end the horrific suffering of the Sudanese people and to ensure there is no new explosion of mass violence.
Crisis Group President Gareth Evans said that the international community now faced a hard policy choice in balancing risk and opportunity: “The Sudanese governing regime has until now utterly failed in its responsibility to protect its own people. The judgement call the Security Council now has to make is whether Khartoum can be most effectively pressured to stop the violence and build a new Sudan by simply letting the Court process proceed, or – after assessing the regime’s initial response, and continuing to monitor it thereafter – by suspending that process in the larger interests of peace”.

Statement by Sudanese Women Rights Groups on the Arrest of, Zobida and Zahra Hagar and the Infant, Hashim Abdel-Shakur

2008-06-27T04:39:00.000-07:00

Statement by Sudanese Women Rights Groups on the Arrest of, Zobida and Zahra Hagar and the Infant, Hashim Abdel-Shakur

Monday June 23, 2008

We, the undersigned from women civil society organization, have grave concerns for the welfare of Zubaida Hagar Sandal, her 9-month-old baby son, Hashim Abdel-Shakur and her sister Zahara Hagar. The two women and the baby were arrested on June 8, 2008, from their house in Khartoum by National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) officers.
Our solidarity with Zubaida, her son and her sister comes from our concern for their safety and being held at unknown location, which is regarded as an enforced disappearance. We are opposed to their continued detention, which is illegal and is against all Sudanese traditions. In addition, we have serious concerns for their well-being as for other female detainees. This is especially alarming in light of recent campaign of arrests in the capital following May 10 events, which has taken place in house-to-house searches, public transport and the streets, targeting individuals from Darfur who are residents in Khartoum.
We recall that Zubaida was in contact with the Committee for the Defense of Individuals Affected by the May 10 events. Zubaida’s husband, Abdel-Shakur Hashim was arrested from his office in Omdurman in May 14, 2008. After her husband’s arrest and subsequent disappearance Zubaida had issued a press release on behalf of the family outlining their concerns for his safety and calling for his release. When she, her baby son and he sister were taken from their house the NISS took them in the pretext that her husband wanted to see their son. Since then no one has heard anything about their whereabouts.
As women groups we are here emphasizing our commitment and support to Zubaida, her son and her sister Zahra and all the women detained following May 0 events. We also condemn the violence inflicted on thousands of Sudanese women and children from Darfur who have suffered from displacement, rape and other forms of sexual violence as a result of the current conflict. For these reasons we campaign for Zubaida and her sisters from Darfur to be protected, to have access to justice and to be compensated for their suffering.
We are reminding the Sudanese Judicial system and law enforcement authorities of their commitment to Sudan’s constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, African Women Protocol, CEDAW and CRC. We call on the authorities immediately release Zubaida, Zahara and all the women who are detained in secret detention centers and/ or to allow them to contact their legal representatives and families and to not separate Zubaida from her son. Furthermore, we call on the authorities not to mistreat or torture Zubaida, her baby son and her sister whilst in detention.
We are calling on all women organizations and organizations which work on women’s rights to work with support this statement and to work with national and international organizations to provide support and press the authorities on behalf of Zubaida and others affected by May 10 events.

Signatories:

1) Hala Alkarib & Monim Eljak: SIHA Network
2) Zahara A. Naiem & Khalil Tukras: Women Development organization, Alfasher North Darfur
3) Karak Myok : DIAR –Rumbek, South Sudan
4) Dolly Oding: Women Development Organization, Juba
5) Asha Elkarib: Sudanese Organization for Research and Development ( SORD)
6) Limya Aljayle: Women in the Media Association, Khartoum
7) Mahasin Alabass: Babkir Badri Scientific Association for Women, Khartoum
8) Neamat Kuku: Khartoum Gender Center, Khartoum
9) Zeniab Badr Eldin : Almoalem Before All ( Alam), Khartoum
10) Faisal Albager :Journalists for Human Rights ( JHR)
11) Rashida Al Ansary and Jane Alaw: Al Amel Center for Rehabilitation Victims of Violance, Nayala, South Darfur
12) Linda Ferdinand : WOTAP Women Network, WAU, South Sudan
13) Fahima Hashim and Tarig Mustafa :Salmmah Center for Women Training, Khartoum
14) Madina Dosa: Madina Center for Gender & Development –Nayala, South Darfur
15) Zeinab Alsawe: Women Empowerment Initiative for Peace -SWEP
16) Ahalam Naser : Sudan Center for Trade Unions Rights, Khartoum
17) Madiha Abdulla &Sabah Adam : Alag Media Center
18) Samia Alhashimi : Mutawenat, Khartoum
19) Mahasen Abdelgadir: Darfur Lawyers Association

APPEALS TO:
Mr Abdel Basit Sabderat
Minister of Justice
Federal Ministry of Justice, PO Box 302, Khartoum, Sudan
Fax: +249 183 770883
Salutation: Dear Minister
Mr Ibrahim Mohamed Hamed
Federal Ministry of the Interior
PO Box 2793, Khartoum, Sudan
Fax: +249 1 8377 6554
Salutation: Dear Minister
COPIES TO:
Dr Abdel Moneim Osman Taha
Rapporteur, Advisory Council for Human Rights, Khartoum, Sudan
Fax: +249 183 77 08 83
Mr Babiker Abdulatif
Head of the General Prosecution Attorney Bureau for Khartoum State
Fax: +249 183 770883
Dr Priscilla Joseph
Chair of the Human Rights Committee, National Assembly, Omdurman, Sudan
Fax: +249 187 560 950

Chad official accuses Sudan army of helping rebels

2008-06-18T08:38:00.000-07:00

The strategy of Sudanese government to destabilase Chad again on display?

Mahamat Hissene, Chad's communications minister, alleged that Sudanese troops backed by two army helicopters on Tuesday helped the rebels attack the post in Bakout, about 470 miles east of the capital, N'Djamena.

Britain to host Darfur talks

2008-04-21T04:52:00.000-07:00

Khadiga Hussein and General Lagu are concerned we should take part in the new Brown sponsored conference. Maybe it's a good idea. Details here:

BRITAIN PROPOSES TO HOST DARFUR TALKS

Chad and the Darfuri Refugees: a complex scenario

2008-02-13T00:21:00.000-08:00

Will Chad uphold its international legal obligations not to expel the rising numbers of Darfuri refugees crossing the border into Chad, whilst internal conflict between armed rebels and presidential troops threatens its very stability?

Sudan has accused Chad of using refugees from Darfur as bargaining chips in the growing dispute between the two countries.

In an effort to stabilise its border with Darfur, Chad's President Idriss Deby has appealed to the European Union to deploy a military force (EUFOR) along the border: the force of almost 4,000 troops expects to be operational by the end of the month.

It has a UN mandate to protect civilians and refugees from violence in the Darfur region of Sudan, and to provide security for humanitarian agencies.

An opposition leader from Chad interviewed this morning on the BBC World News said that while they do not oppose the presence of the EU force on the ground, they would opt for an internal diplomatic solution first centred on dialogue, a mediation which the opposition is allegedly keen and able to offer.

Further articles can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7241390.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7239287.stm

Arab journalists trip to Chad

2008-01-14T15:53:00.000-08:00

This was sent in by both Jane and Justin:

The Save Darfur Coalition is organizing a trip to Chad for a group of Arab journalists (not necessarily based in the UK). All expenses will be covered. A friend of mine is helping to gather these journalists and I was wondering if there was anyone in this group that would be interested in going? Or perhaps you know of someone that might be? If so, could you drop me a line to emanebed@gmail.com asap and I will put you in direct contact with my friend.

Avoid escalation between Chad and Sudan

2008-01-03T16:16:00.000-08:00

Poor Sudan - poor Chad. What a bloody mess.

Saudi Press Agency - 03 January, 2008
GCC secretary general Abdulrahman al-Atiyyah has warned against escalation of tension between Sudan and Chad, and said such a development will have an adverse impact on the regional security.

In a statement, al-Atiyyah called for reaching a political settlement for the dispute between the two fraternal countries.'We in the GCC do feel anxious about these developments, and we would like to urge the two parties to practice self-restraint and to avoid escalation of tension across their joint borders', he added.

The SPLM

2007-12-14T15:52:00.000-08:00

Came across this site. It is the official website of the SPLM. Interesting:

CLICK HERE FOR THE SPLM SITE

That pathetic schoolteacher

2007-11-30T17:11:00.000-08:00

Even Britain's more militant Islamic groups deplore what is happening in Sudan:

TO VIEW PRESS RELEASE CLICK HERE